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CHAPTER ONE

I -Introduction
The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in international relations has long been a
subject of controversy. In the wake of recent humanitarian crises and varying international
responses to such situations, the debate surrounding humanitarian intervention has experienced a
revival with important implications for the principle and its practice.
The concept of intervention for humanitarian reasons has long been a controversial matter
in international law and relations. The traditional concept of humanitarian intervention coupled
with the use of armed force can be traced back to ancient times, but the opinions of scholars,
politicians, diplomats, legal literature and state practice still disagree on its existence and
application. 1 On the one hand, some say that intervention for humanitarian reasons cannot be
legal, justifiable or permissible. On the other hand, there is growing international concern for the
protection of human rights and the right to intervene towards these ends; and for some, there is
an obligation to intervene when violations of human rights reach a point that shocks the
conscience of mankind. 2 The debate continues. Thus, it is important to re-examine the evolution
of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in international law and relations, and also its
existence in history and contemporary practice of states. This is particularly pertinent since
recent events relating to internal armed conflicts and their scale of human sufferings resulting
from these conflicts have highlighted collective efforts to address the many crises that have
1
2

See, Francis Kofi Abiew, "The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention", p. 11 .
Ibid; 2

1

arisen. While sovereignty is still important in international relations, humanitarian imperatives
have led to more interventions in matters that are considered essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of states. It is in this context that the principle of humanitarian intervention has
experienced a revival with ramifications to the extent to which it has been, or is, accepted in
practice in the international community.
Before remarking upon the extent to which the principle of humanitarian intervention has
been accepted by the international community, some preliminary considerations need to be
addressed. In that regard, a brief general theoretically relevant discussion about how principles
gain acceptance, or about indicators for the acceptance of principles in international relations,
and about how they come to be rooted would be appropriate.
An important question that often arises in international relations is whether there are any

universal behavior standards applicable to states, and whether those standards can be regarded as
__:universal, given the different cultural traditions represented in the international system. If those
standards exist, some would argue that they do not matter since the most obvious rule of state
behavior is grounded in self-interest. It is argued, however, that there are certain minimum
standards which states follow that can be regarded as universal, and that these standards matter in
the assessment of state behavior.
Jones argues "the code that .... states have developed is not a rigid set of rules derived
from static principles. " 3 It is a set of guidelines that is designed towards the achievement of
peace and security, although how that goal is attained is not specific. In that connection, "it is

The discussion that follows draws from Jones, Code of Peace: Ethics and Security in the World of the Warlord
States (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991) at xi.

J
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flexible and it is, and has been, responsive to changing conditions and concepts.'.4 These
principles underlie relations between states, or as Jones puts it, "that states think ought to
underlie" their relations. These standards have been derived from a whole range of interactions
among states over the centuries, drawing on law, philosophy, and religious and social concerns.
These principles have come to be embodied in numerous treaties, conventions, declarations,
diplomatic protocols, resolutions and other international instruments that states reconsider and
reaffirm from time to time.
Specifically regarding the principle of humanitarian intervention, this study attempts to
follow closely these international instruments and what states have done and said in order to
ascertain the extent of its acceptance in international relations. Even though the indicator or
benchmark for acceptance of the principle is a gray area which lies along a continuum, certain
characteristics tend to be evident. Its use by states, scholarly writings on the subject and its
enshrinement in international institutions are but some of the characteristics that assist in
knowing how the principle is or becomes accepted.
Another way of conceptualizing how principles get articulated and come to be entrenched
in international relations is through the concept of epistemic communities. 8 The epistemic
community approach focuses on the process through which consensus is reached within a given
domain of expertise and through which consensual knowledge is diffused and carried forward by

4

1bid. There are nine fundamental principles in the international system on which this code relies. These are: ( 1)
Sovereign equality of states (2) Territorial integrity and political independence of states (3) Equal rights and selfdetennination of peoples (4) Non-intervention in internal affairs of states (5) Peaceful settlement of disputes
between states (6) Abstention from the threat or use of force (7) Fulfillment in good faith of international obligations
(8) Cooperation with other states, and (9) Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms .
8
The epistemic community concept presents a research program with which students of world politics can
empirically study the role of ideas in international relations. See Adler and Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic
Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program" (1992) 46 International
Organization 367.

3

other actors. Its fundamental concern is the political influence that an epistemic community can
have on collective policymaking. Haas argues that this approach may bring about "new patterns
of reasoning to decision makers, encouraging them to pursue new paths of policymaking, which
may in turn lead to unpredicted or unpredictable outcomes. 9

An epistemic community is primarily a "network of professionals with recognized
experience and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area." 10 Epistemic communities have: (1) a shared set of
normative and principled beliefs, providing values-based rationale for the social action of
community members; (2) shared casual beliefs deriving from their analysis of practices leading
to a set of problems in their field which then serve as the basis for explaining the multiple
linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validitythat is intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the
flcld of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise that is a set of common practices
relating to a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out
of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a result. 11 An epistemic community
may either be national where their activities are directed towards one country, or emerge as

9

Hass, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination" (1992) 46 International
Organization 1 at 21.
10
Haas notes that the term "epistemic communities" has been defined or employed in diverse ways. It is used
particularly in reference to scientific communities. However, epistemic communities need not be made up of natural
scientists or professionals applying the same methodology that natural scientists do. An epistemic community may
consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds. According to Haas, members of an epistemic
community may also "share intersubjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of
reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared values, shared casual beliefs, and the use of discursive practices;
and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge". These are additional notions
associated with epistemic communities which normally distinguish them from other groups involved in policy
coordination. See, ibid; at 3 and accompanying footnotes.
II Ibid.

4

transnational 12 over time, as a result of the diffusion of the community ideas through
conferences, journals, research collaboration and various informal communications and
contracts. 13 A transnational community's ideas may have their source in an international
organization or in various state agencies. These ideas are then diffused to other states through the
decision makers who have been influenced by the ideas. 14
Fundamentally, the episternic community approach plays an important role in
"articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their
interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying
salient points of negotiation." 15 Members of the episternic community play both direct and
indirect roles in policy coordination. They spread ideas and influence the position adopted by a
wide range of actors. These actors might include domestic and international bodies as well as
government bureaucrats and decision makers, legislative and corporate bodies, and the general

preferences if it can simultaneously influence several governments through its transnational
membership. 17 Episternic communities with a transnational membership can influence national
interests through identifying important issues and their implications from which policyrnakers
may then deduce their interests. 18 Policyrnakers in one state may, in turn, influence the interests
and behavior of other states resulting in the likelihood of convergent state behavior and
international policy coordination, informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the
12

Collaboration in the absence of material interests binding together actors in different countries with common
policy agendas suggests the existence of an epistemic community with transnational membership. Ibid; at 17.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid; at 2.
16
Supra, note 3 at 379.
17
Ibid.
18
Supra, note 4 at 4.
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epistemic community. In the same vein, the epistemic community may contribute to the creation
and maintenance of social institutions that guide international behavior. 19 Haas notes that:
"by focusing on the various ways in which new ideas and information are diffused and
taken into account by decision makers, the epistemic communities approach suggests a
nonsystematic origin for state interests and identifies a dynamic for persistent cooperation
independent of the distribution of international power. "20
This approach thus supplements structural theories of international behavior. In response to new
knowledge expounded by epistemic communities, a state may choose to pursue entirely new
objectives, in which case outcomes may be shaped by the distribution of information as well as
by the distribution of power capabilities. 21
The essential characteristic of epistemic communities is that members are respected
within their own disciplines and have the ability to extend their direct and indirect influence
eventually to major actors in the policy coordination rocess. 22 The timin of events is im ortant
in this regard. Crises and new developments in the international arena not only accelerate the
diffusion process but also lend a sense of urgency to the task of re-evaluating current policies
from which alternative results emerge? 3 In essence, some scholars of international relations have
argued that control over knowledge and information is a significant dimension of power. Thus,
the diffusion of new ideas and information can result in new patterns of behavior and prove to be
an important determinant of international policy coordination. 24
Thus, epistemic communities as an analytic approach to some particular issues in
19

20
21
22
23

24

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Supra, note 3 at 380.
Ibid.
Supra, note 4 at 2-3.
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international relations, it would seem, can be usefully employed in an attempt to consolidate
support or cooperation regarding intervention to protect human rights in the international
system. 25
The dilemma posed by intervention for human rights purposes rests on competing claims
of state sovereignty and humanitarian assistance. However, recent events are leading to a reexamination or reassessment of normative assumptions concerning human rights, state
sovereignty and non-intervention, particularly in situations of widespread violations of human
rights caused by governmental acts or internal conflicts. Most of the recent cases of humanitarian
intervention seem to point to the emergence of a realignment regarding the basic notion of the
inviolability of state sovereignty. The cases of intervention in Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda,
Liberia, Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor have provided grounds for reconsideration of the doctrine
and practice of humanitarian intervention.

25

The study of international relations as a discipline has come under criticism lately for lacking a credible theory
and set of explanations for the sources of international institutions, state interests and state behavior under conditions
of uncertainty. In this regard, a prominent international relations theorist, Robert Keohane called for a "reflective"
approach in the absence of "a research program that in particular studies that it can illuminate important issues in
world politics". See, Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory
(Boulder: west view Press, 1989) at 173. The epistemic communities approach thus amounts to a reflective response
to the challenge posed by Keohane.

7

Most of the literature on humanitarian intervention argues for the primacy of state
sovereignty over human rights or vice versa. Other scholars have called for a delicate balance
between state sovereignty and human rights. Whereas these approaches to the dilemma presented
are commendable, this study argues that state sovereignty need not be interpreted as
incompatible or inconsistent with concern for human rights protection. Sovereignty has always
been limited by human rights concerns. This constraint is itself an attribute of sovereignty. In
other words, the argument presented is that sovereignty cannot and should not be a justification
for preventing humanitarian intervention. The responsibilities that states have in relation to their
citizens should be recognized as part of their sovereignty, and thus permitting intervention to
redress those rights where violated. The effect of adopting such an interpretation is one of
restoring state sovereignty as a main principle of the international system while, at the same
time, restoring notions of responsibility to state sovereignty.
In chapter 7 of this study, I will attem t to criticall

teachings

on

the

question

of

examine Islamic and Christian
humanitarian

intervention.

Islam is one of the most widely practiced religions in the world and it has played important roles
in the international community. A doctrinal Islamic and Christian concept on this subject may be
identified.
The question for Muslims especially since the Gulf War is whether, in case of government
abuse of authority by committing mass violations of basic human rights of their citizens, other
governments could intervene militarily to remedy the situation. The questions also become urgent
and highly contentious ones in the 1990s for Muslims as humanitarian crises have spread
internationally. Muslims have been aggressors and have suffered as victims in some situations. In
some cases, Muslims have persecuted Christians, in others Christians have persecuted Muslims
8

(Bosnia), and Muslims have persecuted Muslims (Iran-Iraq). In all these situations, calls for
armed intervention have been made. Where there has been collective military intervention on
humanitarian grounds, associated with UN Security Council resolutions as in Iraq, Bosnia,
Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor, the governments of Muslim countries have
almost always voted for these resolutions and provided troops as part of an international coalition.
In trying to establish a legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention, this study asks three

questions. First, are there minimum duties states have in terms of protecting the rights of their
nationals that are attributes of their sovereignty? Second, can violation of these minimum duties
constitute the justification for humanitarian intervention? Third, how should such intervention be
effectively implemented? It presents answers to the questions by examining how the doctrine and
practice of humanitarian intervention have evolved up to the present in order to throw some light
on future practice. It argues for intervention expressed in both legal and moral terms to alleviate
the suffering of oppressed people and victims of internal armed conflict. Furthermore in
answering the third question, it employs the notions of epistemic communities as vehicles to build
on the increasing support generated in the post-Cold War period in order to enhance the
legitimacy and effectiveness of future interventions.
In the chapters of this study that follow, the meaning of intervention, armed intervention

and unarmed intervention; the scope of humanitarian intervention; and the definition of
humanitarian intervention and use of the term are examined. Chapter two reviews the traditional
doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention before World War II. Chapter three describes
the evolving norms of humanitarian intervention. Chapter four maps out the cases of intervention
during the Cold War era. Chapter five sets the scene for the practice of humanitarian intervention
after the Cold War era. Chapter six makes a deep assessment of the contemporary development in
9

the principle and practice of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era. Chapter seven is
an analysis of Islamic teachings on the question of humanitarian intervention in the Islamic world.
Chapter eight is a conclusion of this study.
In essence, this study tries to build a legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention

through an examination of the evolution of the doctrine and its practice. It argues that sovereignty
is compatible with humanitarian intervention. Sovereignty implies responsibility and thus when
human rights violations reach a massive scale, either resulting from governmental acts or in
situations of internal conflict, intervention to protect those rights is necessary.

//-Intervention
Intervention means various forms of nonconsensual action that are often thought-todirectly challenge the principle of state sovereignty. Many commentators would prefer to
eliminate the word "humanitarian" before "intervention". Civilian humanitarians dislike the
association with the use of armed force, viewing ''humanitarian intervention" as two contravened
words. Former colonies recall the disingenuous application of the term "intervention" for
purposes that were anything except humanitarian. 5 And many observers do not want the high
ground automatically occupied by those who claim a humanitarian justification for going to war
without serious scrutiny of the specific merits of the case or prejudging whether a particular
intervention is defensible or not. "Of course armed intervention may be undertaken for
humanitarian motives," cautions UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, but "let's get right away
5

See, Report of Danish Institute, "Responsibility to Protect: Volume" 2001, at 15.
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from using the term "humanitarian" to describe armed military operations." 6
The definition of "humanitarian" as a justification for intervention is a high threshold of
suffering. It refers to the threat or actual occurrence of large-scale loss of life (including, of course
genocide), massive forced migrations, and widespread abuses of human rights. Acts that shock
the conscience and elicit a basic humanitarian motive remain politically powerful; it does not,
however, include the overthrow of a democratically elected government, unless it results in largescale loss oflife. 7
The specific objectives are to explore the meaning and evolution of the concept, the
implications of the United Nations Charter and nonmilitary forms of intervention, and to
summarize the various dimensions of the contemporary intervention debate.

11.1. Meaning of Intervention

The actual meaning of the term "intervention" can be derived from the context in which it
occurs, in addition to the purposes for which it is invoked. Actions do not amount to intervention
if they are based on a genuine request from or with the unqualified consent of the target state.
Consent, if it is to be valid in law, should come from the legal government of a sovereign state
and be freely given. Forms of interference that lack coercion in the internal affairs of a state also
do not amount to intervention.
6

Kofi Annan, "Operation Remarks," Humanitarian Action: A Symposium," November 20, 2000, International Peace
Academy Conference Report (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001), p. 11.
7
One searches in vain for a solid definition of"humanitarian" in intemationallaw. The International Curt of Justice
was provided an opportunity in the case of Nicaragua against the United States, but it declined to define the term. It
engaged in a tautology of sorts by stating that humanitarian action is what the international Committee of the Red
Cross does. The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933) is not of much help, by stating
that humanitarian is "having regard to the interests of humanity or mankind at large; relating to or advocating, or
practicing humanity or human action." A second definition notes that the term is "often contemptuous or hostile."
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Of course, wider definitions of intervention have always existed. In today's world,
economic activities and direct foreign investment are considered by some observers as types of
intervention. And with interdependence and globalization rising over the last few decades, anxiety
levels among many governmental officials have increased because there are substantial new
vulnerabilities about which they can do virtually nothing. High state sensitivities to economic and
cultural influences across borders have also meant even greater sensitivities to human rights
pressures that occur without the consent of governments. 8
Obviously, the use of armed force against another state without its consent constitutes
intervention but so too does the use of such nonmilitary means as political and economic
sanctions, arms embargoes and international criminal prosecution. Intervention is a concept with a
distinct character.9 This character lies in the use of forcible or non-forcible measures against a
state, without its consent, solely on account of its internal or external behavior. Although
reservation of the vital interests
(legitimately or illegitimately perceived) of intervening states, 10 there is also a long history of
intervention justified on the grounds of grave human suffering.

11.2.Armed Intervention

8

Kofi Annan, "Peace Operations and the United Nations: Preparing for the Next Century," unpublished paper,
February 1996, pp.4-5. This is the starting point for Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, with Channel de Jonge
Oudraat, Coercive Inducement and the Containment Crises (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1999).
9
Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds; Oppenheim's International Law (London: Longmans, 1996), pp. 428-434;
and Ian Brownlie, International Law and the use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp.44-45. It is
worth noting that some analysts include both solicited (that is, consensual) and uncolicited military force in their
definitions of intervention. See, for example, Martin Wright, power politics (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1979), chapter
11.
1
For a recent overview, See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocricy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000).

°

12

The advent of the UN Charter fundamentally affected earlier interpretations of the legality
of intervention. Not only did the Charter set out the circumstances under which intervention was
permissible, it also changed the terms of debate by employing the term "the threat or use of force"
instead of "intervention". 11
As the charter explicitly permits the use of force in self-defense and enables the Security
Council to authorize force to confront threats to international peace and security, a recurring
aspect of the debate has been the use of force to protect human rights. The 1990s were not the
beginnings of the dispute. Various interpretations of the legality of humanitarian intervention
were fiercely debated, particularly beginning in the late 1960s. 12
The ideological competition of the Cold War lent a particular character to interventions
during that period. With much of the world aligned with one of the two superpowers, there was
considerable pressure from both sides to intervene in both internal and international armed
conflicts. The deadlock m the Security Council an the existence of

e veto also increased the

likelihood that interventions would either not occur at all or be undertaken in the absence of a
Council mandate. In fact, interventions during the Cold War were far more likely to be
undertaken by a single state (for example, the US in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan,
and South Africa and Cuba in Angola), whether directly or by proxy, than they were by
multilateral cooperation. 13
On two occasions during this period, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on cases

11

Ibid·3
See.' for example, Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention and the United ·Nations (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1973)
13
Kofi Annan, "Opening Remarks," Humanitarian Action: A Symposium," November 20, 2000, International Peace
Academy Conference Report (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001 ), p. 11.
12

13

that involved assessing the legality of interventions for which humanitarian purposes had been
declared: the United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel and the United States in Nicaragua. In both
cases, the ICJ adhered to the position that the principle of non-intervention involves the right of
every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference and that international law
requires territorial integrity to be respected. The ICJ rejected intervention that impedes a state
from conducting those matters that each state is permitted, by the principle of sovereignty, to
decide freely, namely its political, economic, social and cultural systems, and the formulation of
its foreign policy. 14
More specifically, in the case of Nicaragua vs. the United States, the ICJ repeated the
attributes of humanitarian aid or assistance that might also be applicable to military intervention
for humanitarian purposes. If the provision of humanitarian assistance is to escape condemnation
as an intervention in the internal affairs of a state, the ICJ took the view that it must be limited to
the purposes hallowed in practice, namel to revent and alleviate human sufferin
and health, and to ensure respect for the human being without discrimination against all in need,
and that it be "linked as closely as possible under the circumstances to the UN Charter in order to
further gain legitimacy." These criteria should be applicable in extreme situations where the need
to "prevent and alleviate human suffering, to protect life and health, and to ensure respect for the
human being" constitutes a humanitarian crisis threatening international or regional peace and
security. The ICJ also rejected the notion of the use of force to ensure the protection of human
rights: ''where human rights are protected by international conventions, that protection takes the
14

One searches in vain for a solid definition of humanitarian intervention in international law. The International Court
of Justice was provided an opportunity in the case of Nicaragua against the United States, but it declined to define the
term. It engaged in a tautology of sorts by stating that humanitarian action is what the international Community of
Red Cross does. The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933), is not of much help, by
stating that humanitarian is "having regard to the interests of humanity or mankind at large; relating to, or advocating
or practicing humanity or human action." A second definition notes that the term is "often contemptuous or hostile."

14

form of such arrangements for monitoring or ensuring the respect for human rights as are
provided for in the conventions themselves .. ...In any event ..... the use of force could not be the
appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect." 15
Such a conclusion does not appear to be definitive. The protection of human rights by
international conventions presupposes a stable and orderly system of monitoring and ensuring
respect for human rights based on those conventions. Cases may arise where the existing
arrangements are inappropriate for protecting human rights, owing to the nature and scale of the
violations. Furthermore, in extreme situations in which the Security Council is unable to act,
political and moral imperatives may leave no choice but to act outside the law.16
Further clarification of the meaning of intervention in the context of the Charter can be
drawn from UN negotiations over the past decade. The end of the Cold War was seen by many as
a rebirth of the UN, and it bore witness to an urge for intervention to sort out problems of civil
strife. 17 Throughout the 1990s there was an unpredictable and diverse pattern of interventions by
the UN, stretching from Iraq to Somalia, Bosnia to Haiti, and Kosovo to East Timor.

11.3.Unarmed Intervention

Most contemporary literature about intervention is concerned with the application of
armed force to pursue humanitarian objectives. The following is an analysis of unarmed

15

International Court of Justice, military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States,), June 27, 1986, paras. 267-268 and 243.
16

B Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 7.
Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, Supplementary to an Agenda for Peace: Position
paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the SO Anniversary of the United Nations, Un Document
s/24111 (1992), and Supplementary to an Agenda for Peace, A/50/60, s/1995/l .
17
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intervention, both through sanctions and criminal prosecution.

(A)- Sanctions

International economic and political sanctions as well as embargoes of various types
became widespread in the 1990s. These sanctions were designed to impose a course of conduct
(including a change of policy) on a state by banning or restricting that state's economic, military
or political relations. Sanctions are a punitive countermeasure against illegal acts.
Economic sanctions include trade and commercial restrictions, and sometimes embargoes
on imports and exports, shipping, flights, investment, and the seizure of a state's assets abroad.
Political sanctions include embargoes on arms, denial of military assistance and training, restraint
on the means and extent of a state's level of armament, the non-recognition of illegal acts
perpetrated b

a state and the refusal of

~f_p....oliM.aLleaders

into the tenito.. . ,ri. . .,e.,_s_._o.....f_.o..._.t....
h...,erL_______

states. 18
Assessment of the use of sanctions under the UN Charter before and after the Cold War
periods indicates three broad trends. First, there was a combination of unilateral and collective
sanctions during the Cold war by individual states and by the UN, mainly in the process of
decolonization (specified in Charter Chapters XI-XIII and elsewhere) 19 against Portugal (in
relation to Angola and Mozambique before 1975), against Rhodesia in 1975, and South Africa's

18

W. Michael Reisman and Douglas L. Sterick, "The applicability of International Law Standards to the UN
Economic Sanctions Programs," European Journal of International Law 9 (1998), p. 86.
19
In relation to decolonization, the regime of the Charter develops standards for the conduct of colonial states in 1945
by establishing a framework for decolonization, based on the right to self-determination and the rights and duties of
the Mandatory powers with regard to the protection of the inhabitants of Trust and Mandated territories, See
"declaration on granting oflndependence to Colonial Countries and peoples". General Assembly Resolution 1514
(xv), December 14, 1960.
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illegal presence in Namibia,20 as well as its practice of apartheid between 1975 and 1979.21 Only
in the clearest cases was it possible for the Security Council to reach decisions on the collective
use of sanctions. Consequently, many nonbinding resolutions on sanctions were passed by the
General Assembly during debates on decolonization.
Second, there was increasing use in the 1990s of unilateral and collective sanctions in the
context of diplomatic efforts to coerce state behavior with respect to maintaining international
peace and security under Chapter VII. Compliance with sanctions regimes is often voluntary at
the outset in order to generate consensus and only later do they sometimes become mandatory
under Chapter VII.
There is the use of sanctions as a means of intervening in aid of democracy, not only by
the UN but more by the British Commonwealth, the European Union (EU), the Organization of
American States (OAS) and other regional organizations. The Haiti case is central because both
the General Assembly and the OAS condemned the 1991 military coup that overthrew the elected
government. The Security Council also prohibited special commercial passenger flights from
going to Haiti and denied the entry of the Haitian military and others to territories of UN member
states. The Security Council also imposed embargoes on a rebel organization fighting the
government in Angola in breach of a peace agreement. 22
The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) also imposed an economic
blockade against the regime in Sierra Leone in 1997. The Commonwealth imposed economic and

20

See Legal Consequences for states of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, ICJ Report (1970), p. 16.
21
See for example, General Assembly Resolution 204 (xx) of November 1, 1965, and Security Council Resolution
216 (1965) of November 12, 1965. For detail, see United Nations Action in the Field of human Rights (New York:
United Nations, 1983), pp. 16-38.
22
Reisman and Sterick, 'The applicability oflntemational Law Standards to the UN Economic sanctions Programs,"
p. 124.
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political sanctions on the military governments of Nigeria, Pakistan and Fiji. 23 Also, there are
smart sanctions which target elites through such measures as freezing foreign assets and
preventing travel, and these have been used as Security Council practice showed. 24
The dramatic suffering caused by economic sanctions suggests that sanctions and
embargoes may not be an intervention tool of preference in the future. 25 Paradoxically, the logic
of the Charter to use forcible measures only as a last resort may be inappropriate to support
humanitarian objectives. But rather, it is reasonable that an earlier resort to armed force may be
more humane than extended and extensive sanctions. 26

(8)- International Criminal Prosecution

Since the war crimes tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo following the Second World War,
the 1990s revived the use of international criminaL pr.os.ec_ution__as a form of non-armed._____
intervention. The basic principles for prosecution under international criminal law were set out in
the late 1940s- that violations of the laws of war were subject to penal sanctions, that one's
superior's orders do not release an individual from responsibility, and that certain acts constitute
crimes against humanity. The 1990s witnessed a series of almost revolutionary changes. Not only
are war criminals and human rights abusers being tried, but a series of transformations in

23

EU Decisions 95/515/CFSP OJL 298/1995; 95/544/CFSP OJL 309/1995; and Toby King," "Human Rights in
European Policy: Success or Failure for Post-modem Diplomacy," European Journal oflntemational Law," p. 124.
24
David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds; The Sanctions Decade. Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 2000)
25
Boutros Ghali, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1995), paras. 66-76.
26
For the humanitarian issues, see Thomas G. Weiss, David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Larry Minear, eds;
Political Gain and Civilian Pain: The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic sanctions (lanham: Rowman and Littlefield,
1997); And Larry Minear, David Cortright, Julia Wagler, George A. Lopez, and Thomas G. Weiss, Towards More
Humane and effective Sanctions Management (New York; Un Department of humanitarian affairs, 19970.
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..
international criminal law suggests that this type of intervention may become more routine. 27
The establishment of the ad hoc war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia in 1993,
in Rwanda in 1994 and recently in Sierra Leone were a major development. Despite criticism,
these tribunals have convicted senior officials and have contributed to the development of
international criminal law. They have established criminal liability for war crimes during internal
armed conflicts and that crimes against humanity extending beyond the confines of armed conflict
and rape is now legally considered an aspect of genocide. 28
Considerable progress has also been made in the rules relating to the immunity of leaders.
Until recently, it was accepted that leaders while in power (and also retired ones) could not be
tried in courts in another country for acts committed in their own country. The conviction in 1989
of President Noriega by the US was a dramatic transition in international law. In the UK, the
House of Lords in Pinochet's case established a very strong precedent for no longer treating
government officials as having absolute rotection under the rules of the
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states.Z 9 The indictment of President Milosevic for his war crimes in Kosovo is another precedent.
Recently, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the jurisdiction over
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is considered a tremendous development in
international criminal law.

27

Ibid; 3.
Ibid· 4
29
The,Pinochet case illustrates the limits on sovereign immunity in regard to crimes committed while in office.
However, it does not affect serving heads of state or serving diplomats. It remains an as yet untested possibility that
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and additional protocols of 1977 on humanitarian law in armed conflict, which are
regarded as being jus co gens, could provide sufficient authority for an armed intervention to enforce them. Common
Art. 1 of the Conventions states that: "the high contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the
present Convention in all circumstances." See Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes against Humanity; The Struggle for
Global Justice (London: Penguin, 1999), p. 398.
28
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Ill. THE USE OF THE TERMS "HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION"

Intervention was invoked against a state's abuse of its sovereignty in cases of brutal and
cruel treatment of those (both nationals and non-nationals) within its power .. Such a state was
regarded as having made itself liable to action by any state or states that were prepared to
intervene. One writer in 1921 defined humanitarian intervention as "reliance upon force for the
justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from the treatment which is so
arbitrary and persistently abusive as to act to exceed the limits of that authority within which the
sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice. "30
Intervention was surrounded by controversy, however, and many condemned the earliest
cases of humanitarian intervention. 31 Critics argued that the humanitarian justifications were
usually a pretext for intervention motivated by strategic, economic or political interests.
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that even when objectives were less objectionable, the
intervening powers undermined the credibility of the enterprise. 32
One noted legal authority concluded in 1963 that "no genume case of humanitarian
intervention has occurred with the possible exception of the occupation of Syria in 1860 and
1861." 33 The scale of the atrocities in that case may have warranted intervention, thousands of
Maronite Christians were killed or displaced. But, by the time the European troops had been

30

Stowell, Intervention in International Law, p. 53.
Dino Kristsiotis, "Reappraising Policy Objections to humanitarian Intervention," Michigan Journal of International
Law 19 (1989), p. 1005.
32
This legacy continues to color the intervention debate, for, as, Ramesh Thakur points out, developing countries are
"neither amused nor mindful at being lectured on universal human values by those who failed to practice the same
during European colonialism and now urge them to cooperate in promoting global human rights norms." Ramesh
Thakur, "Global Norms and International Humanitarian Law: An Asian Perspective," International Review of the
Red Cross 83, no. 841 (March 2001), p. 340.
33
Brownlie, International Law and the Use f Force by States, p. 340.
31
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deployed, the violence was largely over and, after undertaking some relief activities, the troops
withdrew.
At the end of the 19th century, many legal commentators held that a doctrine of humanitarian
intervention existed in customary international law, though a number of scholars disagree.
Contemporary legal scholars disagree on the significance of these conclusions. Some argue that
the doctrine was clearly established in state practice prior to 1945 and that its limits, not the
existence of the doctrine, are open to debate. Others reject this claim, noting the inconsistency of
state practice particularly in the 20th century. What is clear is that this notion of intervention
evolved substantially before the concept of maintaining international order and protecting human
rights.
Since 1945, the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political
independence of states is prohibited by Article 2(4 ), with exceptions for the collective use of force
under Chapter VII and for self-defense in the event of an armed attack in Article 51. Although the
prohibition seems clear, questions about the legality of humanitarian intervention remained. In
1946, for example, an eminent legal scholar continued to argue that intervention is legally
permissible when a state is guilty of cruelties against its nationals in a way that denied their
fundamental human rights and shocked the conscience ofhumankind. 34

111.1. Various Definitions of Humanitarian Intervention

The term humanitarian intervention has gained great currency in recent years, yet a
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Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Gortian Tradition in International Law," British Year Book oflntemational Law 23
( 1946), p. I.
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common definition is not easy to achieve. In general, there is no proper way to define the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention. 35 The literature shows that there are numerous and often conflicting
definitions of humanitarian intervention. 36 Nevertheless, a working definition may be useful to
outline the scope of this study.
The term humanitarian is very broad and in common language can be used to describe "a
wide range of activities by governmental and non-governmental actors that seek to improve the
status and well-being of individuals." Even if this term is narrowed to a concept of protecting
human rights, this term potentially implies a broad array of political, social and economic rights. 37
Recently, the Canadian International Commission on Sovereignty and Intervention defined
humanitarian intervention as "an action taken against a state or its leaders, without their consent,
for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective."

38

The term "humanitarian

intervention" as Oppenheim and Lauterpacht defined is "a dictatorial interference by a state in the
affairs of another state to compel certain action or inaction by which the intervening state imposes
or seeks its will."

39

By such interference, the intervening state demands that the other state does

"an act which, if not compelled, it would not do, or refrain from doing an act which, if not
compelled, it would do."
Several definitions of humanitarian intervention exist. Different scholars support either a
broad or narrow definition of humanitarian intervention, and these differing approaches

35
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Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledging Democracies, 18 Fordham International Law Journal,
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ISSN 1175-1452.
39
Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamination the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in
Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 32 Stan. J. Int'L. 547, n.L. (1987).
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sometimes create confusion. Classical humanitarian intervention40 is the unilateral intervention
for protection of another state's nationals from human rights violations. 41 The theory of
intervention on the grounds of humanity is probably that which recognizes the right of one state to
exercise international control by armed force over the acts of another in regard to its internal
sovereignty when contrary to the laws of humanity. 42 Recently, one commentator defined
humanitarian intervention as "the proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help,
provided by governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights
and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government." 43
Some other scholars understand humanitarian intervention to be a doctrine that deals with the
right of states and international organizations to assist their nationals if they are subjected to
human rights abuses.

44

Ian Brownlie has defined humanitarian intervention more broadly as "The

threat or use of force by a state, a belligerent community or an international organization with the
..

object of protecting human rights." 45
Beyond these definitions, some writers have pointed to the concept of humanitarian
access. They draw a distinction between forcible humanitarian intervention and humanitarian
access. The latter include the situations where the UN or humanitarian aid organizations negotiate
with the governments in order to gain access to affected populations in the internal conflict or
other humanitarian emergencies. It also includes situations where humanitarian access is obtained
without the consent of a government. In both situations the use of military force is absent.
40

Ellery C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law 53 (I 921 ).
See Ulrich Beyerlin, Humanitarian Intervention, 3 Encyclopedia Pub. Inl'L. 211, 212 (I 981).
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Humanitarian intervention, according to some scholars, can encompass any kind of nonforcible state action taken to prevent human rights violations in another country. 46 Sometimes the
parameters for the definition of humanitarian intervention are enlarged, including the use of
armed force either for the protection of nationals abroad 47 or with respect to rescuing nationals. 48
This type of humanitarian intervention is usually discussed as an aspect of self-defense. 49
There are also two relatively rare defmitions of humanitarian intervention: intervention by
invitation

50

and by coercion. Some authors consider the use of coercion to rescue nationals

abroad as diplomatic protection. 51 A NATO seminar in Scheveningen on the topic in November
1999 defined humanitarian intervention as "an armed intervention in another state, without the
agreement of that state, to address a humanitarian disaster, in particular caused by grave and
large-scale violations of fundamental human rights."

52

The key aspects of this definition are

related to sovereignty and human rights. Firstly, for an action to be an intervention, the
sovereignty of the state being intervened in must be breached. Under this definition, International
Force (INTERFET) intervention in East Timor, while motivated by humanitarian concerns, was
not an intervention as the action was taken with the consent of the Indonesian government.
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Secondly, for an intervention to be humanitarian, the desire to address violations of human rights
should be the driving force in the intervention decision.
As we have seen above, there are many conflicting definitions of humanitarian
intervention. Therefore, I prefer to adopt a definition which addresses humanitarian intervention
as a specific problem, namely whether and under which conditions it is permitted under
international law to intervene or threaten to intervene by

53

armed force in another state for

humanitarian reasons without the consent of its government. This study goes with the following
definition of humanitarian intervention: "Humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of armed
force by a state, or group of states, or international organization against another state for
humanitarian purposes without the consent of its government." The use of this term includes two
types of action: intervention as a collective action by and or authorized by the UN or a regional
organization; 54 and multilateral or unilateral action by states without such authorization. It is
necessary to look at both types of intervention as a whole because the discussion on the legality of
unilateral intervention to a large degree rests on the relevance of the question of whether effective
international mechanisms are available to deal with the violation of human rights at issue.
Some important aspects which are more or less related to the problem of humanitarian
intervention, however, must be excluded. First, intervention at the invitation or request or with the
consent of the lawful government is beyond this work55 because this will be characterized as
assistance or military cooperation with the consent of the target state and does not conflict with
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any interpretation of the principle of state sovereignty.

56

Therefore, the intervention in East Timor

in 1999, while motivated by humanitarian concerns, was not a humanitarian intervention because
it took place with the consent of the Indonesian government. In light of the abuses committed
during interventions in the past,

57

the problem here is how to establish what actually constitutes

valid consent by the lawful government. 58 A special problem arises if there is no effective
government, as in the case of Somalia. Second, peacekeeping operations of the UN and
humanitarian relief operations have always been based on an agreement with the respective
government or the parties involved in the conflict. Such peacekeeping operations of the United
Nations

59

and humanitarian relief operations in emergency situations

60

may be neglected in this

regard because they do not deploy armed force. Third, also neglected will be military intervention
which is not undertaken for primarily humanitarian reasons but for other purposes, such as to
repel an aggression,

61

to support a party in a civil war

62

or to support or establish a democratic

system of government in another state against illegitimate regimes. Although there is indeed a
link to the issue of humanitarian intervention, that is only under the more general proposition of
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this intervention theory. 63
Finally, the term "humanitarian intervention" is occasionally used in a very broad sense to also
cover non-forcible action for humanitarian reasons as we have already seen in this study.

64

Each

element of this definition deserves brief comment:
1- Threats or Use of Force

Some scholars have defined intervention to include situations where a state, group of
states or an international organization undertakes actions which do not involve a threat or use of
force. This study focuses on intervention primarily with reference to threat or use of armed force.
Also, attention will be paid to the increasing use of economic sanctions as a means of coercing
state behavior.
In most cases, humanitarian intervention as considered in this study involves the actual

use of armed force through the physical presence of military units into a target state. The goal of
the use of force is to suppress local activities that endanger human rights, to reestablish order
and create conditions for relief operations, or to return refugees and avoid further deprivation of
human rights. Nevertheless, humanitarian intervention can be undertaken where force is not used
in the territory of the target state, where the force is not an armed force, and where force in the
sense of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter is not even used. Interventions can be in different shapes,
even among the ones we discussed in this study, and therefore any working definition of
humanitarian intervention should not be so rigid that it cannot take account of these differences:
( 1) Humanitarian intervention may not involve the actual military unit entering the target state.
63
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Military forces stationed outside the territory of the target state and impeding vessels and aircraft
entering or departing the target state should be considered a use of force that, in appropriate
circumstances, may qualify as intervention; it is usually recognized by the target state as an attack
on its national security. 65
(2) Where there is only the "threat" of armed force, then clearly armed force itself is not actually
being used. Instead, the intervener indicates that unless the target state changes its behavior, the
interveners are ready to use armed force. The threat of armed force falls within the scope of
restraints on the use of armed force since the international community recognizes that threat can
be just as coercive as the actual use of force. States may prefer to use threats because it will cost
less than the actual use of armed force. In the case of humanitarian intervention, the threat of
using force may be a preferred method of intervention if the intervener seeks to protect persons
prior to the deprivation of their human rights. Once deprivation occurs, their effects may be
irreversible. The 1994 intervention in Haiti by the United States and other military forces
involved a threat of forcible intervention, which led to the removal of the de facto regime. This is
a good example of the threat of armed force.
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(3) Where economic sanctions are imposed on a target state with the effect of seriously impeding
the ability of the state to provide goods and services to its people, then the type of coercion
employed is not, by definition, armed force. The imposition of economic sanctions generally has
not been regarded as a use of armed force according to Article 2(4), but has been regarded as
relevant to the principle of non-intervention.

66

Indeed, whenever coercion by a state or states, or a

regional or international organization affects the ability of a target state to conduct its affairs, then
coercion may encourage the target state to change its behavior. This coercion may be considered a
form of humanitarian intervention if done for humanitarian purposes.

2- State, Group of States, or International Organization

Humanitarian intervention may be undertaken by a state, a group of states or a regional or
international organization. The state or states may be acting under the express authority of the UN
Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Some interventions that do not have
the express authority of the UN Security Council may nevertheless be considered within the scope
of authority granted by the UN. Alternatively, such intervention could be undertaken by a state or
states acting without any UN authority but rather under the authority of a regional organization,
which shall be referred to as regional humanitarian intervention. Finally, humanitarian
intervention could be undertaken by a state or states or international organization acting without
the authority of either the UN or a regional organization, which some scholars refer to as
unilateral humanitarian intervention, a somewhat misleading term since the intervention may be
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undertaken by several states.
Since humanitarian intervention has been undertaken by a state, states or an international
organization, then action by non-state entities designed to prevent widespread deprivations of
human rights should be excluded. Without question, non-governmental organizations such as the
Red Cross and Doctors without Borders play a key role in addressing humanitarian crises as they
unfold, even when such organizations act without the consent of the local government. Their
intervention is different from intervention by states, both in the likelihood of creating or
aggravating a threat to international peace and security, and in the legal norms of the UN Charter
and state responsibility that are engaged.

3- Target State and its Nationals
Generally, sovereign states are the targets of humanitarian intervention. The state that is a
target of intervention must be known as the sovereign. However, humanitarian intervention has
been undertaken in territories lacking one of the elements of statehood, which is a government.

An entity that does not possess all the elements of statehood is more vulnerable to external
intervention. The main reason is that intervention against such an entity does not constitute a
violation of Article 2(4) or 2(7) of the UN Charter. Also, external forces have a temptation to
impose on that entity the moral order of their choice without taking the risk of counter collective
security measures. Thus, the emergence of failed states has enlarged the scope of humanitarian
intervention. This doesn't constitute intervention if a state interferes with the affairs of a section
of its own citizens who have unilaterally declared their independence from it.
Humanitarian intervention could include protecting or rescuing one's own nationals along
30

with the nationals of a third state. Military rescue operations by states to protect their own
nationals from imminent danger abroad is different from the problem of humanitarian
intervention. 67 Because of the nationality link, it is disputed whether states have a right to
intervene militarily in another state to protect their own nationals without the consent of the
foreign government. A situation legally quite different to humanitarian intervention arises when
nationals of the intervening states are rescued by military operations. For example, the 1978
Israeli raid on Entebbe in Uganda, in which the rescue of nationals of the intervening state was
clearly the main objective, is legally governed by the right of self-defense. In my understanding,
the description of rescue operations as acts of self-defense should be disregarded. Because human
rights law has a universal reach, it extends equally to foreign nationals so there is no reason why
the protection of nationals of intervening states should be less humanitarian than an action
undertaken to protect nationals of the target state.
Intervention to rescue nationals abroad from dangers in another state should be recognized
as humanitarian in nature and not as self-defense. Once the humanitarian nature of rescue
operations is recognized, such operations can lead to actions required to protect the individual
aliens of other foreign nationals and indigenous people, and to respond to atrocities committed
within the target state. 68
If rescue operations are recognized only as self-defense, international law will favor the
nationals of the intervening state over the target state's own nationals. Rescue operations should
be viewed as humanitarian intervention requiring a collective response to rescue the nationals of
67

See Sean Murphy, "Humanitarian Intervention; Evolving World Order, ( 1996).
Oppenhiem's International Law 440-42 (R> Jennings and A Watts eds; 9th ed; 1992) For further discussion of the
right of a state under international law to intervene for the protection of its own nationals, see infra Chapter 8. This
study also sets aside the issue of rescue of third-country nationals in the process of rescuing one's own nationals.
Those rescues also fall within the scope of the more accepted doctrine of rescue protection of nationals ofthe
intervening states.
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an intervening state facing danger in a foreign country.

4- Humanitarian Objectives
It is difficult to identify an intervention where gross human rights violations are the sole
reason for intervention. Often, there are other issues, such as the protection of persons who are not
nationals of the target state.

In the course of protecting thousands of local nationals, the

intervener also protects a few nationals of its own or those of a third country, so then the
intervention is considered humanitarian in nature.
Armed intervention will be neglected if it is not undertaken primarily for humanitarian
reasons but for other purposes, such as to repel an aggression, to support a party in a civil war, to
encourage self-determination, or to serve other economic or political objectives of the intervening
state. Clearly, all humanitarian actions by states have mixed motives. States often use the
language of humanitarianism even when they act out of self-interests and their real motives are
not easily ascertainable.
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To determine the primary purposes of an intervention, the statements

of officials of the intervening state, states, or international organization are relevant. Finally, the
term humanitarian intervention is occasionally used in a very broad sense to also cover non-armed
action for humanitarian reasons, such as natural and human-made disasters.
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This study focuses

only on the term armed force to avoid any confusion with the discussion on whether the
prohibition of the use of armed force in the UN Charter can be stretched beyond this definition of
armed force so as to include mere economic or political measures.71
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71
See, T. Schweisfurth, Operations to Rescue Nationals in Third States Involving the Use of Force in Relation to the
Protection of Human Rights, GYIL 23 ( 1980) !59.
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5- Consent of the Target State Government
When we talk about "a threat or use of armed force against state" there must be a lack of
consent by a target state government. An act amounts to armed intervention if the country
concerned is opposed to it. Otherwise, the threat is not really a threat and the use of armed force is
char~cterized

~ermission

as military cooperation. If a humanitarian operation is carried out with the

of the government to stop human rights violations committed by a faction in a civil

war, for example, this cannot be described as humanitarian intervention because it cannot be seen
as dictatorial interference as defined by Oppenheim and Lauterpacht. So the action of the
International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) in September 1999, while motivated by
humanitarian concerns, was not an intervention because it was undertaken with the consent of the
fndonesian government. Under this reasoning, the definition of humanitarian intervention should
be limited to situations where a target state has not consented to the interference in its affairs. The
consent from the target state for intervention poses some problems. In crisis situations, the local
.at\thorities of the target state may consist of government that is de jure and is mostly or wholly in
control of its territory, a government that is de facto and is in control of only partial territory or in
exile, or various factions controlling different portions of the territory of the target state. Whether
or not an act of intervention has occurred would depend on which faction has a better legal title or
greater political authority to speak in the name of the community.
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Also, whether or not it is an

act of intervention depends on the attitude of the faction controlling the relevant area of the
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This approach comports with the classical rule in international law that, once an internal factions against a certain
amount of control in a state, it achieves a belligerent status that precludes foreign states from aiding the de jure
government, and any such assistance to either side constitutes unlawful intervention. For a discussion of this
traditional rule, see E. Borchard, "Neutrality" and Civil Wars, 31 AM . J. lnt'l.L. 304 ( 193 7). Whether this traditional
rule survived the Spanish Civil War is unclear. See L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 153-62
(2"d ed. 1979); J. Moore, Law and the Indo-China War 161-63 (1973).
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country.
In some cases, the problem will arise if the government of a target state collapsed and no
authorities existed capable of giving consent or authorizing the intervention, as in the case of
Somalia in 1992. Nevertheless, the issue of consent authorization is still relevant in such cases; it
cannot be assumed that authorization would be granted if a recognized government existed. In
most cases, some types of controlling faction capable of granting authorization exists for each of
the different regions of the country, even if it is difficult to identify that faction. ##

34

CHAPTER TWO

Traditional Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian
Intervention

1- Introduction
The concept of intervention20 by a state in the internal affairs of another has always
been one that the international community has had to confront. External interference in the
relationship between ruler and ruled has been an enduring and pervasive characteristic of the
Westphalia system since its advent. This has always been the case since issues pertaining to the
relationship have an international dimension when the manner in which one state treats its citizens
within its territory is challenged by other states. Intervention was common in the Greek city-state
system, the Roman Empire, and in the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. 21 Two main
motivations have been responsible for interventions in the relation between rulers and ruled.
Firstly, states have intervened in the internal affairs of other states due to the fact that domestic

20

The term "intervention" as applied in the international system eludes any precise definition. It has been generally
used to mean almost any act of interference by one state in the affairs of another. In a more specific sense, it denotes
dictatorial interference in the domestic or foreign affairs of another state that impairs that state's independence. For
various definitions of intervention see for example, Falk, "The United States and the Doctrine of Non-intervention in
the Internal Affairs oflndependent States" (1959) Howard Law Joumall63 at 166; Stowell, Intervention in
International Law (Washington D.C.: John Byrne and Co; 1921) at 318, note 48; Thomas and Thomas, Non
Intervention-The Law and its Import in the Americas (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956) at Chap.
lv; Winfield, "The History oflntervention in International Law" (1922-1923) 3 British Yearbook oflntemational
Law 130 (commenting that "intervention may be anything from a speech of Lord Palmerston 's in the House of
Commons to the partition of Poland"); Kelsen, Principles oflntemational Law (1956) at 64; Leurdijk, Intervention in
International Politics (Leeuwarden: Eisma BY Publishers, 1986) at Chap.5.
21
Morgenthau, for example, observes that "from the time of the ancient Greeks to this day, some states have found it
advantageous to intervene in the affairs of the other states on behalf of their own interests and against the latter's
will". Morgenthau, "To Intervene or not to intervene" (1967) 45 Foreign Affairs at 425. See also, Phillipson, The
International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol. 1 (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1911) at 100101 , Vol2 at 90.
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developments elsewhere could undermine their own security, either by increasing the chance of
conflict between states or by undermining the legitimacy of their own regimes. Secondly,
intervention has occurred because values related to material or security interests, or in the
interests of humanity, have urged states to put pressure on others to change the way in which they
treat their own citizens or subjects. 22 The latter motivation for intervention, especially that in the
interests of humanity, is the primary concern of this chapter. The chapter outlines the historical
development of humanitarian intervention and its practice before the UN Charter era. It attempts
to show the doctrine coexisted with state sovereignty. Its underpinnings can be found in
international law, morality, scholarly writings, treaties and state practice. Thus, the approach used
here is to progress from an examination of the origin and development of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention to a study of contemporary attitudes and practices.
It would be appropriate before embarking on an enquiry into the doctrinal evolution and
practice of humanitarian intervention, however, to make some brief comments or observations on
the concept of state sovereignty. This is pertinent because debates over the current status and
future role of humanitarian intervention are embodied in the changing character of state
sovereignty. The collaboration of state sovereignty with intervention reveals the examination of a
wide range of issues and raises a series of questions. However, a paramount concern here is under
what circumstances can a state or group of states, or the United Nations intervene in domestic
affairs to hold governments responsible for failing to fulfill an international obligation, namely to
provide their citizens with basic human rights? The answer is not an easy one. It is one that the
international community is continuing to grapple with and prompts re-examination. Sovereignty

22

See for example, Krasner, "Sovereignty and Intervention" in Lyons & Mastanduno eds; Beyond Westphalia? State
Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) 228 at 233.
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features in the question of whether or not to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Definitions or
conceptions that tend to emphasize the absolute nature of state sovereignty provide a shield
against developing a strong practice of humanitarian intervention in international relations. It is
contended that the meanings or interpretations of sovereignty are not, and have not, been
incompatible or inconsistent with intervention to protect human rights. In other words, the
responsibilities of states toward their citizens mean that human rights protection must be seen as
part of the definition of sovereignty.

2- Historical Evolution of State Sovereignty and the Doctrine and Practice of
Humanitarian Intervention

1. State Sovereignty

A defining feature of the modem international system is the division of the world into
sovereign states. Most of the basic norms, rules and practices of international relations have rested
on the concept of state sovereignty. In other words, for centuries this sovereignty of nation statesthe idea of final and absolute authority of the state- has been a principal feature of the modem
world. 23 Yet its role in the relations between states has been "so thoroughly delineated,
demarcated, qualified and categorized so much so that the term's continued useful precision is
23

See Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisdiction and the Third
World" (1987) 41 International Organizations 519; Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the
Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice" in Walker & Mendolvitz eds; Contending Sovereignties: Redefining
political community (Boulder: Riener, (1990) at 159; Verhoeven, "Sovereign states: A collectivity or community"
(1994) Hitotsubashi Journal ofLaw and politics 149. although various definitions of sovereignty has been proffered
and distinctions drawn between internal, external, legal and political, shared or exclusive sovereignty, in an attempt at
clarification, its exact meaning has not authoritatively defined. The brief discussion here is to show the evolution of
the concept in an attempt to determine in subsequent chapters, the current understandings and meanings of the term.
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open to question."

24

Some writers have even called for the introduction of other concepts that

may provide more insights for analyzing the authority of nation states in contemporary
international relations, or for its abandonment altogether. 25 It is, however, unlikely that
sovereignty will be eliminated in the relations between states since the view persists that it is the
best mechanism for organizing human society at the international level. Although the formal
principle of sovereignty remains the basic norm of international relations, its content has shifted,
as will be argued later regarding the concept of human rights.
Definitions of sovereignty tend to focus on its legal content which is often perceived to
change little and thus the concept is viewed as a static one. Internally, sovereignty means the
exercise of supreme authority by states within their individual territorial boundaries. Externally, it
means equality of status between states comprising the society of states. Thus, the formal position
of the concept in legal and diplomatic convention has implied both supremacy within and equality
of status without.
The original meaning of sovereignty, according to Paasivirta, is related to the idea of

24

Philpott, "Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History" (1995) 48 Journal of International Affairs 353 at 354.
The term 'sovereignty' has a long and troubled history, and a variety ofrneanings. See Crawford, The creation of
States in international law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970) at 26. According to Oppenhiem it is "doubtful whether
any single word has caused so much intellectual confusion". See, Oppenhiem, See Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual
Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisdiction and the Third World" (1987) 41 International
Organizations 519; Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary
Political Practice" in Walker & Mendolvitz eds; Contending Sovereignties: Redefining political community (Boulder:
Riener, (1990) at 159; Verhoeven, "Sovereign states: A collectivity or community" (1994) Hitotsubashi Journal of
Law and politics 149. although various definitions of sovereignty has been proffered and distinctions drawn between
internal, external, legal and political, shared or exclusive sovereignty, in an attempt at clarification, its exact meaning
has not authoritatively defined. The brief discussion here is to show the evolution of the concept in an attempt to
determine in subsequent chapters, the current understandings and meanings of the term. International Law, Vol. l
(London: Longman, (1905) at I 03; Fall, "Sovereignty" in Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993) at 854.
2
s Goodman, "Democracy, Sovereignty, and Intervention" (1993) 9 American University Journal of International Law
and Policy 27 at 30. Laski for example suggests that "it would be of lasting benefit to political science if the whole
concept of sovereignty were surrendered". Laski, a Grammar of politics 4 ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1938) at
44-45.
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superiority. 26 It stems from the Latin word 'supra'. In mainstream legal and political theory,
therefore, the sovereign is the holder of ultimate power?7 In the Westphalian international system
the ultimate power holder is the state. 1bis particular view of sovereignty maintains that because
the state is under the legal influence of no superior power, sovereignty resides in the state. In
other words, to be sovereign is to be subject to no higher power. The result of this theory of state
sovereignty is that human rights are considered a matter of domestic, and not international
concern.
1bis absolute norm of state sovereignty discussed above has its origin in Aristotle's
Politics and the classic body of Roman Law? 8 In the Politics, Aristotle recognizes the fact that
there must a supreme power existing in the state, and that power may be in the hands of one, of a
few or of many. 29 The idea of sovereignty as formulated in ancient Rome sought to establish the
theoretical absolutism of the powers of the Emperor and to consolidate the despotism of his rule. 30
Among the Romans, the idea of sovereignty found expression in the fact that "the will of the
prince has the force oflaw, since the people have transferred to him all their right and power." 31
In the Middle Ages, government based on the consent of the governed was the ruling
26

Paasivirt, "Internationalization and Stabilization of Contracts Versus State Sovereignty" (1999) British Yearbook
oflntemational law 315 at 3 31.
27
In international law the meaning of sovereignty relates to the idea of independence. The right to be independent
assumes the rights of state autonomy in issues pertaining to its internal affairs and the carrying out of its external
relations. The classic definition given by Judge Max Huber in the Island ofPalmas case in 1928, states that:
"sovereignty" in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe
is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state". Permanent Court of
Arbitration, April4, 1928. UN reports oflntemational arbitral awards, Vol.2, 828 at 838. Again, in the Wimbledon
Case, the Permanent Court oflntemational Justice held that the sovereign state "is subject to no other state and has
full and exclusive powers within its jurisdiction without prejudice to the limits set by applicable law" .PCIJ, series A,
no.l, 1928 at 25.
28
Merriam, History of the Theory of sovereignty since Rousseau (New York: Ams Press, 1968) at II.
29
Book 111, chp.7. Jowett's translation. Cited in ibid.
30
See Hinsley, sovereignty (London: Watts & Co. Ltd; 1966) at 126.
31
Supra, note 9, Cicero for example wrote with reference to sovereignty that "there exists a supreme and permanent
law, to which all human order, if it is to have any truth or validity, must conform" and that there is ''no other
foundation of political authority than the consent ofthe whole people". Quoted in Carlyle, a History of Medieval
Political Theory in the West (1950) at 16-17.
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theory. The idea of original popular sovereignty universally prevailed. It was an axiom of political
theory from the end of the 13th century that the justification of all government lay in the voluntary
submission of the corrununity ruled. 32 At this time, however, a strong doctrine on the nature of
sovereignty was prevented: firstly, by the prevailing idea of the dominance of divine and natural
law over positive law; and secondly, by the idea of the so-called mixed form of state politically by
the conflict between church and state, and by the feudal conditions prevalent within the state
itself. 33 In this era, the concept of absolute sovereignty and even arbitrary authority in the state or
church was unknown. 34 One writer notes that:
"There is nothing more characteristic of the Middle Ages than the absence of any theory of
sovereignty as this conception has been sometimes current during the last three centuries.
The king or ruler of the Middle Ages was conceived of not as the master, but as the
servant of the law; the notion of an absolute king was not medieval, but grew up during
the period of the decline of the political civilization ofthe Middle Ages." 35

Further development of the concept was to come with the formation of the national state. As the
Rome Empire declined, the idea of sovereignty was reinvigorated to reinforce and legitimize
secular authority.
The concept received its first systematic articulation in the works of scholars such as Jean
Bodin, Hugo Gortius and Thomas Hobbes in the 16th and 17th centuries. Bodin defined
sovereignty as, "the most high, absolute and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a
Corrunonwealth ... the greatest power to command." 36 For him, the nature of the supreme power is
absolute, wholly free from the restraint of law, and held subject to no conditions or limitations.
32

See, Merriam, ibid. at 12.
Ibid; at 13.
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Larson, Jenks eta!; Sovereignty Within the Law (New York: Dobbs Ferry, 1965) at 23.
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Bodin, Six Bookes of a Commonweale (London, 1606) trans.Knolles, MacRae ed; (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1962) bk.l, chp.8 at 84. Quoted in Beitz, "Sovereignty and Morality in international affairs" in Held
ed; political Theory Today (Stanford university press, 1991 ).
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Even though he stated in very strong terms the nature of sovereignty, he was prepared to place
limitations on the sovereign power. The sovereign was constrained by natural law, divine law and
the law ofnations. 37
Grotius defined sovereignty as "that power whose acts are not subject to the control of
another, so that they may be made void by the act of any other human wi11." 38 The supreme power
is, however, limited by divine law, natural law, the law of nations, and by such agreements as are
made between ruler and ruled. 39 He points out that:
11

••••

an indefinite number of rights may be subtracted from the authority of the ruler; his

acts ay be rendered subject to ratification by a senate or other body; it may even be
provided that in certain cases a right of insurrection falls to the people yet the sovereignty
still retains its essential quality unimpaired. 11 40
Hobbes defined sovereignty more absolute than Bodin and Grotius did. He regarded sovereignty
as absolute, unified, inalienable, based upon a voluntary but irrevocable contract. 41 The idea of
absoluteness regarding this classical notion of sovereignty has been interpreted as complete or
unlimited freedom of action with no political or institutional constraints regarding the capacity to
act. 42 Using another interpretation, an absolute sovereign is not limited by moral considerations,
so that for a sovereign power nothing can be unjust. 43 In this formulation, therefore, sovereignty is
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regarded as final political authority. 44
It is pertinent to note that both Bodin and Hobbes wrote long after territorial states or city
states had formed in Europe. They were driven to a more extreme defense of sovereign control by
the disorders that were engendered by the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. The
importance of these theorists to the development of state sovereignty is that they "provide
European rulers with a variegated menu of intellectual ideas from which they could draw to
justify their policies. " 45
Although the concept of state sovereignty has been influential from the 16th century
onwards, it has nevertheless been contested or qualified by the continuing influence of
developments within the international system over the past four centuries. The European pattern
of territorial entities ruled by sovereigns and each having equal sovereignty received its
confirmation at Westphalia following the end of the Thirty Years War that had raged over Europe
in the early 17th century. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) marked the acceptance of the idea of
the sovereign authority of the state. 46 The international system that evolved, initially centered in
Europe, was based on the idea that states were the major actors. Their sovereignty was to be
regarded as absolute. The supposition was that states would maintain domestic order within their
borders and command the resources necessary to carry on effective relations with other states
outside their own jurisdiction. 47 Institutions eventually evolved to maintain order and stability in a
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system of international relations. These institutions were: a balance of power to prevent the rise of
a powerful state and to contain aggression; the codification of rules of behavior through
international law; the convening of international conferences to settle major differences; and
diplomatic practices through which states would be encouraged to negotiate differences among
themselves. 48
Within the institutions mentioned above, it is important to note that the Peace of
Westphalia did not sanction the right of rulers to do whatever they pleased within their own
territories. There were important limitations contained in its provisions on the authority of the
sovereign, especially regarding the practice of religion, which was the dominant political question
of the 171h century.49 It provided for a set of internal practices by recognizing rights for both
Protestants and Catholics, thus rejecting the right of rulers to change the religious practices within
their territories arbitrarily. A sovereign, for example, who changed his religion could not compel
his subjects to change theirs. 50 The tension between the scope of sovereign authority and
international pressures indicated in the treaties of Westphalia is analogous to the ongoing debates
regarding a universal human rights regime.
It would seem to be the case that the actual content of sovereign authority -its content both
internally and externally- has never been generally agreed upon and recognized in absolute
terms. 5 1 A discussion of sovereignty in its broad historical context and as an abstract theoretical
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construct suggests its meanings and practices are historically variable .
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2 - Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian intervention has been for a long time a routine feature of the
international system and has coexisted with the development of state sovereignty. The theory of
humanitarian intervention is based on the assumption that states in their relation with their own
nationals have the international obligation to guarantee to them certain basic or fundamental
rights which are considered necessary for their existence, and for the maintenance of friendly
relations among nations. It holds further that these rights are so essential, universal and of high
value to the human being that violations by any state cannot be ignored by other states. This
assumption would authorize intervention by other states in case of flagrant denial of these rights
by any state to its own citizens. 52
Although a "usable general definition" of humanitarian intervention is "extremely difficult
and virtually impossible to apply rigorously" according to some comrnentators, 34 the concept may
be defined as "the reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of
another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits
of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice."35 In a
frequently used definition, the 'theory of intervention on the grounds of humanity recognizes the
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right of one state to exercise international control over the acts of another in regard to its internal
sovereignty when contrary to the laws of humanity. ' 36 Teson defines it as the "proportionate
transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in another
state who are being denied basic human rights and who, themselves, would be rationally willing
to revolt against their oppressive government. " 37 These definitions do overlap in important
aspects and provide a fundamental understanding of the employment of the term by scholars. It is
generally an act performed for the purpose of compelling a sovereign to respect fundamental
human rights in the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives. 53 The classical concept covered any use
of armed force by a state against another state for the purpose of protecting the life and liberty of
the nationals of the latter state unable or unwilling to do so itself. 54
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The genesis of the doctrine can be traced back to ancient times and the religious wars of
the 16th and 17th centuries. Its institutions, however, clearly seem to be a creation of the 19th
century. 55 Prior to the 19th century, humanitarian intervention was based on Christian beliefs and
the religious concept of the dignity of man. 56 St. Thomas Aquinas made references on the basis of
religious solidarity to the effect that a sovereign has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of
another when the latter greatly mistreats its subjects. 57 Similarly, the Spanish scholar Vitoria
argued that:
"if any of the natives converted to Christianity be subjected to force or fear by their
princes in order to make them return to idolatry, this would justify the Spaniards in
making war and in compelling the barbarians by force to stop such misconduct, and in
deposing rulers as in other just wars. Suppose a large part of the Indians were converted to
Christianity, and this whether it were done lawfully or unlawfully, so long as they really
were Christians, the Pope might for a reasonable cause either with or without a request
from them, give them a Christian sovereign and depose their other unbelieving rulers." 58
Vitoria thus contended that resistance by the heathen princes to the Christian missionaries and
measures to force converted Indians to return to paganism would entitle the Pope to remove the
Indian princes and justify war. 59 These statements provided the ideological grounds for most

intervention will be taken to encompass intervention for protection of nationals.
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genuinely humanitarian. Ibid; at 206.
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Supra, note 40 at 214.
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Scott, The Spanish Origins of International Law, Francisco de Vi tori a and His Law of Nations (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1934) at Para.401 (XLIII). Quoted in Green, supra, note 41 at 289. Vitoria's
argument in justifying the conversion of heathens to Christianity whether it was done lawfully or unlawfully, does not
suggest any criteria but instead opens the door for all kinds ofpretextual intervention.
59
Suarez, writing around the same period unlike Vi tori a, narrowed the right to wage war on behalf of nationals by
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interventions undertaken by 'civilized nations' in the affairs of 'non-civilized nations.'

60

When

Christian populations in 'non-civilized nations' were subjected to persecutions or atrocities it was
lawful to intervene. It was also lawful to intervene to end such practices as human sacrifice,
although it is noteworthy that these statements also provided the basis for European powers who
invoked such principles to justify their imperialistic behavior.
Moving from the ecclesiastical underpinnings of the doctrine, the question of when
humanitarian intervention is permissible became secularized in the principle of lending lawful
assistance to peoples struggling against tyranny. Support was found for the doctrine among many
international scholars. 61 For Grotius, writing in 1625, it was important that the law governing
every human society be limited by a widely recognized principle of humanity. If a sovereign acts
contrary to the rights of humanity by grievously ill-treating his own subjects, the right of
intervention may be lawfully exercised.62 In his quoted words, he asserts:
"There is also another question, whether a war for the subjects of another be just, for the
maintaining "only on condition that the friend himself would be justified in avenging himself and actually proposes to
do so. But if the injured party does not entertain such a wish, no one else may intervene, since he who committed the
wrong has made himself subject not to everyone indiscriminately, but only to the person who has been wronged". He,
however, went further to state that a punitive war might be waged to preserve a people's right to worship "on the
ground of the defense of the innocent . .. and if the prince forcibly compelled his subjects to practice idolatry; but
under other circumstances, would not be a sufficient cause for war, unless the whole state should demand assistance
against its sovereign. A Christian prince may not declare war save either by reason of some injury inflicted or for the
defense of the innocent which is permissible in a special sense to Christian prince.
60
Green, supra, note 41.
61
See Stowell, supra, note I at 55.
62
He writes: "The fact must be recognized that kings, and those who posses rights equal to kings, have the right of
demanding punishments not only on account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on
account of injuries which do not affect them excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any
persons whatsoever. Truly it is more honorable to avenge the wrongs of others rather than one's own, in the degree
that in the case of one's own wrongs it is more to be feared that through a sense of personal suffering one may exceed
the proper limit or at least prejudice his mind. Kings in addition to the particular care of their own state, are also
burdened with a general responsibility for human society. The most wide-reaching cause for undertaking wars on
behalf of others is the mutual tie of kinship among men, which of itself affords sufficient ground for rendering
assistance". Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tre ( 1625), Kelsey trans. (New York: Bobbs-Merri1 Co; 1925) at
504-505, 582. Another writer of the period, Pufendorf, also maintained that "common descent alone may be a
sufficient ground for our going to the defense of one who is unjustly oppressed, and implores our aid, if we can
conveniently do so". See de Officio Humanis et Civis (1682), Moore trans. (1927) at Lib. 11 ,cap,. XV!, s.ll.

47

purpose of defending them from injuries by their ruler. Certainly it is undoubted that, ever
since civil societies were formed, the rulers of each claimed some especial rights over his
own subjects. But if a tyrant practices atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man
can approve, the right of human social connection is not cut off in such a case. It would
not follow that others may not take up arms for them. "63
Consequently, the sovereignty or independence of states stopped where it was violated beyond the
point of tolerance. Another writer of the period, Vattel, 64 in his thoughts on the subject, states:
"If the prince, attacking the fundamental laws, gives his people a legitimate reason to
resist him, if tyranny becomes so unbearable as to cause the Nation to rise, any foreign
power is entitled to help an oppressed people that has requested assistance."

65

Thus, authorities on international law considered humanitarian intervention to be in conformity
with natural law. Their writings pointed to the permissibility of the use of force against tyrants
who mistreated their subjects. Whereas publicists around the period in which Grotius and Vattel
were writing formulated the rules of international law in terms of the recognition of natural rights,
the 19th century saw the domination of legal positivism as the basis of international
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Grotius, 2 De Jure Belli est Pacis (Whewell trans. 1853) at 288. Grotius also recognized the abuses inherent in
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64

Vattel had earlier observed that "the sovereign is the one to whom the Nations has entrusted the empire and the
care of government; it has endowed him with his rights; it alone is directly interested in the manner in which the
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jurisprudence. 66 Arntz, for example, developed the theory of humanitarian intervention by
recognizing it in an absolute way against all states. He maintains that "when a government, even
acting within the limits of its sovereignty, violates the rights of humanity, either by measures
contrary to the interests of other states, or by excessive injustice or brutality which seriously
injure our morals and civilization, the right of intervention is legitimate. For, however worthy of
respect the rights of sovereignty and independence of states may be, there is something even more
worthy of respect, namely the law of humanity, or of human society, that must not be violated. In
the same way as within the state freedom of society, the individual is and must be restricted by the
law and the morals of society, the individual freedom of the states must be limited by the law of
human society."

67

Some writers, however, recognizing the independence of sovereign states denied the right
of another state to intervene even though a neighbouring state treats its nationals in an atrocious
manner. To intervene was to usurp the sovereign characteristics of the state against which it was
invoked. Mamiani68 and Carnazza-Amari (both Italian Scholars), for example, did not recognize
the legality of intervention for humanitarian purposes. The latter states that "neither can one
justify intervention in the case where the local government does not respect the elementary laws
of justice and humanity". 69 The French scholar Pradier-Fodere, in essence, observed that the
doctrine is illegal since it constitutes a violation of the independence of states. 70 Other writers
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For an exposition on the distinctions between "natural" and "positive" law as applied to humanitarian intervention
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such as Halleck, Bonfils and Despagnet expressed similar views. 52
Nevertheless, the doctrine still had its support among scholars. 53 Some writers, however,
partially accepted the doctrine. They seemed concerned about whether the doctrine could be
incorporated into the principles of traditional international law. Their worries apparently were
heightened by their fundamental ideological or political beliefs regarding sovereignty and nonintervention versus of humanitarianism. Bernard stated that "the positive law prohibits
intervention. However, there may even be cases in which it becomes a positive duty to transgress
positive law."54 Referring to humanitarian considerations, Harcourt argues "Intervention is a
question rather of policy than of law. It is above and beyond the domain of law, and when wisely
and equitably handled may be the highest policy of justice and humanity." 55 Similarly, Lawrence
stated "intervention to put barbarous and abominable cruelty a high act of policy above and
beyond the domain of law." He stated that it "is destitute of technical legality, but it may be
morally right and even praiseworthy to a high degree, international law, therefore, will not
independence of states because the powers that are not directly, immediately affected by these inhuman acts are not
entitled to intervene. If the human acts are committed against the nationals of the country where they are committed,
the powers are totally disinterested. The acts of inhumanity, however, condemnable they may be, as long as they do
affect or threaten the rights of other states, do not, provide the latter with a basis for lawful intervention, as no state
can stand in judgment of the conduct of others. As long as they do not infringe upon the rights of the other powers or
of their subjects, they remain the sole business of the nationals of the countries where they are committed". PardierFodere, Traite De Droit International European et Americain (1885) 655. Quoted in Hassan, "Realpolitik in
International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict 'Humanitarian Intervention' Reexamined" (1980-81) 17
Willamette Law Review 859 at 863 .
52
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century, Pereira, for instance, states: "internal oppression, however odious and violent it may be, does not affect,
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condemn interventions for such a cause." 56 Phillimore maintained that in the absence of a specific
treaty provision, the right of intervention could be exercised only "in the event of persecution of
large bodies of men, on account of their religious belief, in which case an armed intervention on
their behalf might be as warrantable in international law as an armed intervention to prevent the
shedding of blood and protracted internal hostilities. No writer of authority on international law
sanctions such an intervention, except in the case of positive persecution inflicted avowedly upon
the grounds of religious belief. 57
Westlake, one of the prominent English writers of the period on the other hand, recognized a right
to intervene in the interest of humanity, especially in response to popular feeling. He was of the
view that even a single state could exercise this right. 58
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Furthermore, Lawrence forcefully argues for maintaining a right of intervention by stating that: "so prone are
powerful states to interfere in the affairs of others, and so great are the evils of interference, that a doctrine of absolute
non-intervention has been put forth as a protest against incessant meddling. If this doctrine means that a state should
do nothing but mind its own concerns and never take an interest in the affairs of other states, it is fatal to the idea of a
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International Law 4th ed. (London: Macmillan and Co; 1910) at 129, 137-138. Hall also observes that "while
however, it is settled that as a general rule a state must be allowed to work out its internal changes in its own
fashion ..intervention for the purpose of checking gross tyranny or of helping the efforts of a people to free itself is
very commonly regarded without disfavor". Hall, A Treatise on International Law 2nd. Ed. ( 1884) at 265.
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Phillimore, International Law, vol.l, (1879) at 622-623.
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He asserted that "intervention in the internal affairs of another state is justifiable when a country has fallen into
such a condition of anarchy or misrule as unavoidably to disturb the peace, external or internal of its neighbors,
whatever the conduct of its government may be in that respect ... .In considering anarchy and misrule as a ground for
intervention ... the moral effect on the neighboring population is to be taken into account. Where this include
considerable numbers allied by religion, language or race to the population suffering from misrule, to restrain the
fonner from giving support to the latter in violation of legal rights of the misruled state, may be a task beyond the
power of their government, or requiring it to resort to modes of constraint irksome to its subjects, and not necessary
for their good order if they were not excited by the spectacle of miseries which they must feel acutely. It is idle to
argue in such a case that the duty of the neighboring peoples is to look on quietly. Laws are made for men and not for
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Peace, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904) at 305-307.
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By the early 20th century, the right of humanitarian intervention had gained wide
acceptance in the doctrine of non-intervention. 59 Many writers refused to recognize state
sovereignty as absolute. It was a principle that was susceptible to restrictions. Consequently,
absolute sovereignty and non-intervention were relegated to the background in favor of protecting
human values in some situations. 60 According to Borchard:
"Where a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its own
citizens over whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other states of the family
of nations are authorized by international law to intervene of grounds of humanity. When
these human rights are habitually violated, one or more states may intervene in the name
of the society of nations and may take such measures as to substitute at least temporarily,
if not permanently, its own sovereignty for that of the state thus controlled. Whatever the
origin of the rights of the individual, therefore, it seems assured that these essential rights
rest upon the ultimate sanction of international law and will be protected, in the last
resort, by the most appropriate organ of the international community."61
Similarly, Oppenheim stated that "there is no doubt that, should a state venture to treat its own
subjects or a part thereof with such cruelty as would stagger humanity, public opinion of the rest
of the world would call upon the powers to exercise intervention for the purpose of compelling
such a state to establish a legal order of things within its boundaries sufficient to guarantee to its
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citizens an existence more adequate to the ideas of modem civilization."

62

The doctrine of humanitarian intervention had come to be justified as "an instance of intervention
for the purpose of vindicating the law of nations against outrage. For it is a basic principle of
every human society and the law which governs it that no member may persists in conduct which
is considered to violate the universally recognized principles of decency and humanity."

63

It was

grounded upon a minimum standard for the treatment of individuals within a state, or to put it
another way, minimum conditions for the survival of humanity. In situations where these
standards were violated, the offending state was to be held responsible for such actions.
It is worth noting from an examination of doctrinal writings on the subject that, while they
concentrated on the philosophical, religious and ideological foundations of the doctrine, they
failed to provide definite criteria for the exercise of the right of humanitarian intervention. 64
However, gleaning through the various writings it is possible to discern some yardstick for the
exercise of the right. This included, firstly, lack of other interests or motives than for purely
humanitarian reasons on the part of the intervener. 65 Secondly, there must be a preference for

62

Oppenheim, Intemationallaw (London: Longmans & Co; 1905) vol.l at 34 7. The editor of Oppenheim's treatise
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collective action. 66 Thirdly, intervention must be in response to situations such as tyranny, 67
extreme atrocities, 68 and violations of specific fundamental human rights. 69 Lastly, intervention
was to be restricted to certain situations such as "civilized" against "non-civilized nations." 70
Interestingly, an attempt at setting out some normative criteria as to when it is permissible to
exercise the right was provided by Rougier in his "Theory of Humanitarian Intervention" in 1910.
Starting from a critique of the concepts of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention he rejected
the legality of individual intervention but accepted collective action instead, basing his reasons on
various policy and legal grounds. 71
In essence, while there was no unanimity regarding the incorporation of the doctrine of

humanitarian intervention into customary international law, a great number of authorities held
consistent views on the subject matter, acknowledged its existence, and not only sanctioned
permissible intervention but also argued that it was necessary. 72 The doctrine also sought a
balance between the sovereignty of states and certain basic or natural laws aimed at the protection
of human dignity. For, when a state's conduct toward its subjects is such that it leads to
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massacres, brutality, or religious or racial persecution, and when these acts are of such nature that
they shock the conscience of mankind, the international community has the right to intervene to
restore some semblance of civilized conduct. In some situations, such action may even lead to the
removal of a tyrannical sovereign.
The following are the precedents m state practice tended to support such right of
humanitarian intervention.

3- State Practice in the 19th and early 20th Centuries
State practice regarding interventions for humanitarian reasons date back to earlier times.
One of the earliest known cases occurred in 480 B.C .. The Prince of Syracuse, in defeating the
Carthaginians, laid down as one of the conditions of peace that they refrain from the barbarous
custom of sacrificing their children to Saturn. 73 The history of international relations shows many
cases of humanitarian protest and representation by one or more states on behalf of the citizens of
other states. 74 For the most part, and especially from the latter half of the 1ih century,
humanitarian action was undertaken mostly on behalf of persecuted religious minorities and other
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recognizable minority groups.
Perhaps an initial step in the protection of minorities was to be found in the 1555 Treaty of
Augusburg. This affirmed the principle 'whose the region, his the religion' but provided that in
the Free Cities of the Holy Roman Empire Protestants and Catholics, often only constituting small
minorities, were to live "quietly and peacefully. "75 A more significant treaty was the Peace of
Westphalia, providing that:
"For Catholics and Protestants living under the opposite faith, the conditions of public and
private religious worship, which had obtained at the most favorable date in the year 1624,
were to be accepted as decisive and to be maintained. Subjects who in 1627 had been
debarred from the free exercise of a religion other than that of their ruler were by the
Peace granted the right of private worship and of educating their children at home or
abroad, in conformity with their own faith; they were not to suffer in any civil capacity nor
to be denied religious burial, but were at liberty to emigrate, sell their estates or leave
them to be managed by others." 76
As mentioned earlier, Westphalia recognized some rights for both Protestants and Catholics,
rejecting the rights of rulers to change religious practices within their territories arbitrarily. While
there was no provision for international enforcement, the relevant provisions were described as:
"A perpetual Law and established Sanction of the Empire, to be inserted like other
fundamental Laws and Constitutions of the Empire, and the Empire was obligated not to
pass any legislation which would discriminate between Catholics and Protestants."
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Other Treaties of Peace signed during this period included, for example, that between
Brandenburg and Poland, 1657 (Treaty of Velau); between Sweden, Poland, Austria and
Brandenburg, 1660 (Treaty of Oliva); and between the Holy Roman Empire and France, 1679
(Treaty of Nimeguen). 78 All these treaties constituted examples of Roman Catholic intervention
on behalf of their subjects in countries ceded to Protestant sovereigns. One writer notes that
almost without exception, major peace treaties concerning changes of sovereignty contained
clauses protecting the rights and properties of populations transferred to new sovereignties.79
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention as practiced in the 181h and 19th centuries was
mainly concerned with the rights of Christians, although secularization of religious belief led to
the basing of such intervention on behalf of the dignity of man, 80 as well as Jews and other
minority groups in various countries, and in parts of the Ottoman Empire.81 It was mainly done
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through diplomatic channels, although there were cases of military intervention. It was not until
the 19th and early 20th centuries that humanitarian intervention reflected in state practice gained
ground, as the great powers occasionally sought to protect individuals and groups of individuals
against their own states, though power politics was also involved. Although individual states
invoked humanitarian intervention, in most cases, several of the major powers acted collectively
under the aegis of the concert of Europe, typically against the Turkish/Ottoman Empire. 82

1-lntervention in Greece (1827-1830)

During the period 1827-1830, France, Britain and Russia intervened in Greece to
protect the Greek right of self-determination and Greek Christians from the oppressive rule of the
Turks following a number of massacres. 83 This action resulted in acceptance by the Porte of the

question of the situation of Jews in the German Confederated states was addressed. Furthermore, at that same
Congress an obligation was imposed on Holland not to discriminate between the members of all religious faiths
(which included members of the Jewish faith). Also, another example of intervention by one or more of the Great
Powers through diplomacy occurred in 1840 on behalf of the Jews in Rumania, when the government, in breach of
the Treaty of Berlin refused them recognition as citizens and denied them fundamental rights. See generally,
Feinberg, ibid.
82
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"less in the interests of the Ottoman subjects than in order to resolve the conflicting interests of England, Austria,
France and Russia in the Black Sea area". Supra, note 73 at 525. Quoted in Feinberg, ibid. at 492.
83
On the question of motives for that intervention, Stowell notes that the "motives of the intervention would seem to
have been to protect the rights of Greek self-determination". Stowell, supra, note 1 at 126-127. Oppenheim, point out
the interest mainly to be the European powers concern for the Christian population being subjected to great cruelty in
an attempt to forcibly absorb them into the Muslim empire. Supra, note 66, at 2nd. Ed; at 194; The contention that this
intervention was humanitarian in nature is borne out by the terms of the London Treaty of 1827 to which Britain,
France and Russia were parties. The treaty stated that the contracting powers "having moreover received from the
Greeks an earnest invitation to interpose their mediation with the Ottoman Porte, being animated with the desire of
putting a stop to the effusion of blood, have resolved to combine their efforts, and to regulate the operation thereof,
by a formal Treaty, for the object of re-establishing peace between the contending parties, by means of an
arrangement called for, no less by sentiments of humanity, than by interests for the tranquility of Europe". British and
Foreign state papers, vol.l4, (1826-1827), 633, quoted in supra, note 33 at 22. For a detailed discussion see supra,
note 34 at 280-283.
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1827 London Treaty by which they agreed that bloodshed would be put to an end through limited
employment of military troops, 84 and ultimately in the independence of Greece in 1830. Turkey
rejected the proposal, arguing that the matter was an internal affair. Therefore, the three powers
intervened in Greece with military force. As mentioned, the major powers indicated in the
London Treaty that their action was mandated "no less by sentiments of humanity, than by
interests for the tranquility of Europe. " 85 On the question of whether considerations other than
humanitarian were involved, Brownlie points out the fact that a realist might see this action from
the perspective of the powers being afraid of a unilateral Russian intervention. 86 This comment,
perhaps, recalls the presence of power politics in the arena of international relations. The tendency
of powerful states to invade weaker ones for a variety of reasons
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cannot be discounted.

Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that a number of scholars have accepted this intervention
as based on humanitarian considerations. 88 More recent writers have pointed out that the desire to
eliminate impediments to European commerce mixed with unrest was one of the motivations of
the intervening state, and that the intervention could be considered a lawful exercise of treaty
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United States in 1891 and 1905 against anti-Semitic outrages in Russia". Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order
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humanitarian intervention mainly because its primary motive was to bring an end to the effusion of blood and the
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concessions previously obtained from Turkey by Russia. Neither position is wholly convincing.
The action of the intervening states evidences a belief that widespread killing of persons is a
matter of concern to other states and can serve as a basis for their intervention, yet, the
intervention cannot be regarded as one conducted by states operating under the purest of motives,
and the justification stated does not reflect explicit reliance on a right to humanitarian intervention
under international law.

2- Intervention in Syria (1860-1861)

From the 16th century until World War 1, Syria was composed of Lebanon, Jordan,
Israel, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza, and constituted an integral part of the Ottoman Empire.
89

For centuries before the Ottoman conquest of Syria, the mountains of Lebanon were a refuge for

persecuted religious communities, particularly Maronite Christians. Turkish rule led to the
suppression and massacre of thousands of Maronite Christians by the Muslim population.
Consequently, France was authorized by Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Turkey,
meeting at the conference of Paris of 1860, to intervene in Syria to restore order. As a result 6,000
French troops were deployed. A constitution of the Lebanese region was adopted requiring a
Christian governor who was responsible to the Porte. The French forces withdrew in 1861 after
accomplishing their tasks. 90
Although the Sultan was a formal party to this intervention as a result of the protocol of
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Stowell, supra, note 1 at 63.

°For details of this intervention see Ibid. at 63-66 .
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Paris, Turkey assented "only through constraint and desire to avoid worse." 91 This constraint was
deemed lawful by virtue ofhumanitarian considerations involved. 92
Some writers of the pre-Charter era have characterized this case as one of humanitarian
intervention; others have been skeptical regarding the innocence of the Christian population.
While motivation of the European powers appears humanitarian in nature, the Turkish consent to
the European powers by signing the protocol of Paris argues against regarding this case as
evidencing the legality of nonconsensual humanitarian intervention. If we question the validity of
the Turkish consent, it seems clear that Turkey agreed to the French intervention only through
constraints and to avoid worse. Rather, the case reflects a weakness of the Ottoman Empire in
becoming progressively incapable of maintaining consistent control over certain of its regions and
conceding the growing influence of the European powers.

3- Intervention in the Island of Crete (1866-1868)

As a result of several years of persecution and discrimination at the hands of the Turkish
authorities on the island, the Christian population of Crete revolted against the Ottoman rulers in
1866 and proclaimed union with Greece. The European powers called for the establishment of an
international Commission of Enquiry to investigate the allegations. Turkey refused on the grounds
that the issue was one that fell within its domestic jurisdiction. Great Britain stepped in as a
91

Ibid. at 66.
Some writers have questioned the humanitarian objectives involved here, contending the French expeditionary
force stayed on the after rescue operations were completed and actually behaved like an occupational force. See for
example, supra, note 89. For further discussions on the French intervention in Syria see, Pogany, "Humanitarian
Intervention in International Law: The French Intervention in Syria Re-examined" (1986) 35 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 182; Kloepfer, "The Syrian Crisis, 1860-61: A case Study in Classic Humanitarian
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neutral mediator, offering friendly advice to Turkey, and thus preventing armed intervention.
Consequently, the Turkish government adopted a constitution deemed acceptable to the Christian
population as well as making commitments for the protection of human rights. 93

4- Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria (1876-1878)

Russian intervention in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1877 offers an illustration of
state practice. Following Turkish misrule and harsh treatment of the Christian populations of
Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria within the Ottoman Empire, the concert of European powers
became concerned about the possibility of the creation of effective and equal guarantees for the
rights of the Christian population of these areas in comparison with the rights enjoyed by the
Muslim inhabitants of the Empire. 94 The European powers requested that an international
commission operate in the areas to observe and protect the Christians. Turkey rejected the
proposal but the powers signed a protocol stating that they reserved the right of action should
Turkey fail to maintain the minimum conditions demanded in these areas. Russia declared war on
Turkey with the consent of Austria, Prussia, France, and Italy.
The war between Turkey and Russia ended with the preliminary treaty concluded between
them at San-Stefano. This treaty provided the basis for deliberations and the adoption of the
Berlin Treaty of 1878. By this treaty, a system of Christian autonomy was set up for Bulgaria and
Montenegro, the independence of Serbia and Rumania were recognized, and Bosnia and
93

Supra, note 33 at 26-29.
In describing the situation at the time, Stowell quotes Morley as saying: "fierce revolt against intolerable misrule
slowly blazed up in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a rising in Bulgaria, not dangerous in itself, was put down by
Turkey troops ... with deeds described by the British agent who investigated them on the spot, as the most heinous
crimes that had stained the history of the century". See Stowell, supra, note I at 127.
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Herzegovina were occupied and annexed by Austria-Hungary. 95 It further provided for freedom of
worship and for the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of religion where it concerned
the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employment, and the right to the
exercise of any profession in any locality in all of these states or territories. 96
Although this case appears to have been justified by the overriding humanitarian concerns
of the major powers, it also portrays the inherent risks in exercising the right of humanitarian
intervention. The British government insisted at the time that whatever the repressive nature of
Turkish rule over the Bulgarian, Herzegovinians, and Bosnians, the Russian intervention,
sanctioned by the other powers, "based in theory upon religious sympathy and upon humanity
was a move, in fact, upon the Straits and Constantinople, in pursuance of Russia's century long
program. ,.97 One writer suggests, and as a fact pertaining to this example, the "alleged
humanitarian motives were influenced or affected by the political interests of the intervening
state."
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It appears that there was lack of inclusive supervision in implementation which

facilitated abuse by Russia, ultimately resulting in only partial relief for the victims of oppression
and misrule. 99

5- Intervention in Macedonia (1903-1908-1913)

Another case of intervention in the Ottoman Empire occurred in 1903. In the
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course of a rebellion, fuelled partly by attempts to convert the Christian population in Macedonia,
Turkish troops committed atrocities by attacking the civilian population and destroying many
villages with a considerable loss of life. Austria-Hungary and Russia, acting under the aegis of the
European powers, demanded the Sultan put into effect a program to provide for among other
things, future protection of the population including taxes as reparation for the loss and
destruction suffered by the local population. 100 Although Turkey accepted the demand, there was
a subsequent revolution which led to new atrocities in Macedonia. This led to a declaration of war
by Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia on Turkey. The war ended with the signing of the 1913 Treaty of
London, wherein Turkey ceded the greater part of Macedonia for partition among the Balkan
allies.
Although the Balkan allies were not able to invoke treaty commitments of the 1878 Berlin
Treaty, they did not hesitate to resort to armed force. They justified their action on the grounds of
humanitarian concern for the continuing atrocities that were being perpetrated upon the
Macedonian population. 101

6- Intervention in Cuba (1898)

American action against Cuba in 1898 could possibly be characterized as a case of
humanitarian intervention. 102 Following the rebellion of Cubans against Spanish rule, the
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example of humanitarian intervention, others have seen it as "the powerful influence of endangered investments and
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President of the United States reserved the right of intervention. In President McKinley's war
message to Congress, he declared the purpose of the United States intervention, among other
things, as being "in the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed,
starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either
unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country,
belonging to another nation, and therefore none of our business." 103
A joint resolution ofCongress 104 authorized an armed intervention by the United States in
Cuba leading to the defeat of Spanish forces. A general election was held on the Island under the
authority of the United States, a constitutional convention was convened and within two years the
Republic of Cuba was established.
While other motives may have prompted the United States' action, the evidence points to
the presence of humanitarian ideals as well, and thus may well be considered to fall within the
ambit of intervention for the cause ofhumanity.
Perhaps a general observation to be made is that international scholars examining these
various cases of intervention have recognized that, while the motives were not always pure and
treatment which the military authorities were inflicting upon the non-combatant population in their futile efforts to
suppress the insurrection". Stowell, supra, note I at 120. Von Glahn also cites the American action in Cuba as an
instance of humanitarian intervention. Von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law
(New York: MacMillan Publishing Co; 1992) at 165.
103
Quoted in Thomas & Thomas, supra, note 1 at 22.
104
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independent and that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserted its determination when that is
accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people". Ibid. at 23. This statement hints at the
altruistic nature regarding motives for undertaking the action in Cuba. Brownlie contends the ·~oint Resolution of
Congress approved on 20th April 1898 justified the intervention in terms of American interests". Brownlie, supra,
note 63 at 46. Lillich opposes this contention by referring to the Preamble to the Resolution which mentions
"abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba and which have shocked the
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humanitarian intervention. Lillich, "Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a plea for Constructive
Alternatives" in Moore ed; Law and Civil War in the Modem World (Baltiomre: John Hopkins University Press,
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were most often dictated by political advantage, the motivations of the intervening powers were in
fact humanitarian. 105 In each of these cases, the sovereign authorities were either involved in
committing atrocities or did nothing to prevent the killing of innocent individuals or groups
within their territories. In sum, the humanitarian motives, for example, behind the Concert of
Europe's recurrent interventions in Ottoman affairs should probably not be dismissed as false. 106
By the early 20th century there was less willingness to intervene for the sake of
humanity. 107 Following World War I, the principles of humanitarian intervention as reflected in
state practice were manifested in treaties protecting minority rights. The guarantees of human
rights and collective intervention were vested in the League of Nations as a principal organ to
ensure the treaties were kept, 108 with ultimate recourse to the Permanent Court of International
Justice for interpretation. 109
In the 1920s, the minority system of the League worked quite well 110 but broke down after

1931 in the face of the threat of totalitarian aggression. 111 States were either singly or collectively
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unwilling to intervene in the name of humanity. This unwillingness was shown by the Powers, for
example, in the light of Hitler's false argument of oppression of Aryan minorities and consequent
aggressive action, resulting in the incorporation of Austria into Germany, the disintegration of
Czechoslovakia and the partition of Poland. 112 Again, there was no intervention in the mass
extermination of Jews in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. 113
In light of Nazi Germany's aggression and the arguments used to support it, Thomas and

Thomas observed that the ideal of humanitarian intervention for the protection of minorities "was
twisted and warped into a cloak for illegal intervention." 114 Opponents of the doctrine have cited
these cases of unjustified interventions of other nations as a fundamental reason why the doctrine
should not be recognized by the international community. The problem here relates to
distinguishing the credible exercise of the right from the non-credible. 115 These cases of
misapplication of the doctrine do not strip it of its inherent value as a safeguard for the protection
of humanity.
In sum, the discussion suggests that state sovereignty has coexisted with intervention for

the sake of humanity since the establishment of the state system. Humanitarian intervention is
based on the notion that sovereign jurisdiction is conditional upon compliance with minimum

fundamental in European politics thus playing a major role in frustrating the work of the League of Nations as a
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standards of human rights. 116 Thus, an offending state which has abused its sovereign rights
cannot claim absolute sovereignty. The content of sovereign authority is not immune from state
action to protect humanity. In situations of grave violations of human rights members of the
international community should step in for humanitarian considerations. These considerations and
precedents in state practice motivated the international scholars to document the legality and cases
in which the doctrine has been invoked. 117
While the doctrine's writing is wider, state practice was limited to conventions such as
peace treaties and minority treaties. The precedents show in some cases a tendency to abuse the
doctrine, or the presence of mixed motives in undertaking state action. However, the crucial
concern of the intervening states is related to oppressive and inhuman treatment suffered by
populations under the jurisdiction of sovereign authorities who were supposed to protect their
rights.
In conclusion, it seems clear that the argument supporting the doctrine has its grounds in

recognized sources of international law as the views of international scholars and treaties
indicate. 118 In addition, the many cases during the 19th and early 201h centuries in which states
invoked humanitarian grounds to justify intervention abroad constituted sufficient evidence of
state practice to permit recognition of the right of humanitarian intervention. As Lillich stated,

Ibid.
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"the doctrine appears to have been so clearly established under customary international law that
only its limits and not its existence are subject to debate." 119 ##
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CHAPTER THREE

The Right of Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Charter Era

1- Introduction
Every so often an event happens and compels a re-examination of traditional doctrines of
international law. Such a re-examination occurred after World War I and II conflicts that led to
the creation of the United Nations, new norms were codified in treaties and conventions, and
fundamental changes occurred in the legal field of international relations. 71 A great event such as
the end of the Cold War again is challenging traditional readings of international law and the
behavior of states. Traditional interpretations of sovereignty non-intervention in the internal
affairs, and non-use of force and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention are facing great attack
in the dramatic changes of the world following the end of the Cold War. There is a lively debate
occurring at the UN General assembly and the Security Council about whether or not intervention
by the UN or other actors to stop gross and systematic violations of human rights with grave
humanitarian consequences should override the principles of national sovereignty, territorial
integrity and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. Some countries are strongly
opposed to the norm of humanitarian intervention, others sympathize with it, and many other
countries are trying to make up their minds about accepting or rejecting it.

In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to show that the principle of humanitarian
71

Examples of changes in international law following World War 1 include the League ofNations and its associate
Covenant, the Mandates system, the Kellog-Briand Pact, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the
International Labor Organization. In aftermath of the World War 11, the United Nations and its specialized agencies
were established, the International Court of Justice resumed the work of its predecessor, regional organizations were
created, and scores of international treaties and conventions of profound significance were came into force.
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intervention coexisted with the development of state sovereignty, and that customary international
law permitted intervention in support of humanity under certain circumstances. The promulgation
of the United Nations Charter following World War II affirmed a set of principles and norms that
are directed towards governance of the international system, or at least, aimed at influencing
interactions among states. 72 If the UN Charter, a document intended to be the primary basis for
international relations, created a new international order, then did the right of humanitarian
intervention survive into this order? The legal principles that guided the early evolution of the
humanitarian intervention doctrine, according to some commentators, are no longer valid with the
prohibition of the use of force under the Charter. 73 However, a school of thought holds that the
institution of humanitarian intervention still exists. 74 This chapter investigates the evolution and
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strength of humanitarian intervention in the UN Charter during the Cold War era. Specific Charter
provisions relating to non-intervention and human rights as well as international legal instruments
beyond the Charter such as conventions, resolutions and declarations are examined. It is argued

tlt.at the international human rights regime, at least in principle, constitutes limitations on the
sovereignty of states which have accepted the respective agreements. This however, does not
suggest the non-importance of sovereignty since the conclusion of these covenants are themselves
acts of sovereignty. Thus a norm of justified intervention is grounded in the UN Charter, the
human rights declarations and covenants. In addition, the extent to which state practice
recognized the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is examined.

2- Evolving Norms
A- Principles of State Sovereignty and Non-intervention

humanitarian intervention by the UN as opposed to unilateral action by states. Still others opt for a limited right of
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The UN Charter provides in Art. 2(1) that the "Organization is based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its members." 75 This underlines the importance of the principle of
state sovereignty in daily intercourse between states. The complementary principle of state
sovereignty in international law is non-intervention. This principle provides that no state should
be subject to interference in its internal affairs. 76 This follows directly from the assumption that
each state is a sovereign actor capable of deciding its own policies, internal organization and
independence. Thus, the principle has played a great role in the evolution of the international
order which now exists. However, the desirability of this order has come under increasing
challenge during the 201h century. 77 An international community of independent and sovereign
states is no longer unquestioningly regarded as the most appropriate or even the most desirable

The sovereign equality of states is a concept of law that must be distinguished from the political equality of states.
The concept is an umbrella category that includes within its scope the recognized rights and obligations which fall
upon states. The 1970 declaration on Principles of international law which recognizes this provides that: "all states
enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are all equal members of the international
community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature. In particular, sovereign
equality includes the following: (a) states are juridically equal; (b)each state enjoys the rights inherent in full
sovereignty; (c) each state has the duty to respect the personality of other states; (d) the territorial integrity and
political independence of the state are inviolable; (e) each state has the right freely to choose and develop its political,
social, economic and cultural systems; (f) each state has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its
international organizations and live in peace with other states". These are what Robert Jackson characterizes as the
constitutive rule of sovereignty game. See Jackson, 'quasi-states, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory: International
Jurisprudence and the Third World" (1987) 41lnternational Organization 519.
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burden his subjects too heavily or treat them too harshly, the ruler of another state may not resist that by force. For no
ruler of a state has a right to interfere in the government of another, nor is this a matter subject to his judgment".
Wolf, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractum (1749), Sees. 255-257. Quoted in Benneh, "Review of the Law of
Non-intervention" (1995) 7 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 139 at 140. Both Wolf and Vattel
recognized the observation of the non-intervention because acts of intervention necessary infringe upon state
sovereignty (although Vattel carved out an exception by allowing intervention in a civil war for a just cause)Their
conclusion was reached by drawing an analogy between individuals have a right to their independence. By analogy,
states have a similar right. Intervention was thus seen to be a violation of that bright. On this basis Vattel identified an
international legal order comprising independent states "closed or sealed off from one another. See Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton Univ. Press, 1974) 27-31; Carty, The Decay of International Law? A
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of rules of non-intervention was historically linked to the response of Latin American states in the 19th century to
intervention by the United States and European powers.
77
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mode of organization for the future of humanity.78 Given the significance of the non-intervention
principle in sustaining this order, it is no wonder that the principle is now being placed under
close investigation.
Support by states for adherence to a broadly formulated principle of non-intervention can
be found in their reading of the UN Charter and other international legal instruments. The most
vigorous adherents of a policy of non-intervention have been the weaker states, mostly the Third
World states, apprehensive of severe limitation on their sovereign rights by the more powerful
states in the international system. 79
The starting points for analyzing this principle have been Articles 2 (4) and 2(7) of the UN
Charter. Art. 2(4) states"all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN", while Article 2(7) states that:
"nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to
submit such matter to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.'' 80
This prohibition or apparent prohibition of the threat or use of force is subject to a number of
limitations provided for in the Charter. Specific exemptions from Article 2(4) and other
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international instruments prohibiting the use of force, however, do exist. These are: actions taken
or authorized by the UN in certain circumstances; 81 the use of force in individual or collective
defense; 82 military action against a former enemy state; and certain actions taken pursuant to
regional arrangements or agencies authorized by the Security Council. 83 It is sufficient to note for
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See Chapter VII of the Charter which contains provisions for self-defense or forceful measures authorized by the
Security Council.
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Art. 51 of the Charter states: "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this
right of self-defense shall be immediately reporedecurity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security". While some commentators regard as questionable
whether the protection of nationals abroad falls within the ambit of At.51, other have argued humanitarian
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(Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications Inc; 1967) at 20. Although Bowett admits that intervention for protection of a
state's own nationals still exists as part of the traditional right to self-defense, he contends that its use must meet the
normal conditions of self-defense. These requirements include failure by the territorial state to extend protection for
aliens in accordance with international law; the existence of an actual or imminent danger requiring urgent action;
and lastly, the actions taken must be proportionate and confined to the necessities of freeing the nationals from
danger. However, he expresses doubt as to the validity of a right of intervention on behalf of aliens, grounded on
purely humanitarian reasons as a category of self-defense in the absence of a link of nationality. Supra, note 2 at 45.
See also, Bowett, "The use of Force for the Protection of National Abroad" in Cassese ed; The Current Regulation of
the Use of Force (Dordrecht: Martinus NijhoffPublisherS, 1986) AT 39-55, Hassan holds the conviction that "even if
the protection of nationals was guaranteed under self-defense, extending this rationale to the protection of foreigners
is a distortion of the Charter's language" . Supra, note 2 at 888. Scheffer however, laments the "paradox of
international law that while this customary rule to permit missions to rescue endangered nationals has been
recognized, armed intervention to rescue thousands or even millions of people whose lives are at stake because of a
government's repressive conduct somehow has not met the test of legitimacy under the UN Charter." He argues the
"conventional characterization of rescue operations as acts of self-defense or self-help is an artificial distinction that
should be scrapped. Interventions to rescue nationals from life-threatening dangers in another country are
humanitarian in nature and should be recognized strictly for that purpose, and not as some extended application of
national self-defense". Scheffer, "Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention" (1992) 23 University of
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considered illegal, should be scrapped since humanitarian considerations are involved in both situations. There
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now that, leaving aside the exceptions mentioned, the interpretation of Article 2(4) for some
scholars indicate a total and complete prohibition of force in international relations. 84 The
majority of states during UN debates favored an absolute interpretation of the Charter's
prohibition of intervention. 85 This view appeared to have been articulated in other international
legal instruments. The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, 86 adopted by the General
Assembly in 1965, it has been argued, did not only outlaw "armed intervention" but went beyond,
condemning also "all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of
the state."
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In addition to that declaration there is the more fundamental Declaration of Principle

of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among states in accordance
with the Charter of the UN adopted in 1970. 88 This resolution, while approving the principles
articulated in the 1965 Declaration as the "basic principles" of international law, and laying down
a broad non-intervention principle, perhaps merely restating Article 2(7) in detail, ended with the
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at 209-211.
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condenmed. No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political, or other type of measures to coerce
another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights, or to secure from it
advantages of any kind. Also no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, invite or tolerate subversive terrorist or
armed activities directed towards violent overthrow of the regime of another state or interfere in civil strife in another
state.
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Fairley, :state Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: Reopening Pandora Box ( 1980) 10
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 29 at 43.
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G.A. Res. 2625,25 UN GAOR Supp. (No.28) at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970). Reproduced in (1970) 9
International Legal Materials 1292. See also, the 1974 UN Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res.3314, UN GAOR,
Supp. No. 31, at 142, UN Doc. A/9631 ( 1974). Reprinted in ( 1975) 69 American Journal of International Law 480.
This document defines aggression as "the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
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Council (and nor other state actors removes this label. See Verwey, supra, note 2 at 389.
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usual caveat that "nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as affecting the relevant
provisions of the Charter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security." 89 It
should be noted that, despite the general pronouncements of non-intervention both in the General
Assembly debates and in statements of the various state delegations, there were fewer opinions
expressed and little condemnation of humanitarian intervention during the course of the UN
debates. At the General Assembly debates on the "question of defining aggression, and on
principles concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states," representatives of Mali,
Jamaica, Senegal, Chile and the Netherlands spoke out in favor of intervention to remedy gross
violations of human rights such as genocide. 90 Opposed to such a doctrine were China, Israel,
Panama, Mexico, Romania and a handful of others. 91
Similarly, general prohibitions of intervention have been written into the Charter of the
African Union, the Charter of the Organization of American States, and in the principles of the
Final Act ofthe Helsinki Conference in 1975 (Helsinki Accord) following on from the conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe process 92
These declarations, however, are not ordinary treaties or conventions, and like general
assembly resolutions do not create binding obligations on states. Nevertheless, Fairley argues
"there is a wide consensus that these declarations actually established new rules of international
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Franck & Rodley argue that the Resolution brooks no exception, not even for the protection of human rights and
that its clarity is not obscured by the addition of a paragraph reiterating the obligation of states to respect the right of
self-determination and human rights" Franck & Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention
by Military Force 1973 67 American Journal of International Law 275 at 299-300.
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See, supra, note 14 at 216; Ronzitti, supra, note 2 at 106-107.
91
Ibid.
92
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law binding on all states"

93

and that the support generated for this idea certainly enhances its

persuasive value ... "94
However, it is impossible to identify in a set of comprehensive rules the difference
between permissible and impermissible acts of intervention. 95 Most interactions between states
occur under pressure and inducement, thus the non-intervention norm stands little chance of
affecting behavior if it excludes what occurs everyday as normal world politics. 96 Indeed, the
inconsistency between states' pronouncements on the prohibition of intervention and their actual
responses to the use of force is evident. India's use of force in East Pakistan in 1971, Tanzanian
intervention in Uganda in 1978, Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in 1979, and India's use of
its air force to drop supplies to Tamils in 1987 are some examples. There is clearly a longstanding
contrast between what is preached (non-intervention) and what is actually practiced
Beyond state rhetoric and practice this complex subject matter has received little scholarly
consensus. 97 The issue of what is permissible and impermissible intervention, however, is a
relative one. As far back as 1923 the Permanent Court of International Justice, in its advisory
opinion in the National Decree case pointed out:
"the question whether a certain matter or is solely or not within the jurisdiction of a state is
an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of international relations. It
may well happen that, in a matter which is not in principle regulated by international law,
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the right of a state to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by obligations which it
may have undertaken towards other states. In such a case, jurisdiction which in principle
belongs solely to a state is limited by the rules ofintemationallaw." 98
Therefore, what was once an internal matter for states may become issues subject to international
inquiry and thus for international concern. This is the case with the internationalization of human
rights issues.
It is pertinent to rethink the prevailing assessment of the non-intervention principle due to
its unsatisfactory nature. The context of intervention practice has changed; thus, the principle
needs reformulation and some coherence to take account of developments in international
relations. The identification of international law with society conceived in terms of states emerged
largely with the growth of positivist theories and the ascendance of the nation-state as the
predominant actor in the global arena. This development is rapidly changing with the emergence
and influence of non-state actors in international relations. Modem practice demonstrates that
individuals have become increasingly recognized as participants and subjects of international law.
They possess certain rights which the states must accept, and states are subject to international
scrutiny regarding their human rights practices. If the increase in and growing concern about
violations of human rights is taken into account, which the principle of non-intervention fails to
take into account, then a justification for reexamining the principle will be in order and of the
utmost importance.
Also it has been argued that the major concern of the UN in 1945 was to identify ways of
prohibiting the use of force which in large measure accounted for the significance attached to the
principle of non-intervention. But the consequence of this blanket prohibition of the use of force
98

Nationality Decree in Tunis and Morocco (1923) PCIJ, Series B no.4, 24, 27.

79

is that there is no possibility of discriminating on a normative basis between divergent uses of
force. For example, as currently constituted, it is difficult to distinguish between the Soviet
Intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1977. In the
former case, the human rights of the citizens were clearly violated by the intervention, whereas in
the later case, the effect of the intervention was to promote the human rights of the citizens. 99
From this perspective, therefore, the principle of non-intervention is becoming increasingly
irrelevant. 100 According to Levitin, the concern with war was legitimate after the Second World
War; today, however, the danger of world war has receded, while grave violations of human
rights have become a routine feature of international politics. Therefore, the principle of nonintervention needs to be revised. If international law is to be more relevant in these circumstances,
it must become "more nearly congruent with its moral bases."

101

An argument to similar effect is also made by Teson, who, however, identifies a

"congenital tension between the concern of human rights and the notion of sovereignty- two
pillars of international law."

102

This tension generates a major dilemma for all concerned about

the normative dimensions of international relations because, if intervention is prescribed to
promote human rights, then the door will be opened to "unpredictable and serious undermining of
world order." But if intervention is prohibited even to check human rights violations, then the
principle of non-intervention involves a "morally intolerable proposition whereby the
international community is impotent to combat massacres, acts of genocide, mass murder and
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widespread torture."
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He asserts that it is only individuals who have rights. Sovereignty therefore, does not constitute an
inherent right of the state. In other words, a sovereign derives its rights from its citizens and has
no separate identity. He associates international legal theories that attempt to defend the
autonomous moral standing of states and government with the 'Hegelian Myth' that states have
inalienable rights. For him, the legitimacy of the state can only be justified it if promotes the
rights of all its citizens. Where the state fails to perform this duty, it loses its legitimacy and the
protection afforded by the principle of non-intervention. Other states under these circumstances
are entitled to intervene in order to remedy the human rights violations which have taken place.
Teson's argument can be viewed in two ways: either opening up an exception to the nonintervention norm, or returning to the Grotian position of permitting intervention provided the
cause is just. 104 This builds on other theorists who have taken an increasingly permissive attitude
on intervention, and who are not concerned about the traditional justification underlying nonintervention. 105

8- The Internationalization of Human Rights

Before 1945, the protection of human rights was predominantly a matter of domestic
jurisdiction. Customary international law contained no limitations upon the freedom of the state to
treat its own citizens at its own discretion. Treaty obligations in the field of human rights were
scarce and limited in scope (slavery, minorities etc).
One of the goals of the allied powers during World War II was the realization that only
Ibid.
Little, supra, note 6 at 25.
105
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international protection and promotion of human rights can achieve international peace and
progress. 106 This was a reaction to the atrocities of the Holocaust, which provided the impetus for
the struggle for human rights. The Charter thus provided initial principles for the protection of
human rights. One of its basic purposes, as stated in Article 1(3), is "promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights". Similarly, under Article 55, 107 the members of the UN reaffirm a
commitment to promoting uruversal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all. Under Article 56, all members of the UN "pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55."
In the view of some legal scholars these provisions in themselves establish a legal

obligation for states to observe human rights and, consequently, human rights issues are a matter
of international concern outside the scope of Article 2(7). Other legal scholars consider this view
as too far-reaching in light of the broad wording of the Charter provisions on human rights and
the fundamental character of Article 2(7). However, it is probably generally recognized that states
have in any case legal responsibility under the Charter for gross and systematic violations of
human rights. This view finds support in the practice of the International Court of Justice. In 1971
the Court held that the South African policies of apartheid in the territory of Namibia constituted
106

The preamble of the Charter declares the determination of the peoples of the world "reaffirming faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in equal rights of men and women" and a
commitment "to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the
common interests". In finding the connection between the maintenance of peace and security and the protection of
fundamental human rights, Lauterpacht notes "the correlation between peace and observance of fundamental human
rights is now a recognized fact. The circumstances that the legal duty to respect fundamental human rights become
part and parcel of the new international system upon which peace depends, adds emphasis to that intimate
connection". Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (London: Stevens, 1950) at 186.
107
Article 55 provides: "with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, the UN shall promote: "among conditions universal respect for, and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion".
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"a denial of fundamental human rights and a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of
the Charter."

In spite of differing opinions on their legal effect, the actual practice of the UN has that it
has not been prevented from investigating, discussing and evaluating human rights abuses and
today even taking action despite the numerous constraints which the Organization faces. It would
seem that the Charter provisions regarding human rights represent binding legal obligations for all
states. 108 The cumulative effect of these provisions is that intervention to prevent human rights
abuses is still valid. 109 While it may be doubtful whether states can be called to account for every
alleged violation of the general Charter provisions, there is little doubt that "responsibility exists
under the Charter for any substantial infringement of the provisions, especially when a class of
persons, or a pattern of activity are involved."
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Elaborating and supplementing the Charter provisions on human rights is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted by the General Assembly on 101h December
1948. The Declaration became the objectives of the UN Charter after the atrocities that followed
the Second World War. It proclaims a whole gamut of civil, political economic, social and
cultural rights pertinent to human existence. The Declaration at the very least serves as a yardstick
in measuring the degree of respect for, and compliance with, international standards of human
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rights.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 111 and the Optional Protocol on
communication petitions, were adopted by the General Assembly and entered into force on March
23, 1976. The Covenant defines and sets out in much greater detail than the Universal Declaration
a variety of rights and freedoms. In addition it contains a number of rights that are not listed under
the Declaration. It imposes an absolute and immediate obligation on each of the states parties in
Article 2( 1) to "respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant without distinction of any kind .... "
Under Article 2(2) each party "undertakes to take the necessary steps .... to give effect to the
rights recognized in the present Covenant" where a right is not already protected by existing
legislation.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted in 1966
entered into force in 1976. It contains 31 Articles and is divided into five parts. It elaborates upon
most of the economic, social and cultural rights provided for under the Universal Declaration, and
frequently sets out measures that should be undertaken to achieve their realization. Under the
Covenant, the duties of state parties are merely to take steps "to the maximum of its available
resources" aimed at achieving "progressively the full realization" of these rights. This provision
seems realistic given the fact that economic constraints on states, (especially Third World
countries) may prevent the immediate enjoyment of those rights. 112 However, the question is
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999 UN Treat Series 171 . Reprinted in Newman & Weissbrodt, Selected International Human Rights Instruments
(Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co; 1990).
112
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conjunction with Article 55 and 56 of the UN Charter which creates an obligation on all members of the UN to assist
in these efforts; although no specific provision can be found in the text of the Covenant or in its legislative history.
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whether it is within the discretion of state parties do determine when available resources permit
their realization. It has been suggested that:
"the principle of progressive realization really means that a state is obligated to undertake
a program of activities including but not limited to specific measures listed in the
Covenant indicates that priority should be given to this area and that the level of effort
should increase over time." 113
On the issue of standards to be applied under the Covenant, it is maintained that different
measures would have to be adopted as a matter of practical reality, since no two states are likely
to have the same "available resources."
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Despite these instruments, there are also a host of declarations, conventions and
instruments adopted by the General Assembly explaining specific obligations pertaining to
particular human rights.'' o The General Assembly in 1970, for example, expressed the general
position of the international community by stating "the international conventions and declarations
concluded under the UN auspices give expression to the moral conscience of mankind and
represent humanitarian standards for all members of the international community." The UN by
and large plays only a supervisory role in the implementation and enforcement of action. One
writer suggests it may be classified as "weak" to "strong" depending upon how directly and
quickly it acts in response to complaints. 116

Programs" in Meron ed; Human Rights in International Law, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) at 216.
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A number of institutional arrangements have been established which are designed to deal
with the promotion and protection of human rights. These arrangements constitute the
international human rights regime. The UN's efforts in this regard have been through the use of
committees, commissions, sub-commissions, specialized agencies and working groups. The main
techniques employed in their enforcement measures have been communications, inquiries,
investigations, periodic reports, advisory services, global studies of specific rights or groups of
rights, and recommendations. It uses global and regional conferences and seminars on various
specialized topics, open to individuals and organizations, to make them aware of human rights
values articulated in international instruments. 117
The Human Rights Committee is the principal organ responsible for implementing the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 118 It has adopted a dynamic approach to
protection by reminding state parties that their obligation under the Covenant is not only limited
to respect for human rights, but also to ensure the enjoyment of those rights.
The Commission on Human Rights, under Article 68 of the Charter, is mandated to
establish "commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights." The
commission is instructed to report its recommendations on violations to the Economic and Social
Council. The commission has created various programs for the promotion of human rights, as
well as developing international machinery to deal with violations, such as special rapporteurs
Pennsylvania Press, 1989) at 186-187.
117
Topics covered in such conferences have included: human rights in developing countries; the participation of
women in the economic life of their states; human rights and scientific and technological development; women,
equality, development and peace; and human rights teaching. The significance of these topics help to promote
penetrating discussions of deeper issues of injustice underlying human rights violations.
18
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and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol" (1977) 12 Texas International Law Journal 141. See also Procedure
for Dealing with Communications Relating to Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 27,
1970, Ecosoc Res 1503 (XL VIII), 48 UN ESCOR, supra, (NO. lA) 8, UN Doc. E/4832/Add. I (1970).
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and working groups. 119
Despite the efforts of the UN aimed at promotion and protection, there are still widespread
human rights violations. 120 Apart from weaknesses in the implementation procedures, the main
problems encountered relate to: governmental commitment; problems of perspectives and
priorities; problems in the field of fact-finding; problems stemming from institutional structures;
the primitiveness of remedial responses, methods and procedures; responsibilities in the
information process; and problems of resources. 121 As presently constituted, these mechanisms
fail to deal with situations involving massive human rights violations, as past practice has shown.
In their survey of the UN Human Rights machinery, Pease and Forsythe indicate most

states not only allowed these treaties to originate from UN bodies, but also that more than half of
the international community became legal parties to them. About a quarter of the international
community have accepted monitoring systems of differing strengths for the supervision of the
implementation of these internationally recognized norms. Although few states objected to the
overall process, "there is an overwhelming official consensus that at least the discussion of human
rights is a proper international subject matter, even if many disagreements remain over defmition
and implementation. "122
Apart from the UN human rights machinery, it also worthwhile noting that most of the
world's regional organizations have enacted treaties supporting the protection of human rights.
Example of these treaties are the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the
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American Convention of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People Rights. 123
The strongest universal testimony to the development in the field of human rights was adopted by
the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on June 25, 1993. In the concluding
document-the Vienna Declaration and Program Action-, which was unanimously adopted by all
the members of the UN, it is unequivocally stated in paragraph 4 that "the promotion and
protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community." These
instruments have helped in crystallizing legal norms in favor of human rights so that everyone is
now entitled to certain basic human rights under UN Conventions, regional treaties and bilateral
agreements. 124
The various developments on human rights outlined above have had a significant effect on
the status of individuals in international law. Each step of progress made in terms of concepts,
standards setting, procedures and mechanisms leads to a realignment ofthe position of individuals
in relation to states. 125 If the above examination broadly speaking is correct, then it portends or
indicates a gradual shift in thinking about absolute notions of state sovereignty and its corollary
principle of non-intervention. 126 It is becoming increasingly accepted that human rights violations
within states will not preclude the taking of international action to redress those situations of
abuse. Gross systematic violations of human rights have become a concern of the whole
international community and not just a matter exclusively within the domestic purview of states,
constituting infringement on their sovereign rights. These human rights treaties not only create
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binding legal obligations among states parties, but they also provide evidence of state practice and
new attitudes regarding human rights. Particularly significant is the trend reflected in the
Preamble to the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, which
suggests that human rights treaties merely codify what is intrinsic in the human condition.
It "recognizes that the essential rights of man are not derived from one's being a national
of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human person, for which reason they merit
international protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or complementing the protection
provided by the domestic law of the American states." 127
The extension of this principle into the international arena suggests a theoretical shift in the
conception ofhuman rights. 128
Although there were significant developments regarding human rights prior to the Charter,
the human rights provisions of the Charter and the international human rights instruments
discussed above were a watershed. Since the inception of the UN human rights regime, human
rights issues have become important, and their internationalization has been increasingly
recognized. Even though this is the case, and one finds an ethos of moral universalism underlying
the international human rights instruments, one does not find any explanation why the human
rights provided for are in fact human rights and why they should be accepted as universal. Taking
action in support of human rights necessarily confronts objections of cultural relativism.
Supporters of cultural relativism point out that it is impossible in a culturally diverse world to
have universal notions of human rights. While the objective here is not to resolve the debate one
way or the other, although a universal conceptualization of human rights is preferred, it tends to
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explain the issues at stake in the international hwnan rights discourse. The significance of
arguments about moral universalism should therefore serve to support the examination of the
universality of the UN hwnan rights instrwnents. Thus, some remarks about the concept of human
rights and the debate it engenders will be appropriate.
The concept of human rights does not lend itself easily to any precise definition. 129
Although the concept eludes any precise defmition, it can be argued that hwnan rights are our
entitlements as hwnan beings, which we may demand from one another and from our societies. 130
The idea of hwnan rights is tied to the idea of hwnan dignity: rights are essential for the
maintenance of hwnan dignity. They are based on elementary human needs as imperatives. 131
Human rights are universal and inalienable. They exist by virtue of the right-holder's existence.
They are not created or granted by the state or some agent and, therefore, cannot be taken away.
The practical effect of this would be that rights are not creations of society, state or any political
authority, legitimate or not, and thus cannot be limited or taken away by them. If this were the
case, then it would follow that all hwnan beings have rights in the same way and to the same
extent regardless of race, culture, political system or any other distinction. 132 The conviction that
hwnan beings have certain rights, which governments have a duty to respect, essentially, is a
reaction or response to a feeling of revulsion occasioned by acts of political, religious or
economic repression. The universality of human rights is a feeling of moral outrage. This
consciousness draws on the moral resources of humankind's belief that there is an underlying
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universal humanity, and that it is possible to achieve or strive to achieve a type of society that
ensures that fundamental human needs and reasonable aspirations of human beings all over the
world are effectively realized. 133
The renaissance of natural rights and its consequent influence upon international human
rights is regarded as a product of Western liberal thoughts and its justifications for claims about
the truth, immutability and universality of rationally accessed moral dicturns. 134 This conceptual
approach, however, does not necessarily have universal acceptance throughout the world. The
concept of human rights can assume different meanings to different societies, and is influenced
depending on a particular society's perception by culture, economics, politics and religion among
other factors.

' "o

Polis and Schwab, for example, criticized the establishment of human rights

norms by expressing an objection to ethnocentrism thus:
"unfortunately not only do human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration reveal a
strong western bias, but there has been a tendency to view human rights historically and
in isolation from their social, political, and economic milieu."

136

This particular moral-cultural relativist position which presents theoretical obstacles to human
rights activism essentially asserts, firstly, that rules about morality vary from one place to another.
Secondly, the way to understand this heterogeneity is to place it in its cultural context. Thirdly, it
asserts that moral claims derive from, and are enmeshed in, a cultural context which is itself the
source of their validity. There is no universal morality because the history of the world is the
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history of the plurality of cultures. The attempt to assert universality is more or less a welldisguised account of the imperial practice of making the values of a particular culture general.

137

In this respect, the United Nations human rights regime, as enshrined in such documents as the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are futile proclamations derived from the moral
principles valid in one culture and thrown out into the moral void between cultures.

138

In effect

the particular is presented as the universal.
In practice, most governments accused of human rights violations often resort to the

doctrine of state sovereignty to deny the legitimacy of external criticism. This defense, however,
is commonly strengthened by some form of cultural relativism. This relativism underlies the
assertion of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. The argument usually goes that
outsiders are not competent in matters relating to solving problems internal to another culture.
Thus, a particular interpretation or even the basic idea of human rights may be alien to a particular
culture so that such a culture should not be judged by standards emanating from external
sources. 139
There are few relativists, however, who advocate the extreme position that whatever is, is
right, reducing relativism to subjectivism where, in the absence of grounded criteria, every
individual may determine what is right or wrong, good or bad, for himself.
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According to

Puchala, the most readily defendable moral relativist position is the one provided for in the
Bangkok Declaration, adopted at the World Conference Regional Preparatory Meeting in April
1993. In that Declaration, the Asian states agreed that human rights need to be considered in a
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context that takes into consideration "the significance of national and regional particularities and
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds". 141 Puchala argues that the moral relativist
position turns out to be unsustainable for the following reasons:
"First, relativism tends to confuse empirical facts of difference in moral codes with
philosophical justification for differences. Simply because there are differences does not
mean that all the alternatives are right or acceptable. Second, the justification for
relativism itself has to be philosophically located beyond relativism. That is, moral
relativism can only be right if we all accept the universality of dictums such as mutual
tolerance and noninterference in one another's affairs. Third, and at a more practical level,
even the relativists balk in the face of the morally atrocious human rights sacrifice,
ritualistic mutilation, slavery, genocide, apartheid, concentration camps, gulags and gas
chambers. To explain why such atrocious behavior is immoral invariably requires
reaching for universals, and when presented with such behavior most relativists
accordingly reach out. Finally, there also exists the damning assertion that relativism is
itself immoral because, in the name of community standards, noninterference, political
correctness, or the like, it leads to the condoning of principles and practices that are widely
distasteful."

142

He argues for the reassertion of moral universalism by pointing out that if moral relativism is
unjustifiable and is unsustainable, then it would seem that the contemporary debate about the
universality of human rights, if engaged philosophically, would result in an impasse. And if this
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were the case, the question of whether the UN human rights regime is to remain intact or to be
done away with would become an issue of politics, power and money only, which could well be
for the benefit of Western countries.

143

According to Puchala, a strong case for moral universalism which does not depend for its
justification upon either the will of God or the immutability of natural law can be made. He
employs the aid of anthropologists who argue that scholars usually fmd what they seek. Those
who have sought differences among cultures have found them. By the same token, those who
have sought similarities among cultures in recent works have also found many, especially in the
realms ofmorality.
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Furthermore, studies in contemporary psychology have reinforced the proposition that:
"human beings are genetically wired and cognitively equipped to behave morally."

145

These

studies conclude that all human beings are similarly constituted regarding their moral capacities.
The differences among them have only to do with different attainments of moral maturity.
Accordingly, human beings achieving similar levels of moral maturity, irrespective of culture,
have similar conceptions about the bases of right and wrong. 146 Also, sociologists of religions
have found that the ethical contents of the major religions of the world are similar in their
emphases upon such ideals as charity, civility, humility, piety and non-violence. 147
Perhaps the international community's inability to agree on a universal concept of human
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rights stems from the failure of perceiving what the most basic human needs are according to just
priorities of each society. Individual and societal needs may vary from one environment to
another at any given period of time. It is probably best that the international community perceives
and recognizes this. However, concerns of humanity as a whole should outweigh any cultural
preferences of different societies. As Puchala points out:
"our entitlement is not a claim on God or nature, but a claim on one another. The basis of
our morality is in our obligation as human beings (individuals and in our societies) to
allow and help one another to flourish as human beings. And since the human essence is
universal, requirements for human flourishing are universal, obligations to promote such
flourishing are universal, and therefore, so is human morality."

148

In sum, the status of humanitarian intervention is linked to the status of human rights. Greater
respect for human rights will make the international community more likely to engage in actions
to protect those rights when violated.

3- The UN Charter's Effect on Humanitarian Intervention

A consideration of the relevant principles of the Charter will now be undertaken to
determine the justification for humanitarian intervention. 149 In arguing the survival of the right of
humanitarian intervention, the domestic jurisdiction norm becomes pertinent. The starting point is
the interpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. According to some scholars, emphasis must
be placed on the need to interpret that provision broadly and consistently with its plain language.
148
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It is the fundamental provision of an organization established to "save succeeding generations

from the scourge of war". It cannot therefore be subject to an interpretation that would negate its
true meaning and content. 150 The conclusion reached for an absolute prohibition of use of force in
any manner, it is argued, is further reinforced by an examination of the travaux preparatiores that
led to the drafting of Article 2(4). 151
I

Support has been also found by commentators in international case law such as the Corfue
Channel Case .152 While this case can be distinguished on the ground that it did not touch directly

on the principle of humanitarian intervention, arguments have been made to the effect that the
Court's "judgment should be interpreted as condemning all intervention, self-protection or self-
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help involving the use of force- including humanitarian intervention." 153 Therefore, according to
this interpretation of the Charter, the ban on the use of force was provided to preserve territorial
integrity and political independence of states, its collective security measures were to ensure
peace, and therefore unilateral humanitarian intervention is rendered illegal. 154
However, a qualification must be placed on the prohibition of the use of force under
Article 2(4). 155 Intervention for human rights purposes would not contravene that provision if it is
confined within the conditions for its exercise. 156 It is argued that Article 2(4) is not an absolute
prohibition of the use of force; for, if force is used in a manner which does not threaten the
"territorial integrity or political independence of a state, it escapes the restriction of the first
clause." 157 Thus, Schachter observes that: "if these words are not redundant, they must qualify the
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all-inclusive prohibition against force." 158
In essence, Article 2(4) does not cover territorial inviolability so that a state's territorial

integrity may be preserved even though there is a limited armed force in that state's territory. 159
On the contrary, views have been expressed to the effect that even in situations where a rapid
withdrawal by the intervener takes place when its mission is accomplished without a dissolution
of the existing authoritative structure, that intervention will still temporarily violate the targets
state's territorial integrity and political independence. Akehurst argues: "any humanitarian
intervention, however, limited, constitutes a temporary violation of the target state's political
independence and territorial integrity if is carried out against that state's wishes." 160 On the same
subject matter, Higgins notes "even temporary incursions without permission into another state's
air space constitute a violation of its territorial integrity." 161 Levitin opines that a more sensible
reading of Article 2(4) is that "a state's political independence is compromised whenever another
state attempts through armed force to coerce it, to limit its choices on the international plane, or to
interfere with its domestic political regime." 162 Nanda, however, advocates a cautious approach by
arguing for a limited use of force for humanitarian purposes, which he suggests is permissible in
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international law, even though a temporary breach of a state's territorial integrity is occasioned. 163
In any case, it is argued that, provided conditions and limits set out under international law

are met, there would be no violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of the
target state. 164 Since humanitarian intervention does not seek to challenge attributes of
sovereignty, or territorial or political independence of a state, it will not fall within the scope of
the Article 2(4) prohibition of force norm.
The other Charter provision deserving consideration in dealing with the right of
humanitarian intervention is Article 2(7), which as mentioned earlier establishes the principle of
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. This Article, it seems, protects states against
international action and activities occurring strictly within their territorial boundaries. Thus, it
becomes significant to determine whether human rights issues and their protection are matters
lying essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. For, if they are, then any right of
intervention for whatever purpose would appear to be precluded.
The interpretation of this clause has been qualified despite its assertive nature. 165 In the
past, the UN has found that matters lying within a state's domestic jurisdiction provided no
impediment to de-colonization

166

or anti-apartheid actions. 167 In the same vein, some state treaty
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obligations affecting sovereignty and territorial boundaries cannot be regarded as matters "within
domestic jurisdiction." 168 As states make commitments "to a larger and more intrusive regime of
international treaties and conventions, and as customary international law expands its reach, the
concept of "domestic jurisdiction" shrinks. 169 If the further condition of essentiality mentioned in
Article 2(7) is taken into account, issues subject to international inquiry become considerable, 170
and call for reorientation of priorities. Fundamental human rights must take precedence over any
norms of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.
In stressing the need for balancing the rights of states (as mentioned in the Charter) against

individual rights affirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights
conventions, Javier Perez de Cuellar, former Secretary-General of the UN, challenged the
traditional construction placed on Article 2(7). He maintained that a new balance must be struck
between sovereignty and the protection of human rights. 171
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Scheffer argues "domestic jurisdiction" does not exempt everything within sovereign borders from scrutiny of the
international community any more than the domestic jurisdiction of the city of Toledo shields its government and
residents from the reach of Ohio state law, federal law, or for that matter international law". Scheffer, supra, note 11
at 261.See also, supra, note 27.
170
Ibid.
171
He writes "I believe that the protection of human rights has now become one of the keystones in the arch of peace.
I am convinced that it now involves more a concerted exertion of international influence and pressure through timely
appeal, admonition, remonstrance or condemnation and, in the last resort, an appropriate UN presence, than what was
regarded as permissible under traditional intemationallaw.
It is now interestingly felt that the principle of non-interference within the essential domestic jurisdiction of states
cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated
with impunity. The fact that, in diverse situations, the UN has not been able to prevent atrocities cannot be cited as an
argument, legal or moral, against the necessary corrective action, especially where peace is also threatened.
Omissions or failures due to a variety of contingent circumstances do not constitute a precedent. The case for not
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As already mentioned, it is now increasingly accepted that human rights issues are no
longer strictly within the domestic purview of states. It is a matter of concern for the whole world
community.172 Consequently, human rights abuses prompting humanitarian action are no longer a
"matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state", and so will not amount to a
violation of the non-intervention principle. It should also be noted that Article 2(7) ends with a
critical provision: "this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII," which deals with enforcement actions to maintain international peace and
security. It should be noted that the Security Council is now engaging in more Chapter VII
enforcement actions in matters that were previously considered within the domestic jurisdiction of
states. The practice of the Security Council can be seen to have modified the concept of
"international peace and security" to include grave humanitarian crises, and it is generally
recognized among Western legal scholars that the Security Council now has an exclusive right to
impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of states is by itself indubitably strong.
But it would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this day and age, includes
the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian
populations in the name of controlling civil strife or insurrection. With the heightened international interests in
universalizing a regime of human rights, there is a marked and most welcome shift in public attitudes. To try to resist
it would be politically unwise as it is morally indefensible. It should be perceived as not so much welcome shift a
new departure as a more focused awareness of one of the requirements of peace". J Perez de Cuellar, Report of the
Secretary- General on the Work of the Organization: 1991 atbll-13. Quoted in Scheffer, supra, note II at 262-263.
172
See Fonteyne, supra, note 3 at 241. According to Lauterpacht, "human rights and freedoms having become the
subject of a solemn international obligation and of one of the fundamental purposes of the Charter, are no longer a
matter which is essential within domestic jurisdiction of the members of the UN". Lauterpacht, International law and
Human Rights (Praeger: N.Y., 1950) at 178. Another writer has also concluded that massive human rights violations
"are no longer essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states, and therefore the principle of non-intervention is
not applicable". F. Ermacora, "Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction (Art. 2(7) of the Charter) "(1968) 124
Recueil Des Courrs bk.II, 371 at 436. Beyerlin states that although this issue is still highly debatable, "the scope of
domestic jurisdiction in human rights matters seems to be narrowing" . See , supra, note 2 at 214-215 . As rat contends
that while unilateral humanitarian intervention does not appear to be valid under contemporary international law, it
does not mean states do not have the legal option of compelling governments to redress human rights abuses. They
could resort to non-violent reprisal since respect for basic human rights has been held to be the "concern of all states
and to constitute an obligation erga omnes. He cites the ICJ decision in the Barcelona Case to support this position.
Asrat, supra, note 2 at 185. The Court stated that obligations of this type "derive, for example, in contemporary
international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination. See Barcelona Case Judgment 1970) ICJ Report 3 at 33. This case therefore lays
down the proposition that obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole derive from, among
others, the principles and rules concerning the rights of the human person.
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authorize the use of force for the purpose of preventing or stopping widespread deprivations of
internationally recognized human rights.
Article 2(7) does not affect the right of humanitarian intervention. 173 For, if the most basic
rights are not protected, governments will engage in gross violations of human rights without fear
of punishment. Attempts by other states aimed at protesting the occurrence

174

of human rights

violations will only meet with rebuff under the cloak of non-intervention in domestic matters.
In addition to the above considerations, some proponents express their concern over the

preservation of humanity, arguing that the value of human life takes precedence over legal
principles. Thus, basic humanitarian feelings lend credence to the view that states cannot remain
indifferent while massive human rights violations take place. 175
Another reason for continued justification of the right of humanitarian intervention lies in
the failure of the UN in realizing its original aims. The founding fathers of the organization
expected states would take collective action under the aegis of the UN in situations of "threats to
the peace","breaches of the peace" or acts of aggression, rather than rely on unilateral state
action. 176 The Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter is seized with mandatory
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Ganji states "with regard to action pertaining to the international protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms that the provisions of the Article 2(7) cannot be invokes". Ganji, supra, note 59 at 135. Iillich asserts the UN
definitely has the legal right to intervene for humanitarian reasons if a state violates fundamental human rights an
actual threat to the peace. Lillich, "Intervention to protect human rights" (1969) 15 McGill Law Journal 205 at 212. It
has been further suggested that human rights concerns have been placed outside the scope of article 2(7) even in cases
not amounting to a threat to the peace. See Reisman & McGougal, supra, note 3 at 189, 190-191 .
174
Lillich writes: "to require a state to sit back and watch the slaughter of innocent people in order to avoid violating
blanket prohibitions against the use of force is to stress black letter at the expense of far more fundamental values".
Lillich, "self-help", supra, note 3 at 344.
175
Leff, "Food for the Biafrans" N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1968 at A46, Col.3, quoted in Farer, "Humanitarian
Intervention: The View from Charlottesville" in Lillich, ed; supra, note 2 at 151. Leff puts it tersely in context of the
Biafrans war thus: "I don't care much about international law, Biafra or Nigeria. Babies are dying in Biafra. Forget all
the blather about intemationallaw, sovereignty and self-determination, all that abstract garbage: babies are starving to
death". Ibid.
176
see articles 39-51 of the Charter. On the issue of the appropriateness of unilateral intervention by a state in the
interest of humanity. See Westlake, International Law, Part I; Peace (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 191 0) at 318-
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jurisdiction to take action in those situations. 177 This machinery for collective security and
enforcement has, however, proved to be largely ineffective.'v" Thus, if the Security Council failed
to act under such circumstances, "the cumulative effect of Articles 1, 55 and 56 would be to
establish the legality of unilateral self-help." In effect, "the deterioration of the Charter security
regime has stimulated a partial revival of a type of unilateral jus ad bellum"(recourse to war). 179
This "contemporary doctrine relates only to the vindication of rights which the international
community recognizes but has, in general or in a particular case, demonstrated an ability to secure
or guarantee." 180 Included in this category of rights is humanitarian intervention. 181
Thus, individual states may undertake humanitarian intervention for there exists "a
coordinate responsibility for the active protection of human rights: members may act jointly with

320.
177
Articles 39-44 of the Charter. Also, by the "Uniting for Peace Resolution", where the Council is unable to
function, the secondary authority of the General Assembly becomes operative. The Assembly may thus perform
duties and powers ofthe Council. See also Green, "The Little Assembly" (1949) 3 The Yearbook of World Affairs
169.
178
Soon after the Charter regime came into effect, Jessup observed, "it would seem that the only possible argument
against the substitution of collective measures under the Security Council for individual measures by a single state
would be the inability of the international organization to act with the speed requisite to preserve life. It may take
sometime before the Security Council, with its Military Staff Committee, and the pledged national contingents are in
a state of readiness to act in such cases, but the Charter contemplates that international actions shall be timely as well
as powerful" .Jessup, supra, note 86 at 170. McDougal and Behr, in a comment that is still valid today, note "the most
difficult problem still confronting the framers of the United Nations" Human Rights Program is that of devising
effective procedures for enforcement". McDougal and Behr, "Human Rights in the United Nations" (1964) 58
American Journal of International Law 603 at 629. Lillich points out that the UN's inability to function effectively in
intervening for humanitarian purposes by citing Friedmann's comments that "a combination of the failure to establish
a permanent international military force and existence of the veto power, has effectively destroyed the power of the
United Nations to act as an organ of enforcement of international against a potential lawbreaker" and concludes: "the
effective power of using military lesser forms of coercion in international affairs essentially remains with the nations
states". Supra, note 3 at 170-171. Bazyler observes that "when mass slaughters occur, and the United Nations fails
act, the possibility of the individual state action must remain open". Bazyler, supra, note 3 at 577, footnote 130.
Examples of the UN's inability to act swiftly abound in state practice, which will be discussed in the next section. An
examination of the UN's role in the 1990s in so far as humanitarian purposes are concerned will also be undertaken in
the next Chapter.
179
Reisman, "Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law (1985) 10 Year Journal of International Law
279 at 281.
180
Ronzitti, supra, note 2 at xi.
181 Ibid.
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the organization .... or singly or collectively."

182

Were this not the case, as McDougal and

Reisman contend, it "would be suicidally destructive of the explicit purposes for which the UN
was established. 183
In sum, the argument here is that the provisions of the UN Charter, declarations and

covenants constitute an elaborate international human rights regime that provide justification for
intervention in the protection of those rights.
At least in principle, the basis for humanitarian intervention is grounded in prior
agreement about the internationalization of human rights as appeared in articles 55 and 56 of the
UN Charter and the International Bill of Human Rights. The international human rights regimes
are gradually having the effect of changing the treatment of its own citizens from an issue of
domestic concern to matters within the domain of the international. Thus action to support them is
not impermissible intervention contrary to article 2(7). 184 The advent of the UN Charter suggests
that the customary humanitarian intervention still exists, and is not inconsistent with the purposes
of the UN. Thus, in the event of the failure of collective action under the Charter, there is a revival
of forcible self-help measures to protect human rights. This is supported by the doctrinal writing.
182

McDougal & Reisman, "Response by Professors McDougal & Reisman" (1969) 3 International Lawyer at 438444
183
Ibid; at 444.

184

For critics who make the argument that even if customary international law recognized humanitarian intervention prior to 1945,
the Charter's general prohibition in Article 2(4) has had such an impact on customary international law that the doctrine can no
longer be valid, Teson responds by arguing that: first, one has to prove that subsequent state practice is consistent with the absolute
prohibition". This, he demonstrate, is not the case. Furthermore, he argues "those who take that view-that the Charter radically
changed the law in 1945-must also deal with the equally revolutionary impact of the law of human rights upon traditional
international law". He concludes: "any one who in the face of the impressive rise of human rights concerns simply asserts that post
1945 international law must be seen as containing a rigid prohibition of war, even to remedy serious human rights deprivations
carries a considerable burden of proof. There was a customary principle prohibiting the use of force at the time the Charter was
adopted. In contrary, the human rights articles of the Charter opened the door to a much more innovative development; a concept
of the law of nations as centered on the individual, not the nation-state". Teson, znd ed; supra, note 3 at 157.
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As Reisman and McDougal argue, the UN Charter not only confirmed the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention but also strengthened it. They state that "the Charter strengthened and
extended humanitarian intervention, in that it confirmed the homocentric character of
international law and set in motion a continuous authoritative process of articulating international
human rights." 185

185

Reisman and McDouglas, supra, note 3 at 171. Even though Wolf in this regard favors the survival of the right of
humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter, he arrives at that conclusion via a different route. Although he admits that the
prohibition on the use of force was intended to be absolute, and that the original intent of the framers of the UN Charter was not to
strengthen humanitarian intervention, nevertheless, he demonstrates that state practice can modify the Charter, and such
modification for him, is legitimate because it is not inconsistent with the general purposes of the Charter. See Wolf, supra, note
199 at 363, footnote 168.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Case Studies of State Practice of the Right of Humanitarian
Intervention during the Cold War Era (1945-1989)

/-Introduction
Interventions during the Cold War era were limited and episodic, and might be considered
humanitarian. The competing arguments will be examined in relation to state practice in cases
where intervention by a state ended gross violations of human rights and the international
community's responses to such intervention. Since the UN Charter was established, states have
undertaken a number of interventions which have been justified on the basis of humanitarianism
or characterized as humanitarian interventions. In examining the extent to which state practice
supports the right of humanitarian intervention or otherwise, it is important, however, to keep in
mind the facts relating to gross human rights violations, the extent to which humanitarian
considerations were a factor in the decision of one's state intervention in another, and the
humanitarian outcomes achieved by the intervention. Examples of these interventions constitute
relevant state practice in so far as they involve making compelling cases for humanitarian
intervention. Force has been used, arguably, for humanitarian purposes in the following cases: the
Congo intervention (1964); the Dominican Republic intervention (1965); the East Pakistan
intervention (1971); the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda (1979); and the Vietnam intervention
in Cambodia (1978). Even though these cases have been frequently cited as supporting the right
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of humanitarian intervention, In assessing these cases, I am trying to find out whether the
intervening state's main reason for intervening was to prevent the severe and widespread
deprivation of human rights. If this is not the case, then the intervention is not humanitarian in
nature. Due to the level of human rights violations which had occurred, the reasons given, and the
humanitarian outcomes achieved, it appeared that a case for unilateral humanitarian intervention
could be made.

1-Belgium and the United States' Intervention in the Congo (1964)

On July 30, 1960, Belgium granted the Democratic Republic of the Congo its
independence. In September 1964, rebels fighting the Congolese central government took 2000
foreigners living in Stanleyville as hostages, with the objective of pushing for certain concessions
from the government. When the government rejected their demands, they started to kill the
hostages. The situation was made worse by threats of more killings. 186 Efforts to secure the
release of the hostages failed. As a result and by the consent of the central government, Belgium
with the United States' assistance intervened in the Congo, evacuating the endangered persons on
a mission that lasted four days. Some 2000 people were evacuated to safe areas, and all of them
were foreigners. 187 The intervening forces withdrew from the country upon completion of their
mission.
The intervention was condemned in the Security Council by many African states, as well as the
Soviet Union. The African states insisted at the time that even as the operation went on - with the
186

A telegram from a rebel general to an officer in charge of the hostages was allegedly intercepted which read: "in case of
bombing region, exterminate all without requesting further orders". United States Department of States Bulletin ( 1965), at 18.
Quoted in Lillich, Self-help, supra, note 3 at 339. See also, ibid; at 185.
187
Lillich, ibid.
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rescue of the white foreign residents - innocent blacks were being killed in the process, which
smacked of racism 3 Perhaps this point was driven home to emphasize the idea that the rescuers
valued the lives of one particular group of people (white) more than another (black). While an
accurate account of whatever took place during the operation is still lacking, 4 there is some degree
of certainty that its fundamental purpose was aimed at saving lives given the dangerous situation
posed by rebel activities in the region. This was evident in the fact that Congolese (including
other Africans) as well as people of other nationalities were rescued.5
Belgium and the United States justified their intervention as a humanitarian rescue
mission carried out with the authority of the legitimate government of the Congo. A statement by
the US Department of State read:
"This operation is humanitarian not military. It is designed to avoid bloodshed not to
engage the rebel forces in bloodshed. Its purpose is to accomplish its task quickly and
withdraw, not to seize or hold territory. Personnel engaged are under orders to use force
only in their own defense or in the defense of the region and Congolese civilians. They
will depart from the scene as soon as their evacuation mission is accomplished."

3

6

Supra, note 18 at 288. Some African delegate expressed their dislike for the whole operation at the UN. The Congo
Brazzaville delegate for example had this to say: "why, in a conflict in which the Congolese are fighting between
themselves, should there be no concern for the safety of the civilian population in general and why should the fate of
the whites to be the sole consideration?". I 9 UN SCR, 1 I 7th meeting 14 ( 1964 ), Quoted in Weisberg, "The Congo
Crisis 1964: A Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention" (1972) 12 Virginia Journal oflntemational Law 261 at 267.
4
Franck and Rodley, ibid. It has been pointed out that while the facts are unclear as to responsibility for the deaths of
several blacks, the circumstances indicated an active role played by the white mercenaries of the Tshombe army.
Weisberg, ibid.
5
While the primary aim of the intervening forces was to rescue their own nationals, the overall humanitarian
consideration was not absent. This is evident, for example, from the statement f the US ambassador to the UN that
"while our primary obligation was to protect the lives of American citizens, we are proud that the mission rescued so
many innocent people of 18 other nationalities from their dreadful predicament". United States Department of State
Bulletin ( 1965) at 17. Quoted in Lillich, "Self-help", supra, note 3 at 340.
6
United States Department Bulletin (1964), at 842. Quoted in ibid.

108

Similarly, the Belgium official stated that:
"In exercising its responsibility for the protection of its nationals abroad, the Belgium

government found itself forced to take this action in accordance with the rules of
international law, codified by the Geneva Conventions. What is involved is the legal,
moral and humanitarian operation which conforms to the highest aims of the United
Nations: the defense and protection of fundamental human rights and respect for national
sovereignty."7
What is noted about the mission is that it was undertaken with express authorization of the
Congolese government. It was understood that the intervening forces would withdraw as soon as
the operation was completed, which was done. 8 Thus, it could be argued that this satisfied the
requirement of consent by the de facto government of the target state in a situation in which it was
unable to protect the lives of the endangered nationals. While this consent factor adds to the
legitimacy of the intervention, it should, however, not be treated as the necessary prerequisite in
the circumstances of this case.
This intervention, however, is subjected to criticism. It was motivated by some broad
political and economic objectives. Some African states, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Poland and the
Soviet Union considered the mission as a pretextual humanitarian intervention intended to support
the central government of Tshombe's power. 9 References were made to colonialism and the fact
that the Stanleyville operation was a dangerous precedent which might threaten the independence

7

See Note of the Belgian representative to the president of the Security Council dated 24th November, 1964. UN
Doc. S/6063; SCOR, Supp. Oct-Dec. 1964, at 189-192.
8
Lillich, "Self-help", supra, note 3 at 340.
9
See, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1964 (New York: United Nations, 1966) at 96-98.
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of African states. 10 Perhaps these criticisms were launched due to the fact that by the time the
foreign troops withdrew, Tshombe's position vis-a-vis the rebels had been strengthened. One
writer thus concludes that ''the combined military operation was enough to destroy the rebel
stronghold. It is clear that this had been the prime objective of the United States and Belgian
policy from the beginning." 11 It suggested that, if the central government gained any advantages
from the mission, that would possibly be pure coincidence. Of course, the rescue operations
would necessarily have involved some kind of conflict with the rebels in the process of releasing
the hostages.
Despite these criticisms other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France,
supported the Belgian intervention at the UN. The United Kingdom stated that the intervention
was only humanitarian and that the international community should commend it. 12 France
declared that Belgium could not be considered an aggressor since the purpose of the action was
that of saving human lives. The French delegate noted that "The Belgium mission of protecting
lives and property is the direct result of the failure of the Congolese authorities and is in accord
with a recognized principle of international law, namely, intervention on humanitarian
grounds. " 13 Italy held that Belgian troops had intervened to keep law and order and to prevent
more serious incidents from occurring. Argentina supported the Belgian intervention, calling it
legally justifiable, and finally the Ecuadorian position was not one of outright condemnation of
the intervention. 14
A possible legal justification for this intervention is that this intervention was conducted at
10

Ibid. at 96.
Verwey, supra, note 2 at 401.
12
15 UN SCOR, 873'd Meeting, 13 July 1960, para. 130. Cited in Ronzitti, supra, note 2 at 31.
13
15 UN SCOR, 873'd Meeting 13 July 1960, para. 144. Quoted in ibid.
14
ibid.
11
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the invitation of the Congo government and it involved the rescue of endangered nationals .. With
regard to the consent factor, some writers, such as Professor Brownlie, have suggested the legality
of the intervention was grounded in the fact that it was undertaken at the request of the Congo
government and thus was not based on the principle of humanitarian intervention. With regards to
whether the central government of the Congo was in effective control of the country at the time,
one writer argued that "if a customary principle of international law that intervention is
permissible if requested or authorized by the legitimate government survives the Charter" then
"there is little reason humanitarian intervention, which is also a principle of customary
international law, cannot be regarded as having survived the Charter." If the total context of the
mission is taken into account, the argument would be that "the United States treated the
Congolese invitation as just another factor permitting it to participate in a humanitarian
intervention, rather than as the sine qua non of such intervention's legitimacy." 15 In addition, the
Congo action was not only undertaken to protect its nationals since the United States justified its
action, in part, as an intervention to protect the lives of citizens of the Congo, its own nationals
and those of other foreign countries. The majority of scholars who have examined this case have
deemed it to be lawful.
The Stanleyville operation was undertaken in situations in which both the UN and
Organization of African Unity (OAU) were unable to act quickly because of the urgency of the
situation in the Congo. It is quite clear that circumstances justifying humanitarian intervention
were present. This justification for the operation confirmed its humanitarian character in addition
to the fact that humanitarian outcomes were achieved. Significantly, this intervention was not

15

Somarajah, "Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention" ( 1981) 11:1 Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law 45 at 65; Lillich, "Self-help", supra, note 3 at 340.
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condemned by the Security Council, which could be interpreted as an implied approval of the
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in this case. 16 Lillich, for example, reaches the
inescapable conclusion that "if ever there was a case for the use of forcible self-help to protect
lives, the Congo rescue operation was it. " 17

2-The United States' Intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965)

The events preceding and following the Dominican Republic intervention seem to be
much more complicated than the Congo situation. Briefly, the interim military government which
toppled the constitutional government of President Bosch in a coup in 1963 was subsequently
challenged by a revolt on April 24, 1965. 18 As a result, civil strife broke out which left the
Republic without an effective government. This was followed by the breakdown of law and order.
On April 28, 1965 the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic in order to protect US
nationals and nationals of other countries in the wake of spreading events. 19
In justifying its intervention after the first 500 marines were sent in, US President Johnson

said "for two days American Forces have been in Santo Domingo in an effort to protect the lives
16

See 19 UN SCOR. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 328 UN Doc. SIRes 129 (1964); De Schutter, "Humanitarian Intervention:
A United Nations Task" (1972) 3 California Western International Law Journal. 21 at 23.
17
Supra, note 127.
18
For a more detailed account of the facts see for example, Thomas & Thomas, supra, note 11; Slater, Intervention
and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Crisis (New York, 1970); Nanda, "The United States's Action
in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order-Part I" ( 1966) 43 Denver Law Journal 439; (part 11) ( 1967)
44 Denver Law Joumal225.
19

Prior to sending its forces into Santo Domingo, a note had been sent to the US Embassy signed by Colonel Benoit, president of
the Military Junta to the effect: "regarding my earlier request I wish to add that American lives are in danger and conditions of
public disorder made it impossible to provide adequate protection, I therefore ask you for temporary intervention and assurance, in
restoring order in this country". ( \965) 4 International Legal Materials at 565. It is, however, doubtful to rely on this note as a
request for intervention since it appears that at the time there was no effective government in control of affairs in the country.
However, Lillich notes that the US, tom between inaction or going in to help one of the contending factions, " .chose instead a
more complicated and, .. ..ore constructive course. It landed troops in the Dominican Republic in order to preserve the lives of
foreign nationals-nationals of the United States and many other countries". Meeker, "The Dominican Situation in the Perspective
of International Law" United States Department of State Bulletin (1965) at 62. Quoted in Lillich, "Self-help", supra, note 3 at 340.
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of Americans and nationals of other countries in the face of increasing violence and disorder. " 20
He further indicated in greater detail that:
"We didn't intervene. We didn't kill anyone. We didn't violate any embassies. We were
not perpetrators. But we had to go in the Congo to preserve the lives of American citizens
and haul them out when they were being shot at, we went into the Dominican Republic to
preserve the lives of American citizens and citizens of other nations. While some of the
nations were denouncing us for going in there, their people were begging us to protect
them." 21
Given the situation in the Dominican at the time, the reasons given for the intervention, and the
fact that thousands of foreigners were indeed evacuated,

22

it is not difficult to point out the

humanitarian rationale involved here. Action by the UN or the Organization of American States
(OAS) in terms of consultations and negotiations would have proved costly in terms of lost lives
given the time span within which some immediate action was needed.
The situation in the Dominican Republic, however, runs into problems when, inconsistent
with their earlier objectives, the United States declared later that its aim was to prevent a
communist take-over? 3 It didn't leave the Dominican Republic but remained for a year, with a
troop build up of over 20,000 military personnel. The reasons offered for this presence was that
the breakdown of law and order necessitated the preservation of a situation for a period of time

20

21
22

New Times, May I, 165, at 6, co1.4.
United States Department of States Bulletin ( 1965) at 20. Quoted in Lillich, "Self-help", supra, note 3 at 342.
See Security Council Debate, 3-4 May, 1965, United Nations Year Book 1965, at 141.
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See, Nanda, part II, supra, note at 225 and accompanying notes 6-16. President Johnson had declared in
connection with the crisis that "the American cannot, must not and will not permit the establishment of another
communist government in the western Hemisphere. This was the unanimous view of all American nations when, in
January, 1962 they all declared, I quote: "the principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the
American system". Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1965, at 245.
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which would enable the OAS to act collectively.

24

Subsequently, an Inter-American Peace Force

was established aimed at maintaining, among other things, the security of Dominican Republic
nationals, the protection of human rights and the restoration of conditions to normal. This drew
criticisms from some states that the establishment of this force was a prohibited intervention in a
situation of domestic conflict. 25
Some states, such as the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and China, supported
the Dominican Republic action on humanitarian grounds.

26

The OAS, despite approving the

American action in the Dominican Republic, actually replaced the American forces with its own
peacekeeping troops.27 Cabranes, for example, argues that the norm of non-intervention in the
Inter-American system has undergone a "profound metamorphosis" as a result of OAS approval
of the Dominican action. 28
A purported or possible basis for justification of the intervention in the Dominican
situation, has been on the more narrow grounds of intervention to protect nationals abroad. 29 A

24
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New York Times, May 9, 1965, at E3, col.4. Quoted in Lillich, "Self-help". Supra, note 3 at 343.

See, Thomas & Thomas, supra, note 11 at 49-52.
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20 UN SCOR (1198 111 mtg.) at 37 (1965) (United Kingdom); 20 UN SCOR ( 1198thmtg.) at 111-112 ( 1965) (France); 20 UN
SCOR (12043'd mtg.) at 4 (1965) (Netherlands); 20 UN SCOR (1202"d mgt.) at 19 (1965) (Nationalist China).
27

See Cabranes, "Human Rights and Non-intervention in the Inter-American System" ( 1967) 65 Michigan Law
Review 1147 at 1174-1175.
28
See ibid; at 1171-1175.
29
See, for example, Fenwick, "The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self-defense" ( 1966) 60
American Journal of International Law 64; Meeker, supra, note 131, at 60-63. The principle of self-defense to protect
nationals abroad was also subsequently used as basis for US involvement in the Mayaguez incident of 1975, and the
Israeli raid on Entebbe In 1976. In the Mayaguez incident, Cambodian forces, on 12"' May, 1975, seized an
American vessel-the "Mayaguez-and its crew in what Cambodian claims to be her territorial waters. Diplomatic
efforts to secure the release of the ship and its crew having proved futile, president Ford authorized US Forces to
board the illegally seized ship and land on a Cambodian island, with the object of rescuing the crew and the ship, and
also to conduct strikes against nearby Cambodian military installations. For factual details and comments on this
incident see for example, Digest of United States Practice in International Law (US Government Printer's Office:
Washington, 1975) at 777-783; Rowan, The Four Days of the Mayaguez (1975; Paust, 'Comment: The Seizure and
Recovery ofthe Mayaguez) (1976) 85 Yale Law Journal774; Note, "pueblo and Mayaguez: A Legal Analysis"
( 1977) 9 Case Western Reserve Journal of international Law 79. In the Entebbe rescue operation, an Air France plane
with over 250 passengers aboard en route from Tel Aviv to Pars via Athens was hijacked on June 27, 1976 after
leaving Athens. The hijackers, claiming to be members of the Popular Front for the Liberation f Palestine, forced the
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requirement of the right of self-defense to protect nationals abroad is the removal of troops once
one's nationals have been evacuated. As mentioned earlier, however, the United States not only
remained in the Dominican Republic despite the completion of the evacuation of its nationals and
the nationals of other countries, but engaged in a further troop build-up in the Dominican capital,
justifying its action on the basis of helping to maintain and restore law and order. This state of
affairs suggested the presence of other motives on the part of the United States.
Nevertheless, it can be said of the Dominican situation that the initial US response showed
a commitment to intervene based on humanitarianism. Explaining further the circumstances in
which the United States took forcible action, Ambassador Stevenson stated in the Security
Council:
"We could have decided not to do anything at least for the time being. But the lives of
thousands of people from 40 countries hung in the balance ... The United States initially
landed troops under these emergency conditions to preserve the lives of foreign nationals
and nationals of the United States and any of many other countries. Such action is justified
both on humanitarian and legal grounds." 30
Ultimately, the Security Council did not condemn the Dominican Republic intervention. Although
one can agree that this example confirms the legality of the principle of humanitarian
intervention, the subsequent presence of the United States cannot be justified for the same reason.
This example, perhaps shows the limits within which the doctrine can be applied. The initial aim

plane to Entebbe Airport in Uganda where it was given permission to land. The hijacking ended on 4th July, 1976
with an Israeli commando raid on Entebbe Airport freeing I 05 hostages held by the hijackers. For comments on this
case see Green, supra, note 3; "Rescue at Entebbe-Legal Aspects" (1976) 6Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 312;
Note, "Entebbe: Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad" ( 1977) 9 Case Western Journal of International
Law 117.
30
(1965) 52 Department of states Bulletin 877, quoted n Nanda, "part I", supra, note 130 at 462, Several other
statements by United States officials stressed the humanitarian aim of the operation. See ibid; at 472-473.
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of saving lives having been accomplished, the United States should have withdrawn its troops.
However, maintaining its presence beyond that limited objective gives credence to the view that
motives other than purely humanitarian considerations were involved.

3-lndia's Intervention in East Pakistan (1971)

The Indian intervention in East Pakistan, which resulted in the creation of the state of
Bangladesh, provides an incident of humanitarian intervention. The origins of this intervention
date back to the partition of India in 1947, and as a result of which Pakistan came into being
composed of two separate nations divided by ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences. The two
common factors, namely Islam and alienation from India, which held these parts together, were,
however, not sufficient to ensure stability. 31 By the late 1960s, political and economic domination
of East Pakistan by West Pakistan had resulted in increasing political discontent.
The Pakistani general elections of December 1970 resulted in an overwhelming victory for
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's East Pakistani Awami League party, which campaigned for political
and economic autonomy. 32 Following the results of the elections, there were fears in West
Pakistan, given the demand for autonomy and the possibility of being ruled by the Awami League
Party. The National Assembly having been postponed indefinitely,
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the situation degenerated

into mass demonstrations with the East Bengalis demanding total independence. With no
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possibility of a peaceful settlement of the political crisis on the horizon, the Pakistani army moved
into Dacca on March 25, 1971, unleashing a reign of terror. There were reports of cases of mass
murder and other human rights atrocities committed by the Pakistani army. 34 The report of the
International Commission of Jurists observed:
"The principal features of this ruthless oppression were the indiscriminate killing of
civilians, including women and children and the poorest and weakest members of the
community; the attempt to exterminate or drive out of the country a large part of the
Hindu population; the arrest, torture and killing of Awami League activists, students,
professionals, businessmen and other potential leaders; the raping of women; the
destruction of villages and towns; and the looting of property. All this was done on a scale
which is difficult to comprehend. 11

35

The result of these atrocities saw the death of at least one million people and the influx of over ten
million people seeking refuge in India. 36 This flow of refugees put severe strains on India's
economy. The refugee situation thus made it impossible for India to remain indifferent to the
conflict. Prior to the intervention, the Indian Prime Minister had appealed to other states and, in
vain, to the UN to do something about the situation in which "the general and systematic nature of
inhuman treatment inflicted on the Bangladesh population was evidence of a crime against
humanity. 11

37

But no international action was taken. Relations between India and Pakistan

deteriorated, and broke into full scale war on December 3, 1971, a war that lasted 12 days and
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ended with the surrender of the Pakistani Army. 38 In the aftermath of the intervention, political
prisoners were released, refugees returned to East Pakistan and, finally, Bangladesh was
established as a new independent state.
In justifying its intervention, India darned it had reacted to the aggression committed by
Pakistan, in effect, that it was the lawful exercise of the right of self-defense. It also claimed the
action was necessary for the protection of Bengalis from gross and persistent violations of human
rights by the Pakistani army, while at the same time addressing the problem of over 10 million
Bengali refugees that crossed into its territory. India's representative to the Security Council
stated that:
"Refugees were a reality. Genocide and oppression were a reality. The extinction of all
civil rights was a reality. Provocation and aggression of various kinds by Pakistan from
March 25 onwards were a reality. Bangladesh itself was a reality, as was its recognition by
India. The Security Council was nowhere near reality."39
Elsewhere, India's representative noted again "that we have on this particular occasion
absolutely nothing but the purest of intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what
they are suffering.'>'~ 0 Thus, in India's opinion, its presence was necessary to put a stop to the
atrocities and to prevent further massacres.
India's point of view was supported by the Soviet Union. It pointed to Pakistan's attack on
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Statement of Ambassador Sen to the UN Security Council, UN Doc.s/pv. 1606, 86(1971 ). Cited in Franck &
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India as an invasion of India's territorial integrity. It also drew attention to the refugee situation as
having created security problems for India, but emphasized the fact that the main causes of the
conflict were the "inhuman acts of oppression and terrorism" committed in East Pakistan, and that
a ceasefire was only possible after Pakistani atrocities had come to an end. 41 Other states, such as
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Bhutan, who supported India's point
of view, emphasized the severe violations of human rights and the atrocities committed by
Pakistan. 42
Some states reacted negatively to the intervention. Pakistan, China, and the United States
accused India of aggression and argued that India had no right to intervene in Pakistan's treatment
of the East Pakistani population. 43 In the Security Council, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, and Tunisia
opposed the intervention by condemning "aid given by one state to secessionist movements in
another," "secession, subversion and interference in the internal affairs of a state," and
"intervention by a third party in the internal affairs of a state.'.44 In the General Assembly, most
delegates deemed the situation in East Pakistan as an internal one, asserting that India had to
respect Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. 45
The validity of India's intervention has been the subject of considerable debate. First, the
justification for the Indian action, in part, was on the basis of self-defense. This was a direct
response to the earlier preemptive air strike launched by Pakistan. India's action, therefore, can be
explained by its being a victim of a full scale war initiated by Pakistan and using proportionate
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force in reacting to the aggression. Thus, in principle, the right of self-defense was involved and
claimed.
Second, the Indian action can be justified on the basis of humanitarian intervention.
Teson, for example, characterizes it partly as one of rendering foreign assistance to a people
struggling for their right to self-determination-a collective human rights, and secondly, as
intervention with the objective of ending acts of genocide, that is, humanitarian intervention
proper. For Teson, the strength of India's claim to legality is that these two aspects of
humanitarian intervention are present in the Indian example. 46 The majority of writers have
echoed a viewpoint somewhat similar to the conclusions of the East Pakistan Staff Study which
stated:
"In our view the circumstances were wholly exceptional; it was becoming more and more
urgent to find a solution, both for humanitarian reasons and because the refugee burden
which India was bearing had become intolerable with no solution in sight. Events having
been allowed to reach this point, it is difficult to see what other choice India could have
made."
It must be emphasized that humanitarian intervention is not the grounds of justification

which India itself put forward. As we have seen, India claimed to have acted first in self-defense,
and secondly, in giving support to the new government of Bangladesh, which it recognized when
hostilities began. We have given our reasons for not accepting the validity of these claims. If
India had wished to justify its actions on the principle of humanitarian intervention, it should have
first made a preemptory demand to Pakistan insisting that positive action be taken to rectify the
46
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the UN Charter Paradigm (London: Routledg, 1993) at 119 (rejecting Teson 's argument and making a case for 6aking
into account India's motiv3es in a legal assessment of this intervention).
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violations of human rights. As far as we are aware no such demand was made.
In conclusion, therefore, we consider that India's armed intervention would have been
justified if she had acted under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and further, that India
would have been entitled to act unilaterally under this doctrine in view of the growing and
intolerable burden which the refugees were casting upon India, and in view of the inability of
international organizations to take any effective action to bring to an end the massive violations of
human rights in East Pakistan which were causing the flow of refugees. We also consider that the
degree of force used was no greater than was necessary in order to bring to an end these violations
ofhuman rights." 47
Contrary to the East Pakistan Staff Study and comments to a similar effect by some
writers, however, India did invoke humanitarian reasons for her action in East Pakistan. India's
representative in the General Assembly had stated that:
"The reaction of the people of India to the massive killing of unarmed people by military
force has been intense and sustained. There is intense sorrow and shock and horror at the
reign of terror that has been let loose. The common bonds of race, religion, culture,
history, and geography of the people of East Pakistan with the neighboring Indian state of
West Bengal contribute powerfully to the feelings of the Indian people." 48
Indeed, many commentators, citing the widespread slaughter of East Bengalis by the West
Pakistani army, have considered this intervention to be a leading case of humanitarian
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intervention.

49

0thers, however, have taken a different view of the Indian action and considered it

to be unlawful.

°Comments have been made to the effect that, more importantly, the operation

5

was a strategic one undertaken by a partisan actor. India was interested politically in the secession
of East Pakistan. It thus seized the opportunity to curtail Pakistan's power and to diminish the
territory of its political and military rival. 51 It is probable that taking into consideration the overall
political dynamics for control of the region, it was in India's interest to take some form of action
to cause the break-up of Pakistan and thus reduce the threat posed by its neighbor. If that
happened, then predictably India would have emerged as a dominant power in the region.
However, if one brings into focus the entirety of the crisis, there was no doubt that given
the massive scale on which human rights were being violated, India's action could be looked
upon as intervention to stop the human rights atrocities that were being committed.

52

India's

"various motives converged on a single course of action that was also the course of action called
for by the Bengalis."

53

As Somarajah argues, "the existence of self-interest should not affect the

legality of humanitarian intervention. Therefore, at least on occasions where political expediency
coincides with the existence of humanitarian grounds for intervention, human rights may be
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protected."

54

The Bengali people welcomed the intervention which not only freed them from the

massive scale of repression but also enabled them to obtain their independence through the
creation of Bangladesh, which was quickly recognized by the UN and subsequently admitted to
that body.
Another possible basis for justification of India's actions relates to the UN's inability to
deal with the situation over the period in which these massacres were going on.

55

There was no

doubt that the massacres were a matter of international interest, yet no action was taken.

56

India

interested itself in the situation, went to the rescue and then withdrew its forces promptly. The
fact that the UN did not condemn the intervention could also be interpreted as an implied
recognition of the doctrine. Given the extraordinary circumstances in East Pakistan, which some
writers view as being of genocidal proportions, this case fits into the category of acts "shocking
the conscience of mankind" for which intervention to redress the situation was necessary.
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Despite the self-interested nature of the Indian action, this intervention nevertheless, ultimately
achieved the task of protecting human rights and was not condemned by the Security Council.
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4-Vietnam's Intervention in Cambodia (1978)

The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia gives another illustration of the use of force for
the protection of human rights. In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge forces led by Pol Pot took over
power from the Republican government.

59

Soon thereafter it embarked upon a program of total

reorganization of the country. In the process of this reorganization, massive violations of human
rights by the regime against its own citizens took place. There were reported cases of starvation,
torture, mass killings and deportations. In a three year period, an estimated number of over two
million people were reported dead through starvation, disease and slaughter. The enormity of the
human rights violations in Cambodia at the time has been described as of genocidal proportions. 60
The Khmer Rouge killed Vietnamese civilians living in Cambodia and began destroying
Vietnamese villages and killing Vietnamese civilians in a series of raids along the CambodiaVietnam borders, in some cases penetrating inside Vietnam.
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Despite the international community's expression of outrage at the human rights atrocities,
no effective measures were taken to stop what was happening in Cambodia.
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In December 1978,

Vietnamese forces accompanied by the Cambodian United Front for National Salvation invaded
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Cambodia and overthrew the Pol Pot regime and established a Vietnamese-supported
government.

63

In the UN Security Council debate following the intervention, Vietnam set out its
justification for undertaking military action against Cambodia. Its official position was that the
Cambodian affair comprised two distinct conflicts: first, the conflict between Vietnam and
Cambodia; and second, the civil war in Cambodia. Vietnam had become involved in the former
conflict only after prior Cambodian aggression. Thus, its use of force had been undertaken only in
self-defense. Regarding the latter, its cause originated from the inhuman conditions which the
citizens of Cambodia were being subjected to by their government. The civil war was fought by
the Cambodian people themselves, who eventually overthrew the inhumane Pol Pot regime.

64

In the Security Council, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary,
Mongolia and Bulgaria supported the Vietnamese position. These states pointed to the inhumane
conditions in which the Cambodian people were being held and stated that the Pol Pot regime had
been overthrown solely by the United Front for National Salvation. 65
Other members of the Security Council challenged these representations. China did not
comment on the inhumane conditions in which the Cambodian population were being held. Given
the persistent tensions between China and Vietnam, China declared Vietnam had committed
aggression against Cambodia, thus violating that country's political and territorial sovereignty.
The United Front, it contended, was nothing but a puppet organization created and run by
Vietnam.
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China, of course, had been a supporter of the Khmer Rouge. However, it is also worth
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mentioning that those states supporting Vietnam's action were opposed to the Khmer Rouge
regime. The Non-aligned countries held Vietnam responsible for violating Cambodia's territorial
integrity. They did not explicitly condemn Vietnam but asked for its withdrawal from Cambodia.
Most of these states did not raise the issue of human rights violations, except Bolivia, Nigeria and
Singapore, which mentioned the issue. They were, however, of the view that such human rights
violations did not justify intervention by a third state. 67 Some Western states also condemned the
Vietnamese action. The United States, however, did not declare it is prohibited to use force
against a government that committed grave breaches of human rights within its territory. The
Security Council, however, was unable to adopt any resolution. 68 At its 34th session, the General
Assembly adopted a number of resolutions censuring "foreign intervention" in Cambodia and
called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from that country.

69

On the whole, it seems to be the case that international reaction to this case was shaped by
bitter Cold War rivalries rather than any concern for human rights atrocities prevailing before the
Vietnamese intervention.
It has been observed that Vietnam had other motives. It harbored territorial ambitions over
Cambodia and seized the opportunity, given the situation, to invade Cambodia and install a
puppet government. 70 In added to this is the fact that, over a decade after the invasion,
Vietnamese troops and advisors were still present on Cambodian soil. 71 It is worth mentioning,
however, that in February 1979, Vietnam had signed a Treaty of Friendship with the government
of the new People's Republic of Cambodia, formed in early January. That Treaty of Friendship
67
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provided the legal basis for the acknowledged presence of Vietnamese troops inside Cambodia
until their declared withdrawal. 72 The danger here, as Thomas comments, is that while
interventions may relieve the immediate reign of terror or the persecution of a particular group,
they can also end up in the substitution of one oppressor by another. Alternatively, they may
create new uncertainties and dangers springing from a different geopolitical configuration. 73
Cambodians freed from the terror of the Pol Pot regime, for example, found themselves
dependent on Vietnam on the one hand, with the added threat of the Khmer Rouge, supported by
the West, on the Thai border on the other. 74
The purported basis for the Vietnamese intervention was self-defense. Cambodian
aggression against Vietnam supported a proportionate response aimed at neutralizing Cambodian
forces along Vietnam's border. What is less clear, according to one analyst, is whether Vietnam's
response justified seizure of the capital, installation of a puppet regime and the presence of
Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, although it could be argued that despite the superiority of its
forces, Vietnam believed that the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime was the only option left in
eliminating the Cambodian threat.
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A possible basis for justifying this intervention on humanitarian grounds was the existence
of large-scale atrocities. The Pol Pot regime had killed between one-quarter to one-third of the
Cambodian population, and by so doing had lost the legal right to govern the Cambodian people.
The justification for a humanitarian intervention existed, therefore, when Vietnam undertook its
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military action against Cambodia.

76

As Wolf suggests, the international community's negative

reaction to this case "does not constitute a negation of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention"
since cold war rivalries shaped opinion either in favor of or against the Vietnamese intervention.
Viewed in this light, strict issues of legality thus played only minor role in international reaction
to the intervention. 77
On the basis of the facts discussed, it is difficult to assert whether, in fact, the objective of

the Vietnamese was merely hurnanitarian. 78 There is no doubt, however, that the Cambodian case
was "a perfect candidate for humanitarian intervention"

79

given the massive scale of human rights

violations. The failure of the international community, including the UN, to find a diplomatic
solution or to take any concrete measures of response, left the Vietnamese course of action as the
viable option and the immediate solution to end the atrocities that were being committed.

5- Tanzania's Intervention in Uganda (1979)

In April 1979, the brutal rule of President ldi Amin of Uganda came to an end as a result
ofhis overthrow by Ugandan rebels supported by Tanzanian troops. Amin's rule (1971-1979) had
been consistently notorious for its gross violation of human rights. 80 Prior to the Tanzanian
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invasion, relations between the two countries had been very strained.

81

There had been a series of

border skirmishes between them. However, the immediate cause hastening Tanzania's invasion
stemmed from Uganda's incursion into the former territory in October 1978. Ugandan troops
moved into Tanzanian territory and occupied the Kagera Salient.
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Amin thereafter declared

annexation of that territory and the creation of a new boundary between the two countries. 83 Amin
justified his action by saying that Tanzania previously invaded Ugandan territory. In light of this
aggression, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did nothing to condemn it but urged
Uganda to withdraw its forces.
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Amin withdrew his troops after 15 days of plunder but continued

in harassing the Tanzanians along the border.
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By February 1979, the Tanzanian army, along

with Ugandan exiles and refugees, had launched a full-scale invasion into Uganda. In April 1979,
these combined forces toppled Amin's regime. A new provisional government of the Ugandan
National Liberation Front under Professor YusufLule was formed.
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Initially, Tanzania justified its intervention as a reaction to the Ugandan's armed attack on
Tanzania which led to the occupation of the Kagera Salient at the end of October 1978, which in
some cases was characterized as punitive in nature and at other time as self-defense.
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fact that Ugandan forces had already withdrawn from the territory in question and also that the
nature of the response far exceeded the bounds of proportionality, it is difficult to sustain this
claim of self-defense.

88

In referring to the intentions of President Nyerere of Tanzania, 89 as well

as the length and scope of the invasion, Hassan observes that "Tanzania did not contemplate a
singular objective. From the beginning, it seemed determined to pursue a military solution and the
overthrow of Amin's government."

90

Taking into consideration the lack of goodwill between

these two countries it is not difficult to imagine that other objectives were on the Tanzanian
agenda during the conflict.
After the capture of Kampala, Tanzania declared on April 12 its limited objective.

91

It

invoked humanitarian considerations as one of its objectives 92 Its Foreign Minister stated that the
fall of Amin was "a tremendous victory for the people of Uganda and a singular triumph for
freedom, justice and human dignity." 93 Some writers note that Tanzania did not invoke
humanitarian considerations in this conflict.

94

While it may be moot whether it did or not, it is

important to realize that Tanzania did not seek any territorial expansion. Even if its objective was
to remove Amin from power, that aim by itself is not inconsistent with the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention.
The brutality of the Amin regime against his own people is a well known fact which does
not need recounting here. One writer describes this as "the efficiency of the state's repressive
88

See supra, note II.
Nyrere metaphorically referred to "driving this snake from our house" . Quoted n Hassan, supra, note 2 at 893 .
90
Ibid.
91
It should be pointed out that Nyrere declared from the outset Tanzania's aim was not to punish Amin. "The aim of
uprooting Amin was not our task he said; it was the task of the people fUganda" (1979) 16 Africa Research Bulletin
(political, social, and cultural series) at 5223. Quoted in Ronzitti, supra, note 2 at 103.
92
See Ronzitti, ibid. However, Hassan is of the view that once the war started Tanzania never even invoked
humanitarian reasons for its intervention.
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Ibid.
94
See for example, Hassan, supra, note 2 at 894.
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machinery" which had become "destructive of human rights."

95

The Ugandan people were left

with no possible alternative but to seek foreign assistance in getting rid of this tyrant.
The international community expressed relief regarding the overthrow of the Amin
regime. The United States supported Tanzania from the beginning, although on the grounds of
self-defense.
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Strong support for Tanzania's intervention was from the United Kingdom,

Zambia, Ethiopia, Angola, Botswana, Gambia and Mozambique. The Soviet Union announced
the withdrawal of its troops in Uganda and the suspension of arms supplies after Amin's initial
invasion of Tanzania.
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Rwanda, Guinea, Malawi, Canada and Australia also quickly recognized

the new government.
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Kenya remained neutral initially but later offered its cooperation to the

new Ugandan government.
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At the summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 1979, most
African states remained silent on the Tanzania intervention. Only a few states - Sudan and Nigeria
-condemned the action. Sudan criticized Tanzania for its invasion of Uganda and its interference
in its internal affairs in violation of the principle of the OAU. This position was supported by
Nigeria, which also expressed concern about the danger of the precedent set by the Tanzanian
action.
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In response to this criticism, President Binaisa of Uganda stated that member states of

the OAU should not "hide behind the formula of non-intervention when human rights are
blatantly violated."
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This statement gave support for the principle of humanitarian intervention.
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Supra, note 173 at 313 .
Teson, supra, note 3 at 165.
97
Ibid.
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Rnzitti, supra, note 2 at I 05.
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Teson, supra, note 3 at 165.
100
Nigeria's negative reaction might be attributed to the fact that it still bore Tanzania a grudge over the latter's
support of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. See Thomas, New States, Sovereignty and Intervention (Aldershot:
Gower Publishing Co; 1985) at Ill.
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Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1979 at 29669-29674,29840-29841.
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In essence, the silence of most African states was considered an implied approval of the

Tanzanian intervention. Thomas, for example, writes "the general African consensus ... seemed
to settle at the level of tacit approval of Tanzania's action, with open praise withheld due to the
knowledge that such actions could be abused." 102 Putting aside considerations that such actions
are susceptible to abuse, however, it would seem at the time that most African states refrained
from explicitly endorsing the Tanzanian action during the OAU meeting for fear of becoming
targets of intervention given the appalling human rights record of some of the governments.
A purported justification for the Tanzanian intervention is self-defense but the reaction of
international scholars to the legality of the intervention was mixed. Some have said that once the
Ugandan forces were removed from Tanzania, there was no further right to enter Uganda and
dispose Amin from power. Others have rejected the claim that Tanzania was acting in selfdefense. Hassan has argued that it was lawful for Tanzania to carry out an extensive counter
offensive to repel the Ugandan army from within its territory, and even continued in "hot pursuit"
to ensure a peaceful end of the conflict, but maintains the ultimate overthrow of the Amin regime
cannot be legitimate regardless of Uganda's initial provocation. For him, the self-defense
justification ceased when Ugandan troops retreated. 103 Murphy, on the other hand, has indicated
that there is widespread acceptance that a state exercising the right of self-defense may not only

..

expel the aggressor but many pursue them into their own territory and, in some situations,
overthrow their government if necessary to prevent recurrence of the initial attack. Thus,
according to him, "Tanzania's claim that it was acting in self-defense is not clearly erroneous,

•
unless it is shown that Tanzania's security would not have been further threatened if Amin

102
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Thomas, supra, note 5 at 112.
See Hassan, supra, note 2 at 902-903.
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remained in power."

104

However, the fact that Tanzania stayed for months following the fall of

Kampala makes the argwnent about self-defense doubtful. As Nanda points out, the Tanzanian
invasion was not "necessary and proportional" since the Tanzanian army stayed in Uganda for
several months following Amin's overthrow.

105

Humanitarian considerations offer a further reason for the Tanzanian action. Most
commentators who have examined this case, concluded that it was justified on humanitarian
grounds.

106

There is no question that the gross violation of hwnan rights in Amin's regime,

"especially the casual killings of a large number of people, provided the justification for
humanitarian intervention: Amin's treatment of subjects was revolting to the human conscience,
and the efficiency of the state's repressive machinery made action by the people ineffective."

107

In

that regard one writer has argued:
"if Tanzania was courageous enough to do what several other states would have wished to
do and if it was acting as the "international conscience" in replacing a regime which most
governments believed to be abhorrent and whose domestic policies violated all the
international legal standards relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, then its

104

See, Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia:
University Press, 1996) at I 06-107.
105
Nanda, "Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti-Revisiting the Validity of humanitarian
Intervention under International law. Part 1(1992) 20 Denver Journal oflntemationallaw and Policy at 321.
Umozurike also support this view maintaining: "Tanzania's military intervention in Uganda cannot be justified as an
act of self-defense" and that "it might have been so justified if Tanzania merely cleared the Ugandans from the
Kagera salient". Supra, note 173, at 312.
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See Wolf, "Humanitarian Intervention" Michigan Yearbook on International Legal Studies Annual, 1988, 333 at
350; supra, note 172 at 59; Suzuki, "A state's Provisional Competence to Protect Human Rights in a Foreign state"
(1980) 15 Texas International Law jouma1231 at 239-240; Teson 2nd. Ed; supra, note 3 at 195 (concluding the
Tanzanian intervention in Uganda was a legitimate use of force to stop ongoing serious deprivations of the most
fundamental human rights). See also, supra, note 197 at I 07 (maintaining the reason for Tanzania's intervention is
best characterized as one involving mixed reasons of self-defense and protection of human rights).
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Supra, note 173 at 312.
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actions should be supported explicitly by that international community and by its law."

108

Bazyler, while recognizing that Tanzania's motives may not have been pure, nevertheless
concludes it was guided partly by humanitarian concerns. He writes:
"the sheer brutality of Idi Amin's regime, the unwillingness of the United Nations and the
Organization of African Unity to do anything about Amin despite knowledge of his
brutalities, and the limited intervention by Tanzanian forces, indicate that, on balance, the
Tanzanian intervention in Uganda can be justified on humanitarian grounds." 109

In sum, although one could argue that there were other motives involved in the Tanzanian
..

intervention, if one takes into consideration the inability of the OAU and the UN to act given the
massive scale of human rights in Amin's Uganda, Tanzania had no option but to intervene in the
cause of humanity. President Nyerere had stated that "it is a good precedent ... if Africa, as such,
is unable to take up its responsibilities, it is incumbent upon each state to do so . . . , it is a lesson to
Amin and people of his kind."

110

Thus, Tanzania was obliged to intervene given the lack of

collective action on the part of the OAU.
The Tanzanian action, in effect, ended the gross human rights violations that characterized
the brutal regime of Amin and resulted in an improvement of the human rights situation in
Uganda. It did not exert any political influence over Uganda, install a puppet government or seek

..

to annex any Ugandan territory after the intervention. As Teson comments, " .... the widespread
feeling that the human rights cause had been served caused the international community to refrain
from criticizing the Tanzanian intervention." 111

'
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Quoted in supra, note 172 at 74-75.
Bazyler, supra, note 3 at 591.
110
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2- Conclusion
In sum, at least in principle, the whole basis for hwnanitarian intervention is grounded in
prior agreement about the internationalization of hwnan rights as embodied in Articles 55 and 56
of the UN Charter, as well as the International Bill of Hwnan Rights. This impressive
international human rights regime is gradually having the effect of altering treatment by a state of
its own citizens from an issue of domestic concern to matters within the domain of the
international. Thus, action to support them is not impermissible intervention contrary to Article
2(7).

112

The advent of the UN Charter suggests that the customary institution of hwnanitarian

intervention still exists, and is not inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. Therefore, in the
event of failure of collective action under the Charter, there is a revival of forcible self-help
measures to protect human rights. This is supported by the doctrinal writing. As Reisman and
McDougal argue, the UN Charter not only confirmed the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention
but also strengthened it. They state that:
"the Charter strengthened and extended humanitarian intervention in that it confirmed the
homocentric character of international law and set in motion a continuous authoritative

112

for critics who make the argument that even if customary international law recognized humanitarian intervention
prior to I 945, the Charter's general prohibition n Article 2(4) has had such an impact on customary international law
that the doctrine can no longer be valid, Teson responds by arguing thus: "First, one has to prove that subsequent
state practice is consistent with the absolute prohibition". This, he demonstrates, is not the case. Furthermore, he
argues "those who take that view-that the Charter radically changed the law in I 945-must also deal with the equally
revolutionary impact of the law of human rights upon traditional international law" He concludes: "anyone who in the
fact of the impressive rise of human rights concerns simply asserts that post 1945 international law must be seen as
containing a rigid prohibition of war, even to remedy serious human rights deprivations carries a considerable burden
of proof. ... there was a customary principle prohibiting the use of force at the time the Charter was adopted. In
contrast, the human rights articles of the Charter opened the door to a much more innovative development: a concept
ofthe law of nations as centered on the individual, not the nation-state". Teson, 2nd ed; supra, note 3 at 157.
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process of articulating international human rights .... "

113

Assessment of state practice in the period of 1945-1989 showed the existence of the humanitarian
intervention principle in situations of gross violations of human rights.

114

The examples of state

practice discussed here revealed that states believe the right of unilateral humanitarian
intervention is available to them as an option grounded in either the Charter or customary
international law.

115

Opinio juris follows from the articulation of the rule that human rights are a

matter of international concern and that use of force to remedy the most serious human rights
violations is not prohibited in international law. Even though there is no consensus on the validity

'

of such sanctions, as Wolf remarks:
"abstract declarations from the General Assembly condemning intervention in the
broadest terms should not be taken as persuasive evidence of opinio juris. The
inconsistency between nations theoretical statements on the prohibition on the use of force
and their actual, real world responses to such use of force is manifest. In the final analysis,
the conviction of most of the states and scholars who oppose humanitarian intervention is

•

113

Reisman and McDougal, supra, note 3 at 171. Even though Wolf in this regard favors the survival fthe right of
humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter, he arrives at that conclusion via a different route. Although he
admits that the prohibition on the use of force was intended to be absolute, and that the original intent of the framers
of the UN Charter was not to strengthen humanitarian intervention, nevertheless, he demonstrates that state practice
can modify the Charter, and such modification for him, is legitimate because it is not inconsistent with the general
purposes ofthe Charter. See Wolf, supra, note 199 at 363, footnote 168.
114
Similarly, Reisman's assessment of the period under consideration concludes: "the post-UN practice of
humanitarian intervention affirms the continuing validity of the institution and the conditions under which it will be
deemed lawful, assuming compliance with these conditions, humanitarian intervention will be lawful under the
Charter as well as under general international law". Reisman, "Humanitarian intervention to Protect the Ibos" in
Lillich ed; supra, note 2 at 187.
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See Simon "The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention" (1993) 24 California Western
International Law Journal 117 at 150. Writing in 1981, Sornarajah asserts that "in view of the many post-Charter
interventions justified on the basis of humanitarian grounds, it is a bit late to argue that such interventions are illegal
under the Charter". Supra, note 127 at 75. See also Chattetjee, "Some Legal Problems of the Support role in
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of questionable strength. When states are confronted with real world instances of
intervention to prevent mass slaughter which do not implicate intense global rivalries, they
will not condemn them. And when scholars who support an absolute interpretation of the
prohibition on the use of force are challenged with the moral imperative of tenninating
genocide, they will go no further than to label armed intervention as a meaningless
technical breach of law. In light of such de facto approval by scholars and states of every
ideological tendency, an argument rejecting the legality of humanitarian intervention
based on opinio juris is unpersuasive."

116

The scale of human rights atrocities committed in the Ugandan, Pakistani and Cambodian cases,
and the reasons given in these and other examples discussed, indicated the articulation of nonhumanitarian and humanitarian concerns. The choice of not proffering humanitarian reasons in
some of the examples as some scholars contend, it seems, was based on tactical considerations
rather than legal constraints.
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In any case, the fact that the interveners invariably had mixed motives should not be a basis for

condemnation of the whole humanitarian enterprise.
It seems to be the case that the context of the Cold War dictated, by and large, support or

condemnation in state practice for humanitarian intervention. The extent of approval or
condemnation varied in each case depending on its impact on the wider geopolitical relationship
between the superpowers, even though these interventions were into states where the respective
governments were engaging in gross abuse of the human rights of their citizens, and the
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Wolf, supra, note 199 at 358-359. But see Ronzitti, supra, note 2 at 108-109.
See for example, supra, note 197 at 143 (noting the doubtful validity of an acceptance of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention by the International community since in virtually all instances (e.g the Indian and
Vietnamese situations) the interventions were justified on a basis other than a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
117

137

interventions had the effect of putting a stop to those violations. Thus, it would appear the
principle did not enjoy much support as some writers contend, mainly because humanitarian
values during the Cold War were subjected to geopolitical considerations. Even if the doctrine did
not enjoy wide support in states practice, these cases would appear not to invalidate the doctrine.
None of these cases where extreme conditions warranted intervention to protect human rights
drew explicit condemnation from the General Assembly or the Security Council, Cambodia
notwithstanding. Perhaps this was as much for political reasons as for support of the principle of
humanitarian intervention. The silent acquiescence on the part of the vast majority of states,
however, arguably may be interpreted as an implied acknowledgement of international principles
concerning the doctrine and its practice in the period under consideration. ##
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CHAPTER FIVE

The Practice of Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era

1- Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, many leaders, diplomats, scholars and thinkers have been
urging the UN to be more activist in intervening for humanitarian purposes, that is, to put an end
to human suffering, and prevent further suffering in civil wars and other forms of internal strife,
and especially to end the suffering of victims of massive human rights violations in these conflict
situations.
The 1990s witnessed in the international system so profound that they would have been
several decades ago. The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the events
that surrounded the Gulf War changed the perceptions of the behavior of states and international
institutions at the international level. The Cold War, likewise, presented a once-in- a lifetime
opportunity for the nations of the world, acting individually, collectively and through the
UN .... "to help achieve the two principal purposes of the UN: the maintenance of international
peace and security, and the promotion and encouragement of human rights and fundamental
freedoms" .. However, the euphoria generated in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the promise of
a new world order, 188 based on the rule of law they engender, which jeopardize the nation-state
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Lillich, "The Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention
in the Post-Cold War World" (1994) 3 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law I at 2. For a detailed discussion of
the concept of a new world order see Kegeley Jr; "The New Global Order: The Power of Principle in a Pluralistic World" (1992) 6
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system and global stability. The international community is thus presented with opportunities and
formidable challenges in dealing with this state of affairs.
One of the mechanisms or instruments employed by the international community m
dealing with these crises has been the use of multilateral or collective intervention. In the wake of
recent humanitarian crises, the requirements of multilateral cooperation in dealing with
international peace and security have led to a growing recognition among states of the
obsolescence of traditional notions of absolute sovereignty. The taboo that customarily rules out
of order even the discussion of civil wars, tyrannies and disasters, unless they clearly impact on
other states, has begun to weaken. It is also significant that there seem to be changing attitudes
among the Third World states, who have been traditionally the strong supporters of the principle
of sovereignty. Childers and Urquhart, for example, see a growing readiness among these states to
find "genuinely disinterested and UN-directed humanitarian intervention without formal
government request or sanction." 189 While an unprecedented level of cooperation has taken place
within the UN in sanctioning post-Cold War humanitarian operations, it is also instructive to note
that disagreements and hesitancy have nonetheless been evident, thereby weakening multilateral
action to redress humanitarian crises.
Having made these remarks, it is important to note that there is a growing body of practice
on humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era. Recent UN operations in Northern Iraq,
Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Haiti, and regional efforts in Liberia and Kosovo all
reveal a humanitarian dimension, whether this be the creation of humanitarian corridors, the
Ethics and International Affairs 21; Carpenter, "The New World Disorder" ( 1991) Foreign Policy 24: Henrikson, "How can the
vision of a New World Order be Realized" (1992) 16 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 63.
189
The support this assertion by citing intimations of readiness from India and Zimbabwe to develop general principles and
guidelines for intervention to create corridors of peace and tranquility during the Security Council Summit in January 1992. See
Childers and Urquhart, Renewing the UN System (Uppsala: Dag Hammerskjold Foundation, 1994) at 18.
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delivery of humanitarian assistance, or the establishment of safe havens. These various actions
have, by virtue of their UN mandates, been formally collective in nature, adding to their
legitimacy and making them stand out from earlier unilateral humanitarian interventions
discussed in the previous chapter. These actions have ushered in a more vigorous approach to UN
conflict management efforts, be it in situations of massive violations of human rights resulting
from state collapse or civil wars.
This chapter will examine the scope of humanitarian action and the challenges and debates
surrounding such intervention in their legal, moral and practical dimensions in Iraq, Somalia,
Bosnia, Rwanda, Liberia, Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor in order to determine issues of legitimacy
and whether a conclusion can be reached on increasing support in international practice.
However, before examining these cases, a few preliminary remarks placing them in context will
be in order.
The international community increasingly recognizes the interdependence of the
preservation of international peace and security and the protection of human rights. This is
because of many threats to or breaches of international peace and security revolving around issues
of human rights. The post-Cold War era has witnessed situations in which grave violations of
human rights have posed a threat to international peace and security. The demise ofthe Cold War
removed the saliency of the ideological factor in international relations, but has witnessed the
proliferation of inter-state conflicts in such places as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia,
Rwanda, Kosovo and others. These conflicts have often caused widespread human suffering and
their repercussions affect international peace and security. Regarding these challenges, the postCold war era has shown the UN's ability to take steps toward the development of collective
mechanisms for authorizing intervention in support of human rights.
141

In December 1991, the UN General Assembly to this end adopted an extraordinary
resolution for strengthening the coordination of the UN's humanitarian assistance in emergencies,
as well as pressuring non-consensual governments to pennit aid to people in need during civil
wars and internal conflicts.
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The favorable climate under which the UN has begun to perform

its role paved the way for a Security Council meeting on 31 January 1992, at the level of Heads of
State and government. Most leaders at that meeting mentioned human rights as an issue of
concern for the international community. 191 While some were in favor of a more definite role for
the Security Council in human rights issues, 192 others cautioned against intervention in the
190

G.A. Res.AIRES/46/182 (1991).
In stressing the fact that a new era has begun in which governments can no longer hide behind state sovereignty and violate the
human rights of their citizens, the UN Secretary General Boutrus Ghali stated: "state sovereignty takes a new meaning in this
context. Added to its dimension of rights is the dimension of responsibility, both internal and external. Violations of state
sovereignty is an offense against the global order, but its misuse also may undermine human rights and jeopardize a peaceful
global life. Civil wars are no longer civil, and the carnage they inflict will not let the world remain indifferent. The narrow
nationalism that would oppose or disregard the norms of a stable international order and the micronationalism that resists healthy
economic or political integration can destruct a peaceful global existence. Nations are too interdependent, national frontiers are too
porous, and transnational realities in the spheres of technology and investment on one side and poverty and misery on the other are
too dangerous to permit egocentric isolationism. Now that the Cold war has come to an end, we must work to a void the outbreak
or resurgence of new conflicts. The upsurge of nationalities, which includes countries with multiple ethnic groups to divide,
constitutes a new challenge to peace and security. Nationalists fever will increase ad infinitum the number of communities that lay
claim to sovereignty, for there will always be dissatisfied minorities within those minorities that achieve independence. Peace, first
threatened by ethnic conflict and tribal warfare, could then frequently be troubled by border disputes. A new strategy will have to
be adopted by the UN in order to respond to the irredentist or pro-autonomy claims of ethnic and cultural communities. It will
have to take into account the abundant supply of arms, the aggravation of economic inequalities among different communities, the
flow of refugees". Security Council summit Opening Address by members" US Federal News Service, January 31, 1992, at vm-52, 3-4, I. Quoted in Scheffer, "Toward a Modem Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention" (1992) 23 University of Toledo Law
Review 253 at 283, footnote 128.
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throughout the world". US president George Bush stated that: "we must advance the momentous movement toward democracy and
freedom and expand the circle of nations committed to human rights and the rule of law. The will of the majority must never
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internal affairs of states. 193 They, however, declared that "the absence of war and military
conflicts amongst states does not in itself insure international peace and security. The nonmilitary sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have
become threats to peace and security. The UN membership as a whole needs to give the highest
priority to the solution of these matters."
The members of the Council pledge their commitment to international law and to the UN
Charter. All disputes between states should be peacefully resolved in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter. The members of the Council reaffirm their commitment to the
collective security system of the Charter to deal with threats to peace and to reverse acts of
aggress10n.
The Summit thus sought to strengthen the authority of the UN to negotiate peaceful
resolution of conflicts and to intervene in circumstances that endanger humanity. It directed the
UN Secretary General to report "on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the
framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, form
peacekeeping and peacemaking." 194

In his report to the Security Council subsequent to the summit, the UN Secretary General,
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The Chinese Prime minister Li Peng stated: "in our view, such basic principles as sovereign equality of member states and noninterference in their internal affairs as enshrined in the charter of the UN should be observed by all its members, without
exception. In essence, the issue of human rights falls within the sovereignty of each country. A country's human rights situation
should not be judged in total disregard of its history and national conditions. It is neither appropriate nor workable to demand that
all countries measure up to the human rights criteria or models of one or more number of countries. China is opposed to
interference in the internal affairs of other countries using human rights as an excuse". India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao
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"Security Council Summit Declaration: New Risks for Stability and Security" New York Times, (Feb. I 1992) A4. Ibid.
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Boutros Ghali, encouraged the idea of the greater institutionalization of the conflict management
role of the Council. The report argued for conclusion of the military agreements envisaged in
Article 43, re-establishment of the Military Staff Committee, institutionalization of peacekeeping
forces, creation of "peace enforcement" units, and an increased role for the international Court of
Justice. Furthermore, the report pointed out that one of the UN' s security roles in the post-Cold
War period was to "address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and
political oppression". 195

In sum, it seems clear that the UN has begun to take seriously and to address issues
relating to gross human rights violations or suffering which constitute threats to international
peace and security. The case for humanitarian intervention by the UN is grounded in the duty and
responsibility of the Security Council to take whatever measures are necessary to maintain
international peace and security. The basis for this assertion can be found in Chapter VII, and the
responsibility of member states under Article 25 of the UN Charter. However, the notion that
human rights violations within a state are a threat to international peace and security is a
somewhat contentious one.

9

The international response and the practical measures taken in that

direction will now be analyzed through the case studies.
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2- The Case Studies

1-lntervention in Northern Iraq (1991-1992)
The repression of the Iraqi Kurds predates the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath. 10 It has
been part of years-long policy of Arab colonial domination and the denial of the Kurds' right to
self-determination.

11

Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I,

the Treaty of Sevres ( 1920) provided the Kurds with the prospect of an independent Kurdish state.
The provision of the Treaty giving the Kurds "an absolute unmolested opportunity to autonomous
development" was never implemented. 12 The Treaty of Lausanne (July 1923) ignored completely
the clams of the Kurds and divided the Kurdish territory between Iraq and Iran. Thus, Kurdish
aspirations of self-determination with the goal of forming a separate Kurdish state never
materialized due to geopolitical considerations on the part of the European powers.

13

The Kurds have continuously revolted against rule from Baghdad, and from 1961 to 1971
were engaged in armed rebellion. 14 Even though agreement was concluded with Baghdad which
provided some measure of autonomy, 15 the reality of the situation, however, was that the Iraqi
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The Kurdish people are estimated to be abut 20 million. They are divided among four states in the Middle East
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government marginalized and excluded the Kurds and began a colonial "Arabization" program
consisting of large-scale Kurdish deportations and forced Arab settlement in the region. 16 Again
in the 1980s, the Kurdish population started a rebellion that was ruthless crushed. From 1985,
Saddam Hussein's regime engaged in a systematic program of destruction of Kurdish towns and
villages, and the use of poison gas against the Kurdish population. 17 The failure of humanitarian
intervention on behalf of the Kurds by the international community was partly due to the fact that,
despite his atrocities against the Kurdish population, Saddam Hussein was an effective shield
against Iran in the Persian Gulf, and thus enjoyed a friendly though uneasy relationship with the
West. 18
In the aftermath ofthe Gulf War in February 1991, the Iraqi Kurds were again subjected

to atrocities committed by the Iraqi regime. The defeat of Iraq by the Allied powers in "Operation
Desert Storm" and the consequent signals of support to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein
19

gave the Kurdish rebels an opportunity to enhance their position in the region. Kurdistan was

further reduced due to additional demands of containing the Shi'ite rebellion in the south. Kurdish
rebels exploited this opportunity and scored some success. The situation was reversed with
Saddam's forces attacking Kurdish villages, forcing 2 million civilians to flee into the countryside
recognition that Iraq was comprised of two main nationalities-Arabs and Kurds recognized as having national and
minority rights. These rights included guaranteed rights to self-rule, proportionate representation in the Iraqi
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and intentionally starving and engaging in massacres with poison and chemical gas. 20 Almost one
million of these Kurds fled north in an attempt to reach safety in Turkey and Iran, giving rise to
tensions between those countries and Iraq. The magnitude of the repression and the refugee
problem were borne out of the fact that out of a total Kurdish population of approximately 3-4
million in Iraq, over 1.5 million refugees were generated in a short period of time. 21 The regional
security factor led the Allied powers to reconsider the policy of non-intervention in the internal
affairs of states. The Iraqi mistreatment of the Kurdish population became a matter that threatened
international peace and security in the region, and subsequently provided the legal basis for
Security Council action.

In taking account of these developments, the Security Council, faced with mounting
atrocities committed by the Iraqi government against the Kurds, adopted Resolution 688 on April
5, 1991,22 which condemned Iraq's repression of the Kurds and other groups and considered these
developments a threat to international peace and security. It demanded that "Iraq immediately end
this repression" and insisted that it "allow immediate access by international humanitarian
organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all
necessary facilities for their operation." And it appealed to "all member states and to humanitarian
organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts." The Security Council also
20
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demanded that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary General to these ends.
The legitimacy of Resolution 688 by the Security Council was hotly debated, since the
participants understood the resolution would establish a precedent shaping perceptions of the
proper role of the Security Council in future situations arising out of internal conflict. On the one
hand, France argued that massive human rights violations, whether or not they constituted a threat
to international peace and security, warranted intervention by the Security Council, which "would
have been remiss in its task had it stood idly by, without reacting to the massacre of entire
populations, the extermination of civilians, including women and children."

23

Other states

supporting the resolution stressed the international repercussions of Iraq's repression of its
civilian population in the flows of refugees to neighboring states.

24

The Iraqi response was that

the resolution is illegitimate interference in Iraqi's internal affairs and violation of Article 2(7) of
the UN Charter. Iraq also accused the United States and Iraq's neighbors of the partitioning of
Iraq. China and other states opposing the resolution made reference to Article 2(7), stating that
"the Security Council should not consider or take action on questions concerning the internal
affairs of any state. " 25 The states that supported the resolution characterized it as necessary action
to address a threat to international peace from the flows of refugees.
Actual intervention in Iraq to protect the Kurds "Operation Provide Comfort" was
undertaken by troops from the United States, Britain, France and other countries. The United
States, Britain and France first declared a "No fly zone" in the north and "Operation Southern
Watch" in southern Iraq where the Shi'ite population was threatened. Armed forces were also
used to create humanitarian enclaves protected from the Iraqi military. Iraq protested these
23
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measures, for they were undertaken when Iraq was negotiating with the UN over access for
humanitarian organizations. These countries relied on resolution 688 to legitimize their actions.
Other than the military forces used in the operation, thirty other countries contributed relief
supplies and some fifty non-governmental organizations (NGOs) either offered assistance or
participated in the operation. 26
Overall, the UN aid efforts in Iraq relied on allied military intervention in northern Iraq in
its early stages to establish a security zone; to respond to any Iraqi air operation in northern Iraq;
the deployment of a UN force to provide limited protection to UN humanitarian workers; and an
agreement negotiated with the Iraqi government to establish the logistics of the humanitarian
effort throughout Iraq.

27

Any analysis of this action shows the ever-present tension between sovereignty and nonintervention on the one hand, and the protection of human rights on the other. Issues relating to
the legitimacy of the humanitarian action in Iraq and the value of the operation as a precedent are
debatable.
The moral case for the humanitarian initiative in northern Iraq is compelling. The
justification for humanitarian action to redress gross and systematic abuse of human rights is
imperative. The Iraqi violation of the Kurdish peoples' rights within its own territory was directly
related to the rights of the other states to intervene, and to use force as was necessary to remedy
the situation where regional peace and security was threatened. In this case, the repression was so
great as to cause a mass exodus of refugees into neighboring states, threatening the peace and
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security of those states. The Security Council, responsible for maintaining international peace and
security, would be justified in demanding intervention for humanitarian purposes and, in fact, did
just that. 28
To support the dimension of moral legitimacy in this case, where the state is guilty of
gross and persistent human rights violations, the consent of the governed can no longer be
presumed. Similarly, the innocent victims of humanitarian crises cannot have chosen or consented
to their fate. Legitimacy in this respect will mean that a government should respect the human
rights of its citizens. Where the opposite happens, non-intervention will no longer be morally
required, and the government would have lost its moral authority to demand that external actors
remain uninvolved in its internal matters. 29 From an ethical point of view, governments are
domestically and internationally mere agents of the people. Consequently, their international
rights derive from the rights of the citizens who inhabit and constitute the state.
The ethical aspect of the UN action in Iraq, however, would have been strengthened if it
had clearly mentioned the rights of the Kurdish people. Resolution 688 did not refer to the Kurds
as a people, nationality, group or minority but instead made reference to "the Iraqi population in
many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas." The observation has
been made that in doing this "the Security Council failed to highlight the measures of the Iraqi
government aimed against the Kurds as a people, measures which many considered were amount
to genocidal actions." 30 By drawing a link between action in the Kurdish-populated areas with
Security Council Resolution 687 (the resolution on the ceasefire) and thus making it part of
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package of punitive actions against Iraq, the UN further devalued the moral dimensions of this
case. 31 Mayall, for example, has argued that the obligation to "do something" about the Kurds did
not spring from generalized duties to protect human rights wherever they are threatened, but from
specific responsibilities incurred by the Western powers from the Gulf War. Undoubtedly, had the
repression occurred in any circumstances other than as a result of the Gulf War, it is
inconceivable that western governments would have responded to pressures from public opinion
to intervene for purposes of humanity. 32 Although one could fault the UN- sanctioned action on
this score, account should also be taken of the fact that the immediate and urgent humanitarian
concerns were met, demonstrating at least some moral concern for the plight of the Kurds even
though the broader political question of Kurdish self-determination was not addressed.
Another scope of debate regarding UN action in northern Iraq concerns the scope of
Resolution 688. Despite the debates preceding its passage, discussed earlier, some commentators,
such as Malanczuk and Gordon, have argued that the resolution does not validate strictly internal
human rights violations, without transboundary effects, as threats to international peace and
security.

33

They claimed that the resolution clearly provides that it is the external effects of the

Iraqi repression that are threats to international peace and security. Moreover, the resolution did
not authorize the Security Council to use force to protect human rights in these circumstances,
since it contained no reference to Chapter VII. Chapter VII is the only Chapter in the Charter that
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authorizes or permits the Security Council to use or approve the use of force. 34 Although the
Security Council ordered Iraq to permit humanitarian assistance, the Resolution does not mention
collective enforcement measures, and thus, given its narrow scope, it should not be viewed as
approving intervention for humanitarian purposes because humanitarian intervention by definition
involves the use of force.

35

Resolution 688 did not specifically authorize the use of force, and the

Secretary General did not request it, although he did in the end acquiesce in the intervention. 36
Added to this is the issue of state sovereignty. Unlike Somalia, where there was no
functioning government, and Haiti, where there were competing governments, Iraq had a single
sovereign functioning government. In this regard, some states questioned the authority of the UN
to intervene against a sovereign government to redress human rights violations. In this context,
the Allied action of protecting the Kurds in northern Iraq posed a direct challenge to Iraq, and was
a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. In effect, since Resolution 688 was relied upon to legitimize the
actions in northern Iraq, as mentioned earlier, the legality of these acts becomes questionable
according to this viewpoint. 37
It would seem that claims relating to Security Council action under Resolution 688 as

legally binding only because it was in response to a "threat to peace" is an exercise in an
excessive way. Resolution 688 was sufficiently open-ended to provide a legal basis for the allied
action. According to Teson, the relevant issue here is not whether the Security Council can do
anything it wants so long as it is styled a ''threat to international peace and security." As Teson
argues, setting aside word games, this situation was a human rights issue about Iraq's treatment of
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its own citizens. A reasonable reading of 688 is that the Security Council was essentially
concerned about human rights abuses themselves. The reference to "the threat to peace and
security was added for good measure. " 38
The key element in the UN action in northern Iraq is the revival of the sovereignty debate.
Was the UN action in Iraq a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, as argued above, or does the response
to the plight of the Kurds suggest a shift in international opinion towards reconstructing state
sovereignty to take account of massive human rights violations? A case can be made for the
assertion that there is a movement towards reconstructing sovereignty to take into consideration
human rights violations.
First, although the former UN Secretary General Preze de Cuellar may have had initial
reservation about the scope of the humanitarian mission in Iraq, he argued for a change in the
traditional understanding of state sovereignty in light of the international community's interest in
taking action where massive human rights violations are involved. In his final report to the
General Assembly in 1991, de Cuellar stated that:
"protection of human rights now involves a more concerted exertion of international
influence and pressure .... and, in the last resort, an appropriate UN presence, that is what
was regarded permissible under traditional international law. It is now increasingly felt
that the principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of states
cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively
or systematically violated with impunity .... We need not impale ourselves on the horns of
a dilemma between respect for sovereignty and the protection of human rights. What is
involved is not the right of intervention but the collective obligation of states to bring
38
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relief and redress in hwnan rights emergencies."39
The Secretary General argued that international bmmdaries have been erased in certain domains
of concern. Chopra stated that "there is already a shift in jurisdiction from the territorial "place"
of the domestic concern to the "place" of issues deemed matters of international concern, such as
international crimes, which are committed against the international community as a whole, which
are not distinguished by their locus delicti. "40 In effect, it becomes clear that the official UN view
of state sovereignty underwent significant reevaluation in light of the Gulf War and 'Operation
Provide Comfort. ' 41
Western leaders have also used 'Operation Provide Comfort' to change the traditional
understanding of sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs of states. The British Foreign
Minister, Douglas Hurd, in this regard remarked that "the demarcation between internal and
external policies of a nation is not absolute."

42

French Foreign Minister, Roland Dwnas, argued

that the French concept of the "duty to intervene"

43

emerged from the Iraqi oppression in a

similar way in that the concept of "crime against hwnanity" emerged from the Holocaust. In
France, he noted, it is a crime not to help someone who is in danger.

39
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Ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, noted that:
"The response to the plight of the Kurds suggests a shift in world opinion towards
the rebalancing of the claims of sovereignty and those of extreme human need. This is
good news since it means we are moving closer to deterring genocide and aiding its
victims. However, it also means we have much careful thinking to do about the nature of,
and the limitations upon, intervention to carry out humanitarian assistance programs
where states refuse in pursuit of policies of repression to give permission to such
assistance." 45
Echoing similar viewpoints at the London Summit in July 1991, the G7 issued a political
declaration noting:
" ... the urgent and overwhelming nature of the humanitarian problem in Iraq caused by
violent oppression by the government required exceptional action by the international
community, following UN Security Council Resolution 688. We urge the UN and its
affiliated agencies to be ready to consider similar action in the future if circumstances
require it."46
These developments effectively encourage intervention to protect human rights since the rights of
individuals are often violated by their own governments. The steady erosion of traditional
understandings of state sovereignty is making it easier for international organizations,
governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to intervene when governments refuse
to meet the needs of their citizens and a lot ofpeople are at risk.
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As Stedman argued, "it may be
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that the international community has begun to accept the position that the interests of people come
before the interests of states."

48

In short, Iraq's treatment of the Kurds shows the international

community's commitment to the view that sovereignty and nonintervention could no longer
shield genocidal and other repressive acts, which are themselves forbidden by international law
and treaties.
Having noted these developments, what then is the value of the Security Council action in
terms of its status as a precedent? Some writers have noted the improbability of the birth of a new
order, or caution against arriving at the conclusion that the case of the Iraqi Kurds sets a clear
precedent for humanitarian intervention.

49

Fine, for instance, argues "neither the United States

nor the United Nations is inclined to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support
any friend, or oppose any foe under a human rights banner." "The world will come to view the
Kurdish enclaves," according to Fine, "as a curio of international law, like Guantanamo Bay or
Gibralta." 50 He gives a number of reasons,

51

the coalescence of which explain the break with

international law customs in Kurdish Iraq, and concludes the absence of one or more of these
factors explains the lack of international militancy toward massive human rights violations in
other regions of the world.

52

Thus, the allied action in northern Iraq, for some, is neither reassuring as humanitarian
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intervention, nor does it signify the emergence of a new legal norm. It reinforces increasing fears
that the global order that is being structured is maintained by a self-appointed cop whose actions
are post-facto legitimized by the UN. 53
Contrary to the above assertions, the intervention in the support of the Iraqi Kurds has
broader importance for the following reasons. First, this case demonstrated the Security Council
willingness to act in response to internal repression when the consequences of that repression
resulted in transboundary refugees flows, even though the limits of the precedent are also
apparent. As shown earlier, five members of the Security Council expressed doubts about a
greater role for the Council in conflicts that they saw as essentially internal affairs.
Second, this case addressed the humanitarian crisis in Iraq as just that, avoiding the more
contentious political issue of Kurdish self-determination. Allied leaders did not take sides on the
issue of Kurdish self-determination, but saw in the creation of humanitarian enclaves the prospect
or possibility of an open dialogue that would ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi
citizens are respected. In this regard, former UN Secretary General de Cuellar argued in favor of a
"collective obligation of states to bring relief and redress in human rights emergencies" rather
than a more open-ended right of intervention.

54

Third, the UN action in Iraq resulted in a motivation for institutional reforms mapping out
UN humanitarian responses, such as through the creation of 'corridors of peace' or 'zones of
tranquility.'

55

To this end, the General Assembly adopted in December 1991 Resolution 46/182

to strengthen UN coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance. This resolution, among
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other things, lays down guiding principles for humanitarian assistance that take account of both
state sovereignty and the needs of "victims of natural disasters and other emergencies."

56

These

principles indicate a movement from the traditional focus on the primacy of state sovereignty and
on state-initiated requests for assistance. The resolution also resulted in the establishment of the
Department of Humanitarian Affairs which should enable the UN and other humanitarian
agencies working with the UN to respond in a timely manner and effectively in future
humanitarian emergencies. 57

2- Intervention in Somalia (1992)

The international response to the Somali crisis was more complex than the intervention in
Iraq because Somalia had no functioning government. The degeneration of Somali society into
civil strife and anarchy was puzzling since Somalia is one of the few homogenous states in Africa
with a common language, a common culture and a single religion, which is Islam.
The roots of the tragedy in Somalia can be attributed to both internal and external factors.
Internally, after its independence in 1960,

58

"the Somali government was a mere political

superstructure resting on the tectonic plates of the main organizing units of Somali society, the
clans", according to Farer.

59

Successful government depended on a delicate balancing act
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because of a system of client and patron built upon traditional clan relationships. When Barre
took over power in a coup in 1969, the principle of Somali politics remained the same but
gradually lost its balance. 60
The calamity that befell Somalia began partly with the policies pursued by Siad Barre in
the 1970s and 1980s. The Barre government's lack of legitimacy and imposition of centralized
rule worsened the negative results of his polices. The relative stability of Somali society in the
1970s and 1980s was dependent on the skillful manipulation of domestic politics. Barre's hold on
power was sustained by the suppression of critics, detention and military reprisals against his
opponents, manipulation of clan of interests and rivalries, and the occasional buying out of
opposition groups with cash. By the 1980s, however, the increase in inter-clan rivalries had
weakened his military base. It became increasingly obvious that he neither possessed the skill to
bring together the various sectional interests nor the leadership necessary to pull the country out
of its political impasse, with the worsening economic situation.

61

Externally, geopolitical considerations, such as Somalia's strategic proximity to the oilrich Middle East, were of great value to the superpowers during the Cold War. Both superpowers
sought a military presence in Somalia and generally in the Hom of Africa. The paramount interest
of both the United States and the Soviet Union was not to help Somalia but to pursue their own
global and regional agendas by carving out spheres of influence. Superpower rivalry in the 1970s
and 1980s thus gave Somalia leverage through which it got considerable economic and military
aid. With the demise of the Cold War, the United States and the former Soviet Union lost interest

Somalia, 1991-1993" in Harris ed; The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Printer, 1995) 145 at 146.
60
Slim & Visman, ibid; at 147.
61
Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chas: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers,
1993)at 17.

159

in the competition in the Hom of Africa and subsequently withdrew their presence.

62

One

consequence of Superpower competition was the acquisition and stockpiling of enormous military
arsenals by states in the region.

63

These arms acquisitions - a legacy of the Superpower rivalry -

thus played a prominent role in changing the magnitude, direction and extent of the anarchic
conditions prevailing in Somalia in the early 1990s. 64
The end of the Cold War diminished Superpower influence in Somalia. The result of this
was that previously suppressed long-standing grievances were unleashed in the form of ethnic
conflicts, destabilizing the Hom of Africa. Bitter clan fighting became the norm in central and
southern Somalia as the twenty-one year dictatorship of Siad Barre came to an end in January
1991 and created a power vacuum.

65

Intense fighting in and around Mogadishu quickly spread

throughout the rest of the country. Heavily armed bandits, many of whom were members of the
various major factions, and others with seemingly no real allegiance, took advantage of the
anarchy caused by civil war to seize control of parts of the country, and become involved in
looting, controlling the distribution of the food and raping women. 66 In effect, the civil war left
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Somalia in ruins with no functioning government.

67

By the middle of 1992 it was estimated that the situation had reached a peak in the crisis
with 1.2 million Somalis displaced either internally or externally in Ethiopia, Yemen and
Kenya. 68 About 4.5 million people were threatened with severe malnutrition and disease, and
suffered more than 300,000 deaths. 69 It was against this background of humanitarian catastrophe
that the events precipitating international intervention should be located.
After the overthrow of Barre, various humanitarian relief efforts were frustrated by the
actions of the warring factions to prevent relief supplies from reaching their enemies. There was a
general atmosphere of insecurity in the country which led to the delivery of relief supplies in all
parts of the country being stopped. The most important issue at the time was how to secure
conditions under which various UN agencies and NGOs could distribute relief assistance to
people that needed it the most. 70 Meanwhile, several attempts to mediate the conflict had failed. 71
Mediation efforts had failed because the various clans and sub-clans hated each other intensely;
the factions' leaders had virtually no legitimacy, since their supporters could switch their loyalties
anytime; and the number of factions and political movements kept increasing. 72
Given this terrible situation, the Security Council adopted Resolution 733 on January 23,
1992. It directed the Secretary General to immediately "undertake the necessary action to increase

York City, at 2.
Clark, "Debacle n Somalia: failure f Collective Response" in Damrsoch ed; supra, note 59 at 212.
68
Punier, "Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal (1990-1995)" ( 1996) 15: 1 Refugee Survey Quarterly
35 at 54.
69
( 1993) 30: 1 UN Chronicle at 1.
70
Jonah, "Humanitarian Intervention" in Weiss & Minear eds; Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining
Civilians n Times of War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) at 72.
71
See supra, note 66 at 32-36.
72
Ibid; at 32. It was for these reasons that the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali 's report to the Security council in
March 1993 argued that: National reconciliation is a difficult process in the best of circumstances; it is particularly
difficult in Somalia because of the multiplicity of parties, factions and other leaders, and the total absence of law and
order in all parts of the country" .See, Security Council Document S/25354 of 3 March 1993.
67

161

humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia," and called upon all parties to cooperate with
the Secretary General and to facilitate the delivery of aid.

73

In March 1992, the major factions in the civil conflict agreed to a UN mediated ceasefire,
74

which led to the establishment in April of the United Nations Operations in Somalia

(UNOSOM1) with a mandate to restore peace and protect humanitarian relief operations. The
truce was largely ignored among the factions, and the delivery of humanitarian aid by the UN and
other humanitarian NGOs was greatly impeded by armed gangs not only in Mogadishu, but
throughout the country.
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The deteriorating situation was followed by the unanimous adoption of

Security Council Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992.

76

This Resolution went beyond a mere

insistence on providing access to humanitarian relief agencies. The Council recognized the
"unique" situation in Somalia and declared that it fell under Chapter VII. 77 It determined that "the
magnitude of the human tragedy" caused by the conflict and the obstacles being created to "the
distribution of humanitarian assistance constituted a threat to international peace and security."
Furthermore, the Council authorized member states "to use all necessary means" to "create a
secure environment" for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It stated that "impediments to
humanitarian relief violated international humanitarian law" and that individuals in Somalia had a
right to that assistance. Finally, it stated that anyone interfering with humanitarian assistance "will
73
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be held individually responsible in respect of such acts."

It is instructive to point out that, unlike Resolution 688, China voted in favor of Resolution
794 although it is not entirely clear how far humanitarian considerations played a role in its
decision. Wheeler and Morris observe that the most positive explanation of China's position
might be its willingness to cooperate with the international community as it explores a limited
conception of multilateral intervention for the protection of human rights. However, they caution
that it is easy to overstate the extent to which experiments with norms of humanitarian
intervention are finding collective support in the society of states. For them, China is at best only
just becoming receptive to the notion that sovereignty and non-intervention can be overridden in
the protection of human rights. This stems, in part, from China's attempt at maintaining friendly
relations with the West, but the extent to which it reflects the gradual evolution of consensual
moral principles in the international community is debatable.
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Following the adoption of Resolution 794, the United States deployed a humanitarian
military-relief force to create a secure environment for the delivery of food and medicine to the
people of Somalia. The US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) marked the beginning of
"Operation Restore Hope", which enabled the UN and humanitarian NGOs to undertake their
extensive operations. This was the most successful phase of the multilateral action. By the end of
April 1993, the multilateral forces had helped in improving conditions significantly in Somalia. In
May the US-led action was concluded and responsibility passed over to the UN under Resolution
814, which established UNOSOM II, allowing the use of force as envisaged under Chapter VII.
The responsibility of UNOSOM II, in broad terms, was to complete, through disarmament and
78
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reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, and law and
order in Somalia.
The operation took a tum for the worse with the UN mandate expanding to include
"nation-building" which involved disarming the factions and arresting uncooperative faction
leaders. Acting under this mandate, 24 members of the Pakistani UN peace-keeping force were
killed on June 5, 1993. This incident seriously undermined the role of the UN peacekeeping force
and its ability to control an increasingly volatile situation. In a unanimous vote, the Security
Council passed Resolution 837 that called for the total disarmament and the arrest and
prosecution of those responsible for the killings. In an unprecedented tum of events, US forces
under UN command on June 12, 1993, carried out retaliatory attacks in the Somali capital in an
effort to bring the anarchic situation to an end and to restore conditions of normalcy. In the
months that followed, the search for General Aideed, who had been blamed for the killings, led to
the deaths of many Somalis, members of the UN peacekeeping forces and foreign journalists. The
violence intensified until early October when US forces suffered heavy casualties with 12 soldiers
killed, 70 wounded and 6 missing in action. 79
American policy began to shift when President Clinton announced intentions of
reinforcing US military presence in Somalia and proceeding with the political dialogue that had
already begun among the Somali factions. Secretary of State Warren Christopher subsequently
announced that the US had made mistakes regarding the Somali operation and that the search for
Aideed was no longer the main focus of the operation. The US began disengaging from Somalia
with France, Italy and other Western nations following suit.
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UN efforts at encouraging negotiations failed. Given the situation, Security Council
Resolution 897 was passed which sought to limit UN involvement by restricting UN forces to
tasks such as keeping the roads open to allow humanitarian aid channelled to the interior. When
UNOSOM's mandate expired by the end of March 1995, neither the Somali factions nor the
humanitarian NGOs requested an extension. It was very clear that UN peace management efforts
had failed.
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In sum, the Somalia experience evolved through four phases: conventional ceasefire

observation between July and November 1992; forcible delivery of humanitarian assistance
between December 1992 and March 1993; combat operations between June and October 1993;
and nation-building after October 1993. 82
Since the withdrawal of UN forces in March 1995, the political situation in Somalia has
remained the same. The various Somali faction leaders have failed to honor their commitments
towards an all inclusive national reconciliation conference and the formation of a government.
Nevertheless, while there had been no progress towards that end, the worst scenario of all out
civil war had been averted.
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The Somalia experience embodies the debate involving making a moral case for nonintervention versus intervention. Was there a moral obligation for the international community to
respond to the humanitarian crisis that was Somalia? In making a case for non-intervention, some
would argue that even if in practice the state, as in Somalia, is one that lacks a "general will' or is
experiencing a crisis of authority because of fighting involving different factions the ultimate
consequences of which will be to tear the society apart, foreign intervention is still seen as a
81
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greater evil. It is best to leave resolution of the crisis to the local people. Cynics contend that
efforts aimed at promoting peace through outside intervention merely prolong conflict or result in
a stalemate.
Alternatively, for others Somalia required a response, including the military means
necessary to render humanitarian aid effective, and thus was morally justifiable. As Walzer
argues, non-intervention is not an absolute moral rule. If what is going on locally becomes
intolerable, humanitarian intervention is morally necessary whenever cruelty and suffering are
extreme and local forces seem incapable of putting an end to them. 84 For him, the agent of last
resort to put an end to suffering is anyone near enough and strong enough to stop what needs
stopping, but he realizes this is not always easy.

85

In this case, the Organization of African Unity

(OAU) would have been the appropriate body capable of stopping the conflict in its early stages
before it took a turn for the worse, since that regional organization would have understood better
what was going on, and would have been able to grapple with the dynamics of the local politics.
The OAU, however, for various reasons, and most particularly its reluctance to intervene
in internal conflicts on the continent, was ineffective in dealing with the Somali conflict. One
might add, however, that there is some indication towards change in the OAU's approach in
dealing with situations such as Somalia or Liberia. At its summit in July 1992, African states were
prepared to sanction intervention in internal conflicts aimed at the delivery of humanitarian relief.
The report presented by the OAU Secretary General to the Council of Ministers in Dakar in June
1992 is perhaps indicative of an awareness about changing attitudes in so far as the OAU is
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concerned. The report stated:

86

"It is arguable .... that within the context of general international law as well as
humanitarian law, Africa should take the lead in developing the notion that sovereignty
can be legally transcended by the intervention of outside forces, by their will to facilitate
prevention and or resolution, particularly on humanitarian grounds. In other words, given
that every African is his brother's keeper and that our brokers are at best artificial, we in
Africa need to use our own cultural and social relationships to interpret the principle of
noninterference in such a way that we are enabled to apply it to our advantage in conflict
prevention and resolution. In developing the law, in this context, account should also be
taken of the need to create and maintain an enabling environment for economic
development and progress."
The tragedy of Somalia represented a real test of the ability of the international community to
intervene for humanitarian reasons. As the international community was confronted with media
images of starving men, women and children which had replaced pictures of wicked gunmen
fighting each other, public opinion was always in favor of taking some kind of action. Western
leaders clearly understood that the deplorable situation in Somalia could not be allowed to
86
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continue and that humanitarian intervention was an option.
Thus, the moral legitimacy of the Somali operation was not in doubt. There certainly was
a moral obligation for the UN to act and, by acting, the Organization alleviated the human
suffering that was a consequence of the civil conflict. It is encouraging that member states have at
least accepted this obligation. This is reflected in the resolution that established the UN
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). 87 Under the resolution there is a recognition by
member states of the necessity to provide the international community with access to people in
humanitarian need, and also to provide for their welfare in humanitarian crisis. According to Jan
Eliasson, UN under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, this resolution has been used "as
a diplomatic, formal basis for various negotiations" in creating humanitarian corridors for the
provision of assistance to people in need.

88

In Somalia, the Security Council should have acted

earlier than it did, as it took significant media pressure, public opinion and some prodding from
the UN Secretary General

89

to convince the Western political establishment of the necessity for

initiating "Operation Restore Hope."
What are the legal implications of the Somali action? Some commentators have expressed
skepticism regarding its value as a precedent. For them Resolution 794 contains caveats. They
argue that, although the Resolution was innovative in its acceptance that human suffering can
87
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constitute a threat to international peace and security, its significance was undermined by the use
of terms such as "unique", "extraordinary" and "exceptional." This has to be seen, therefore, as an
attempt to differentiate Somalia from other cases of internal disorder or instability.90
It is argued that, while the case is unique because there was no functioning government,

the Security Council set a precedent by placing overwhelming humanitarian needs above the
traditional restraints against intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. 91 Resolution
794 marked a significant inroad into the principle of humanitarian intervention. Unlike Resolution
688, which as some contend, did not explicitly authorize the use of force to assist the Iraqi Kurds,
Resolution 794 recognized that massive human rights violations amounted to a threat to peace and
security, and called for the use of "all necessary means" to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid
in chaotic situations such as was the case in Somalia. Although the Resolution was couched in the
language of civil war posing a "threat to peace" as a result of the massive refugee flows fleeing
the fighting, the Council's action is unprecedented to the extent that it clearly specifies the use of
collective intervention for humanitarian purposes. 92 Teson forcefully encapsulates the case for the
Security Council action thus:
"the main concern prompting enforcement action by the Security Council was the extreme
90
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situation created by a combination of famine, death and disease caused by the civil war;
the breach of humanitarian law by the warring factions; and the general situation of
anarchy." 93
Not only did the Resolution specify collective intervention for human rights purposes, but it went
further by enunciating individual responsibility in situations of interference with humanitarian
assistance. 94 The resolution sent a strong signal that the UN will no longer be prevented from
interfering on humanitarian grounds in the internal affairs of member states. Even so, it probably
should not be construed as giving the Security Council a broad right of intervention in less
outrageous cases. 95
Somalia provides support for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. The
overwhelming support that the intervention received

96

provides evidence of new attitudes and

readiness to intervene on grounds of humanitarian concerns. However, observers have also
commented on Somalia as being the turning point in the trajectory- when optimistic ideas about
humanitarian intervention were replaced by realism concerning the limits of such actions. The
failures of US and UN military efforts in Somalia have led to the so-called "Somalia syndrome"
where collective interventions to prevent mass starvation, genocide, massive exodus of refugees
and gross violations of human rights are no longer deemed either politically or operationally
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feasible.

97

There are obvious lessons to be learnt, as Weiss puts it, in "overcoming the Somalia

syndrome. "98
Although the successful phase of "Operation Restore Hope" provided a secure
environment for relief distribution, the experience took a turn for the worse with the expansion of
the UN mandate to include "nation-building" involving disarming the warring factions and
arresting uncooperative leaders, as mentioned earlier. Briefly put, it seems to be the case that
unclear and shifting objectives spelled failure and probably compounded the problem. This
unfortunately added to nee-isolationist sentiments among politicians who in principle were
disposed to support humanitarian missions.

99

However, in cases where preventive and peaceful

measures have failed, the international community should muster the moral fortitude to act
forcefully, argues Harff.

100

Furthermore, Weiss has commented that Somalia illustrates a situation in which the US
and its Western allies "have not systematically prepared UN operations, with the result that
symbols dwarf effective action."

101

In such situations, governments are "particularly prone to

crisis-induced reactions chosen for their symbolic value and ease of execution rather than their
decisive effect." 102 "Visceral reactions are to seek either magical "quick fixes" or else adhocery,
hoping that warring factions will come to their senses" For Wiess, Somalia provided evidence that
neither approach or reaction is the basis for a military policy that is workable and that both are
97
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potentially counterproductive.

103

The lessons of Somalia may be important for future management of what has been
characterized as "failed states". In examining the Somalia operation, one notes the various
Security Council resolutions remained unclear in prescribing the methods of political settlement
and for the "re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration." The
result, as Hoffmann comments, is that the operation was plagued by a rift between those who (like
the US - some of the time) wanted to rebuild political life 'from the bottom up' (according to the
model of encouraging institutions) and those (particularly in the UN bureaucracy) who opted for a
model "accommodating existing forces", and of working with the factional leaders, from the 'top
down'.

104

This rift specially did much to reduce the UN's capacity to reach a political solution.

Added to this is the fact that expansive mandates can also bog down the UN so much as to limit
its capabilities or desire to carry out even the simple task of delivering humanitarian assistance or
traditional peacekeeping when it ought to be done.
political level.
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This problem can be resolved at the

106

The significance of "Operation Restore Hope" for future humanitarian operations is that
the UN succeeded in assuring the delivery of humanitarian relief to Somalis and, perhaps, saving
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millions of lives. It also partially succeeded in bringing the warring factions together and averting
a worst case scenario of an all out civil war. In defining the scope of its humanitarian mandate,
the UN will necessarily confront the problems of political institution building. Caution must,
however, be exercised in terms of the unchecked use of Chapter VII powers to carry out "peace
building" operations.

107

Chapter VII should be used to authorize "peace building" missions only

as a last resort. 108
In sum, Somalia provides an example of Security Council authorization for collective

humanitarian intervention, at least in situations where there is no functioning central government,
leading to civil war in which massive human rights violations occur. Resolution 794 was an
explicit statement of the right of intervention in response to a humanitarian crisis. Setting aside
the ultimate outcome of the Somalia operation, it represents the clearest articulation of the
principle of humanitarian intervention.

3- Intervention in Haiti (1993-1994)

The case of Haiti is the most important case of supporting the legitimacy both of an
international principle of democratic rule and collective humanitarian intervention. Although the
107
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case of Haiti is different in many aspects from the earlier cases examined, it shares with them the
massive human suffering in a situation of gross violations of human and political rights. The
immediate crisis inducing international action began with the overthrow of President Jean
Aristide in a military coup in 1991 and the subsequent widespread human rights violations by the
new military rulers.
Haiti gained its independence in 1804 and since then has had a tradition of dictatorial
rule. 109 This state of affairs seemed to have become more pronounced when Francois "Papa Doc"
Duvalier became the country's leader after winning elections that were considered fraudulent in
1957. His term of office was marked by violence and intimidation as tools of controlling the
Haitian people. In 1971, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier succeeded his father as president and
proceeded to govern in a similar manner .110 He was overthrown in 1986 and was succeeded by the
National Council of Government, a civilian-military junta. In 1987, the Organization of American
States (OAS) urged Haiti to move towards democratization by holding free and fair elections.
However, the period from 1986 to1991 was marked by a series of short term governments each of
which came to power either through a military coup or through elections fraught with
irregularities. 111 On December 16, 1990, elections were held in Haiti with international
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supervision. Aristide became the first democratically elected President of Haiti on January 7,
1991.

112

A military coup led by General Cedras overthrew Aristide on September 30, 1991. 113

The Security Council held emergency meeting at the request of Haiti's Ambassador to the
UN and stated that the coup was an internal domestic matter which, did not constitute a threat to
the international peace.

114

Due to the inaction of the Security Council, the OAS on October 2,

1991, responded quickly to the coup by condemning it and imposing economic and diplomatic
sanctions on Haiti. They demanded "full restoration of the rule of law and of the constitutional
regime, and the immediate reinstatement of President Aristide in the exercise of his legitimate
authority."
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The Security Council convened formally on October 3, 1991 and condemned the

coup. It strongly support the OAS action but failed to adopt a formal resolution against the coup
because China and some non-aligned states considered the situation in Haiti a domestic matter
which is beyond the reach of the UN concern. 116
On October 10, 1992, the UN General Assembly strongly condemned the "illegal
replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti and the use of violence, military coercion and
the violation of human rights in Haiti" and affirmed as "unacceptable any entity resulting from
that illegal situation."
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What is noticeable here is that there is no mention of Haiti's right to

choose its political system and nor is there any reference to Haiti's sovereignty.
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In May 1992, the OAS ad hoc Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers again passed
a resolution which called upon member states to adopt whatever actions may be necessary for the
greater effectiveness of the measures referred to in the ministers earlier resolutions in response to
the coup. Additionally, they recommended the immediate freezing all of assets of the Haitian state
held in any OAS member state. 118 Refusal of Haiti's de facto military dictator Gen. Cedras to
reinstate the democratically elected Aristide government and the continued violent persecution of
Aristide supporters led the Security Council to adopt coercive measures against Haiti in June
1993. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council adopted Resolution 841,
imposing an economic embargo on Haiti.
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The Security Council's binding resolution clearly

affirmed that the solution to the crisis in Haiti was the restoration of democracy in the country.
The strong UN sanctions imposed on Haiti compelled the Haitian military regime to
accept a UN Governors Island Agreement in July 1993, which would have returned Haiti to
democratic rule under President Aristide.
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Under the terms of Resolution 841 and the

Governors Island Agreement, the UN suspended the economic sanctions on Haiti on August 27,
1993, because the regime had begun the restoration of democratic rule. The Governors Island
Agreement collapsed when violence against Aristide supporters resumed in September and
October of 1993 and reached a crisis point when pro-junta mobs stopped the troops assigned

passed resolutions regarding the human rights situation in Haiti. See GA Res. 46/138 and UN Doc. A/C.3/47/L.73.
Cited in supra, note 228 at footnote 55.
118
See Resolution of Democracy in Haiti, Res. MRE/RES.3/92, May 17, 1992. Cited in ibid; at 133-134.
119
SC Res. 841, UN Doc. S/RES/841 (1993 ). With regard to this Resolution, Damrosch maintain that "it goes farther
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under UN Resolution 867,

121

to assist in the monitoring and modernization of the Haiti police and

military. On October 13, 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 873 which re-imposed the
previously suspended economic sanctions,

122

and authorized member states, in another

Resolution passed on October 16, to use military force to enforce the sanctions. 123
As the pressures for international action continued to mount in the wake of the de facto
government's brutal treatment of its people and the exodus of refugees from Haiti on July 31,
1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 940 authorizing member states to use "all
necessary means to facilitate the departure of the military leadership from Haiti."
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Acting under

this mandate, the United States and other UN members put pressure on the Haiti military
leadership. On September 15, after the diplomatic measures had been exhausted, President
Clinton declared that a US-led military intervention was near to happening.
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Fortunately, on

September 18, former United States President Carter's mission persuaded the Junta's leadership
to agree to hand over power to President Aristide and leave the country by October 15. This
agreement was reached at the last moment before an invading force of US-led multinational
troops was to land in Haiti.
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As a result, President Aristide returned to Haiti, the Security

Council lifted all sanctions against Haiti, the US-led Multinational Force in Haiti was replaced
with the UN mission in Haiti and the crisis came to an end when foreign troops finally withdrew.
The UN authorized US-led multinational involvement in Haiti marked a precedent in the
support of multinational humanitarian intervention and, for some commentators, an emerging
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principle of democratic govemance. 127 The moral and legal dimensions of international action in
Haiti are defensible. The US-led action is justified partly by the need to put a stop the human
rights violations of the Cedras regime. In justifying the intervention, President Clinton held the de
facto military authorities in Haiti responsible for human rights abuses that included the execution
of children, the raping of women, and the killings that were going on. President Clinton stated that
"let me be clear, General Cedras and his accomplices alone are responsible for this suffering and
terrible human tragedy."
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Despite the horrible scenes of government brutality against the

Haitian people which were regularly flashed across television screens, and repeated references by
the American president to atrocities committed in Haiti, some commentators have questioned the
US-led action and its legitimacy as a case of humanitarian intervention. 129 Weber argues that the
September agreement, brokered just before the intervention, suggests that human rights violations
were not a priority for the United States. She writes:
"It seems ... the focus on the protection of Haitian human rights served as a false cover for

an issue closer to home-immigration. Viewing human rights through immigration
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concerns suggests that the population at risk in US-Haitian relations was not so much the
Haitian population but the US citizenry .... Focusing on one issue like human rights in
order to cover a concern with another issue like immigration is not a particularly new
move. One fmds this frequently in intervention discourses. I want to suggest that the US
discourse on Haiti was an example of dissimulation understood as the escalation of the
fake. US intervention justifications amounted to projecting the US population's own fears
(real or imagined) onto the Haitians (a 'false') location." 130
The existence of mixed motives regarding the United States' involvement cannot be ruled
out in this case. The United States was certainly concerned about the continued mass exodus of
Haitian refugees seeking asylum in the United States and was seeking methods to bring the
refugee situation to an end. The United States' national interests were thus affected by the
intolerable situation in Haiti that created the refugee problem. The national interest must be
construed broadly as being affected because the Haitian situation was morally reprehensible. The
fact that mixed motives were present should not nullify this intervention since the humanitarian
motive was clearly evident.
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Moreover, the US-led action indicates that a humanitarian crisis

can become internationalized, pointing the way to action against a government in power.
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The legal basis for humanitarian intervention in Haiti can be found in Resolution 940. The
Security Council expressed grave concern regarding the "significant further deterioration of the
humanitarian situation." Also, it referred to the Haitian authorities' "systematic violation of civil
liberties." The Security Council thus used the grave human rights violations and removal of the de
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facto government in Haiti as the justification for authorizing military action. The Haitian
paradigm thus seems to reinforce the proposition that states have accepted grave human rights
violations as the basis for action by the Security Council under Chapter VII. 133
Some lessons emerge from the Haiti experience. Although the OAS was less effective
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in taking action against Haiti, its immediate reaction in the wake of the crisis by applying
diplomatic and economic sanctions must be appreciated. It suggests a willingness of the regional
organization to respond to similar situations in the future. The organization's initiative prompted
the UN to lend its support to find a solution to the crisis. In the same breath, this action also
reveals the ambiguities that characterize the international community's efforts to reach at some
point a consensus on when and how to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. It took two years for the
UN to take its first decisive action. Even then, it was only after mandatory sanctions were in
effect that the Haitian military dictators began taking the UN or OAS seriously. It took another
year for the Security Council to authorize action that proved effective in returning Aristide to
power. By the time those other remedies had proved quite ineffective, it was too late to save those
who could have been rescued by an earlier intervention. The point here is that early use of force
may have been desirable in preventing further worsening of the crisis.
In conclusion, it is significant to note that a number of states in the Latin American region
supported various measures ranging from mediation, economic sanctions to the use of force to
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reinstall Aristide, although some of the larger states were reluctant to support military force.
Despite the lack of unanimity for forceful action, the very fact of expression of support to some
extent represents a shift on the part of governments in the Latin American region from their
previous absolute non-intervention stance.

4- NATO Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia (1994)

The intricate and complicated conflict in former Yugoslavia

135

created one of the most

difficult dilemmas and a critical test case for the Western alliance and the UN in terms of
international intervention and conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era.
Yugoslavia was created around a Serbian nucleus during a series of wars in the 19th and
20th centuries as the Ottoman Empire gradually lost its grip on the Balkan territories.
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The

strong leadership of Marshal Tito from the end of the World War II held the state together and
successfully contained ethnic tension during the Cold War. Upon Tito's death in 1980, cracks
within the Yugoslav Republic began to emerge. The post-Tito period led to the rearrangement of
the governmental structure which was designed to balance competing ethnic groups and interests.
This was done by rotating the presidency among the six republics. One writer remarks that this
arrangement in effect contained the seeds of its own destruction.
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Partly in response to increasing Serb nationalism and growmg anticommunism,
independence movements in Croatia and Slovenia gained momentum in the late 1980s. 138 After
the fall of the Communist government, the republics making up Yugoslavia started to secede.
Slovenia parliament declared it would no longer follow federal legislation, 139 and Croatia took
similar steps toward greater political autonomy. Despite attempts at renegotiating the federal
constitution along loose confederal lines, the political, economic and ethnic cracks between the
various republics widened. Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence on June 26, 1991.
They rejected what in their estimation was a situation of "economically stifling, politically
outdated and nationalistically divisive policies of Belgrade." 140 The result was the outbreak of
warfare. 141 Initial international response to the Yugoslav crisis came from the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Union (EU) and the UN. In spite of
opposition from the US, members of the EU granted recognition to both Slovenia and Croatia on
January 15, 1992, under pressure from Germany.
The outbreak of civil strife in Bosnia-Herzegovina was almost predictable and inevitable.
Bosnia is ethnically rnixed. 142 As Alija Izetbegovic remarks, the national groups were thoroughly
mixed "almost like the colors in a Jackson Pollack painting." 143 The rights and interests of
Bosnia's mixed population had been protected under Tito's rule, which maintained their equality
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140
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under the multi-national Yugoslav state. As the federation was disintegrating, this unstable ethnic
mix within Bosnia's borders could no longer be held together. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a
referendum was held on February 29 and March 1, 1992, in which an overwhelming majority of
the voters favored independence. The Serbian population boycotted and rejected the result of this
referendum. Nevertheless, the government of Bosnia declared independence on March 3, 1992.
The signs of violence were clearly written on the wall in the aftermath of this declaration. The
chances of violence were amplified by the EC's recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a situation
which the Serbs were not prepared to tolerate.
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Immediately after the government declared

independence, rebel Bosnian Serb forces tried to overthrow the government. The chaos and ethnic
strife that followed resulted in widespread and massive human rights violations in which all sides
to the conflict were involved. In an effort to preserve their hegemony and capture more territory
for a greater Serbian state, the Serbs engaged in ethnic cleansing involving a program of genocide
and forced evacuations. 145 Hundreds of thousands of people were killed and close to two million
people were displaced from their homes, becoming refugees as a result of this practice. The
atrocities that were reportedly committed were compared as the severity and extent of those
committed by the Nazis during World War II.
As mentioned earlier, this intricate conflict meant the international community had to deal
with more interlocutors. These not only included the authorities in Serbia but also the Serb
Republic of Krajina; Croatian authorities in Croatia, the Croatian military and militias in Bosnia
and Herzegovina; the Bosnian government and Bosnia Serb authorities in the self-declared
Republic of Serbska, and the splinter Muslim faction in the autonomous zone of Western Bosnia.
144
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Given the complexity of the Yugoslav crisis, it was no surprise that the international
community was cautious in its reaction and showed a reluctance to intervene. It was in this
context that the international community became involved initially through the CSCE, then the
EC and the UN. The EC, seized with the situation, tried to mediate the conflict which member
governments saw as a European issue. 146 After attempts to arrange a series of ceasefrres and bring
about a peaceful resolution of the conflict had failed, 147 Austria, Canada, Hungary, Yugoslavia (in
particular)
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and other countries requested the Security Council to become involved by sending

peacekeeping forces and imposing a mandatory oil embargo on Yugoslavia.
The Security Council finally considered taking some form of action. In its initial meeting
on September 25, 1991, the Yugoslav delegate pointed out that "Yugoslavia can no longer be
simply repaired. It should be re-defined." 149 India argued that consent manifested in a formal
request by Yugoslavia would be needed for the Council to consider intervention. China and
Zimbabwe reminded members of the significance of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
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other states. 150 Yemen cautioned that in future the Security Council would encounter similar
situations requiring creative approaches. 151 Zaire viewed the conflict as a civil war. 152 Russia
stressed the significance of a political settlement, not only for inter-governmental conflicts, but
also for intra-state conflicts ... showing how dangerous the growth of separatism and national
extremism is, not only for each individual country but for entire regions. 153 Britain affirmed the
strong international dimension of the conflict, while the US referred to the danger of escalation
and the dangerous impact on Yugoslavia's neighbors, who faced refugee flows, energy shortfall
and the threat of a spillover of fighting as a matter of primary concem. 154
In response to these concerns, Resolution 713 was unanimously passed. The initial

mandate of the UN expressed concern that the continuation of the war constituted a threat to
international peace and security. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it decided that all states
implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment.
Following from that, the Council also adopted Resolution 743 on February 21, 1992 which
established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). This force was created following
the Secretary General's recommendation that in the context of the ceasefire then in effect, such a
force could become successful in consolidating the ceasefire and facilitating negotiation of a
comprehensive settlement. 155 As noted earlier, recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the EC
intensified the violence in that republic in the spring of 1992. As large portions of territory came
under the control of the JNA and Serbian militias, reports of atrocities being committed began
surfacing. Security Council Resolution 752 was adopted calling for, among other things, both
Ibid.
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parties to stop fighting and to respect the territorial integrity of each republic. Resolution 757
came after that, calling for economic sanctions against Serbia for its continued and grave human
rights violations.
The first time that the UN Security Council authorized coercive measures in the conflict
was in the summer of 1992. In its Resolution 770 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII,
called upon states "to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures
necessary to facilitate in coordination with the UN the delivery ... of humanitarian assistance ...
in ... Bosnia-Herzegovina."
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While recognizing that the situation in Bosnia amounted to a

"threat to international peace and security," the Council was also "deeply concerned" by the
reports of abuses against civilians imprisoned in camps, prisons and detention centers" which had
so shocked the international community that it referred to the use of all necessary measures to
have them closed. This resolution further expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to deliver
humanitarian assistance, and in performing this task to use "all measures necessary."
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To this

end, several thousand UN peacekeepers were put on the ground to protect humanitarian convoys
with totally inadequate military back-up. These forces relied almost entirely on negotiations to get
humanitarian assistance to where it was needed the most, which frequently resulted in delays and
disruptions. Added to this was the fact the UN and NGO officials were not immune from attack.
Faced with the failure of several attempts at protecting the Bosnian Muslims, the Security
Council passed Resolution 781, which directed the imposition of a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia to
prevent Serbian attacks from hindering the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. Not only were
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the Bosnian Muslims vulnerable to Serb attacks in the UN declared safe zones, even UN
peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers became hostages to the whims of local combatants.
One commentator remarks that the Bosnian Serbs in those circumstances viewed the UN
Resolutions as attempts by the US and EC to give the appearance of protecting the Muslims while
doing nothing.
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As it became clear that the so-called UN designated "safe zones" were anything

but safe and enforcement action proved difficult, the Security Council, under Resolution 816,
authorized member states to "take all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the event of further violations to ensure compliance with the ban on
flights." Unlike the disagreement regarding the interpretation of resolutions concerning Iraq, the
Security Council this time specifically approved the enforcement by NATO fighter planes. Acting
under authority of these Resolutions, NATO fighter planes embarked on a series of bombing
campaigns against Bosnian Serb positions that violated the "safe havens" designated by the UN to
deter further attacks. NATO's use of force may have ended the commission of further atrocities in
Bosnia and facilitated more realistic proposals towards ending the war. In December 1995, the
warring parties started negotiations designed to bring the war in Bosnia to an end. The initialing
of the agreements known as the Dayton Peace Accord in November 1995 culminated in a peace
settlement signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.
158
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The Dayton Agreement, despite paying lip service to a unitary Bosnia, ratified and sought
to strengthen existing territorial divisions. It gave grounds for qualified hope for a stable,
relatively peaceful Bosnia. It required the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb forces from the
Sarajevo suburbs as well as from a corridor stretching from Sarajevo to Gorazde, and assigned
these areas to the Bosnian government It also establishes a NATO-led implementation Forces for
Bosnia (IFOR) to oversee the implementation of the military part of the peace plan. 160
The war in the former Yugoslavia raised particularly difficult questions and dilemmas for
the international community on the issue of intervention in its moral, legal and practical
dimensions. Morally, there was a sense of revulsion occasioned by atrocities committed in the
course of the conflict as images of emaciated prisoners held in Serb-controlled concentration
camps, the shelling of cities with women and children dying or wounded with no food or medical
supplies, and accounts of murders and rape filled television screens around the world. In those
circumstances, international public opinion certainly favored taking action to redress this
abhorrent state of affairs. Some critics argue that foreign policy or international response should
not be driven by emotional reactions fostered by the media. In line with this mode of thinking,
hesitation characterized involvement in the Yugoslavian civil war in its early stages as Western
governments believed military intervention in Bosnia would pose unacceptable risks to the lives
of soldiers committed to such an endeavor, and that intervention would not end the fighting.
Indeed, some policymakers in the US, for example, argued against the commission of ground
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troops in Bosnia for fear of becoming bogged down in a quagmire, and of sustaining casualties of
major proportions

161

in an enterprise that would have, in the end, been difficult to justify to their

domestic constituents. The Somalia syndrome reinforced this view and led to a cautionary
approach. Yet the unwillingness and inability to act in the early stages of the conflict had a
crippling effect on the UN and put its credibility at stake. Resolution 770, for example, promised
more than member goverrunents were willing to do. "All measures necessary" were never taken
to ensure that humanitarian aid was delivered. In the words of Higgins, "we have chosen to
respond to major unlawful violence not by stopping that violence, but by trying to provide relief
to the suffering. But our choice of policy allows the suffering to continue."
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The provision of humanitarian assistance surely alleviated human suffering and saved
lives. Under the protection of UNPROFOR, much needed relief supplies were brought to alleviate
the hardship endured by besieged communities. But this provision of humanitarian relief also had
serious military and political consequences. Some Bosnian Muslims, for instance, considered the
delivery of inadequate relief as merely sustaining them until they could be killed by the Serbs.
UNPROFOR came under shelling and sniper fire; the declaration of "safe havens" meant nothing
as Serb gunners pounded those enclaves; and agencies like the UNHCR were compelled to escort
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refugees from Serb-held areas. The UN was seen by many of the war victims as accomplices to
the atrocities that had been committed.
The Security Council, as mentioned earlier, gave UNPROFOR a humanitarian mandate
without the necessary military backup given the situation on the ground. Although Resolution 776
authorized UNPROFOR to support UNHCR efforts in the delivery of humanitarian aid,
UNPROFOR's use of force was deemed politically undesirable due to the increased risk of troop
casualties. Moreover, the unwillingness to use force in delivering humanitarian assistance may be
partly viewed as the desire to remain neutral or impartial. Indeed the very deployment of a UN
force on the ground gave Western governments a justification for not undertaking air strikes for
fear of hitting their own troops or turning them into Serb hostages. As the former UN UnderSecretary General for peacekeeping operations, Kofi Annan, admits "The reality is there are
situations when you cannot assist people unless you are prepared to take certain military
measures."
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The UN assistance program was used as an excuse for the lack of military

intervention. Weiss argues that humanitarian assistance combined with an inadequate military
force was a "powerful diversion" substituting for more creative military strategies to end the war.
164

Taking action in providing inadequate military support for the delivery of humanitarian

assistance to people in need, while neglecting responsibility for protecting those people against
murder, ethnic cleansing and rape, led to a deep moral crisis in the UN's humanitarian action.
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The Security Council Resolutions discussed earlier provided legal justification for
humanitarian intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Resolution 770, among others, authorized the
use of force by states to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. While the Council
recognized that the situation in Bosnia constituted a threat to international peace and security, it
also made references to the gross human rights violations that were going on, in which civilians
were subjected to murders, ethnic cleansing and rapes. In the debates preceding the passage of
resolution 770, even delegates who were skeptical about authorizing individual states to act as
opposed to a collective UN intervention conceded that the situation in the former Yugoslavia
called for the use of force. India, for example, referred to the desperate plight of the civilian
population which demanded urgent response not excluding the use of force. The Indian
representative stated that India was:
"not opposed to the concept of the use of force in the present situation..... We have no
doubt whatever that the critical and desperate plight of the population demands urgent and
effective response on the part of the international community and that such a response
cannot and must not exclude the use of force."
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The delegate from Zimbabwe noted the "pain and agony of fratricidal carnage that has
accompanied the disintegration of what used to be the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."
He continued by saying "Zimbabwe has consistently supported efforts within the Security
Council that we believed had a chance of assisting to bring about peace and stability ... " Thus,
"Zimbabwe is of the view that any necessary measures taken or arrangements made to deal with
powers feared that it would cause an even greater loss of life to the civilian population of Bosnia and their own
forces. Concerned about the humanitarian problem but worried about the safety of their own people, those leaders
followed what they evidently believed was the only responsible course of action open to them at the time". Jackson,
"Armed Humanitarianism" 91993) XL VUI International Journal. 579 at 603.
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this crisis have to be undertaken as a collective enforcement measure." The representative of
Ecuador maintained "the international community cannot be insensitive to the suffering of
defenseless human beings, accordingly the states that answer the Council's call will be authorized
to use every means necessary to achieve the specific aim in question because of the exceptionally
urgent circumstances that prevail in Bosnia and Herzegovina."
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The debates show a strong

endorsement for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
The intervention by NATO forces is partly explicable in the sense of it having a
humanitarian dimension. It was an action undertaken pursuant to authorization from the UN with
the aim of ending the abhorrent human rights situation as a result of the conflict. 168 Although
initial UN authorization was limited to the use of air power to securing delivery of humanitarian
assistance and enforcement of the "no-fly" zones, those limited purposes were exceeded in some
instance. NATO, for example, responded by taking strong action against the Bosnian Serb
bombing of a Sarajevo market in which 37 people were killed.
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Situations of this kind, though,

depict the difficulties involved in the insistence upon the neutrality of humanitarian interventions.
Two kinds of problems are encountered here.
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One is the territorial issue involving the merits of

the dispute, claims put forward by the various parties, questions relating to who has the right to
which part of the territory, and whether secession is justified, etc. These are hard cases about
which any intervener must strive to be impartial. The second situation involves human rights
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abuses, and violations of international humanitarian law generally. Neutrality or impartiality will
not be the issue here as intervention must target the perpetrators and compel them to put a stop to
those practices. If both sides to the conflict are guilty, then it is incumbent to stop them.
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The

traditional UN peacekeeping approach and its insistence upon neutrality and impartiality between
the perpetrators and their victims have come under a lot of criticism. In Bosnia, the circumstances
of the war were such that the interveners had to ignore directives on impartiality and take sides in
support of the victims. Such an action, however, need not prejudge the merits of the dispute.
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UN involvement in the former Yugoslavia conflict could be justified on three grounds.
First, there was the refugee situation. The impact of the massive exodus of refugees across
borders was evident. More than 500,000 Yugoslav refugees fled into other European countries.
Bosnian Serbs and Croats were resettled in Serbia while temporary sanctuary was found for
hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Croats who were displaced as a result of the
conflict.
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Second, the humanitarian situation resulting from the war was equally severe. The
Bosnian Serb military strategy which centered on attacking Muslim communities consequently
left large segments of the civilian population bereft of essential supplies of food, medicine, power
and water. These disruptions carried with them starvation, exposure to the natural elements of the
weather and disease. Humanitarian concerns were thus significant and fell within the mandate of
the UN Security Council.
Third, human rights violations perpetrated especially by the Bosnian Serbs for instance,
mistreatment of Muslims held in concentration camps and widespread rape of Muslim women
171
172
173
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shocked the international community. The human rights situation by itself provided the necessary
justification for involvement by the CSCE as evidenced in the Moscow Declaration of October
1991.
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In the Moscow Declaration, leaders of the CSCE suggested their preparedness regarding

intervention to enforce a member state's obligation to respect human rights. The least that can be
done in that regard will be to send rapporteurs without the target state's consent. The CSCE
proceeded cautiously regarding the former Yugoslavia, following the EC's and the UN's lead,
though by mid 1992 it had sent human rights monitors into Serbian areas. 175
In sum, the situation in the former Yugoslavia showed the Security Council's

preparedness, at least in principle, to authorize the use of force for humanitarian reasons.
Humanitarian concerns certainly played a prominent role in the international response to the
conflict.

5- Intervention in Rwanda ( 1994)

The civil war and the consequent series of massacres that followed in the wake of the
death of Rwanda's President, Juvenal Habyarimana, on April 6, 1994, have been described by
most commentators as constituting genocide. 176 Rwanda is not a simple case of tribal or ethnic
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Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Document of the Moscow Meeting on the human
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c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
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conflict as has been presented by some observers. The root causes of the civil war are attributable
to the impact of Belgian colonization on Hutu-Tutsi relations in Rwanda, and to political
manipulation of that cleavage by Belgian and Rwandan elites in competition in the period
preceding Belgian decolonization.
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As the Report by African Rights notes:

"Hutus and Tutsis existed a century ago, but were defmed in very different terms in those
days. They were far less mutually hostile. Colonial rule and its attendant racial ideology,
followed by independent governments committed to Hutu supremacy and intermittent
inter-communal violence, have dramatically altered the nature of the Hutu-Tutsi problem,
and made the divide between the two far sharper and more violent. In short, the political
manipulation of ethnicity is the main culprit for today's ethnic problem."
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Hutus and Tutsis did not have a mutual ancestral hatred for each other. The ethnic divide is
attributable to the political and social reorganization that was largely the influence of colonialism.
179

Tbroughout the period of colonial rule, support vacillated between the two groups. The

intention of the colonial powers was to "divide and rule"- a strategy that basically changed the
nature of the relationships between the two groups. Colonial Rwanda thus contributed to the
character of Rwandan society.
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d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group;
f)
177
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Upon attainment of independence from Belgium in 1962, violent political competition and
clashes resulted in the deaths of thousands of the Tutsi minority, and forced tens of thousands
more to seek refuge in Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda. In 1973, Habyarimana seized power in a
military coup, establishing the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND).
Afterwards, Rwanda became a one-party state with the "Tutsi factor" mainly absent in Rwandese
politics. Habyarimana put in place a system of ethnic quotas for jobs and educational
opportunities. Power was mainly concentrated between a minority of northern Hutus.
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Response to internal and external pressures led to the opening up of the political system and the
formation of other parties in June 1991.
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In October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was made up of Tutsi exiles

who had sought refuge in neighboring countries after the majority Hutu overthrew the rule of the
minority Tutsi following independence, initiated a military offensive into Rwanda from Uganda.
For the next three years, a low intensity civil conflict was waged between the Rwandan
government and the RPF, whose demands included the return of all Rwandan refugees and the
formation of a government that would promote ethnic reconciliation. The RPF achieved limited
success.

The Rwandan government began a security crackdown. Around this time, the

international community started protesting human rights violations in Rwanda and threatening
Kigali with sanctions.
Pressure from the international community resulted in the signing of the Arusha Accords
in August 1993 between Habyarimana and the RPF.
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This agreement offered the prospect for

Jones, supra, note 158 at 227.
Supra note 159 at iv.
183
The Accords dealt with some of the most important issues underlying the conflict such as return of Rwandan
refugees and resettlement of displaced people, power sharing, and integration of the armed forces. This UN-brokered
182
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peace, democracy and national reconciliation. Yet it also encountered strong opposition from
Hutu extremists who feared an end to their hitherto privileged status in Rwandan society. These
extremists were bent on derailing implementation of the Arusha Accords and its supporters
including moderates within the Rwandan government.
With the peace plan in jeopardy, on April 6, 1994, president Habyarimana and the
president of Burundi died in a plane crash caused by the firing of rockets at Kigali airport.
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This

incident not only renewed the civil conflict with the RPF, but led to the creation of a political
vacuum in which Rwandan government forces, the Presidential Guard and the Hutu youth militia
engaged in killing Tutsis and moderate Hutu leaders. The wave of terror unleashed resulted in the
most brutal and systematic slaughter of civilians ever witnessed on the African continent.
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In

the wake of this tragedy, the RPF launched a fresh offensive from Uganda. It finally defeated the
remnants of the Hutu-dominated government forces in July 1994, and unilaterally declared a
ceasefire.
Although about 2,700 troops constituting UNAMIR had maintained a presence in Rwanda
at the time to oversee implementation of the Arusha Accords, they were powerless in stopping the
massacres. The Rwandan Prime Minister, members of her government, along with Belgian UN
guards assigned to protect her, were brutally killed. Belgium withdrew its military troops serving
with UNAMIR following this incident and urged the Security Council to withdraw continuation

peace had an implementation program that called for the deployment of what became known as the United Nations
assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), to guarantee peace and transition to democracy; creation of a transitional
government involving the parties in power, the opposition parties and the RPF; and the holding of multi-party
elections no later than 1995. See supra, note 159 at 32-33.
184
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of the UNAMIR operation given the circumstances of the chaos and mayhem in the country.
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It

is estimated that up to one million Rwandans were killed. Furthermore, an estimated 1.3 million
fled to neighboring countries with a further 2.2 million people internally displaced. In a nutshell,
over half of Rwanda's total population, estimated at 8.1 million before the genocide, were either
killed, annihilated by epidemics or internally displaced as a result of the civil war.
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Despite the humanitarian crisis of almost unprecedented magnitude caused by the civil
conflict, the initial international response was less than enthusiastic. The initial Security Council
reaction was to pass Resolution 912 on April21, 1994, reducing the number ofUNAMIR troops
to 270 in order to prevent sustaining more casualties, and in the hope that the violence would
end. 188 The situation, however, continued to deteriorate. On May 13, 1994, the UN Secretary
General, in his report to the Security Council, stated:
"the world community has witnessed with horror and disbelief the slaughter and suffering
of innocent civilians in Rwanda. While the chances for a lasting peace are fundamentally
in the hands of the political and military leaders of the country, the international
community cannot ignore the atrocities effects of this conflict on innocent civilians."
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He urged the Security Council to undertake a re-examination of Resolution 912 and a
reconsideration of appropriate action to end the massacres. The Security Council appeared to
adjust to the reality of what was going on in Rwanda. On May 17, 1994, the Security Council
unanimously passed Resolution 918, increasing the strength of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops. The
Resolution called for an expanded mandate for UNAMIR, which included protection of displaced
186
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persons, refugees and civilians. It also called for the creation and maintenance of secure
hwnanitarian areas and the provision of support for hwnanitarian relief operations. However,
these troops were not deployed at the time, the reason being that member states made no
commitments to provide the requisite nwnber troops for such an undertaking. The delay by
member states meant little or no international action was taken that might have prevented or
reduced the enormity of the refugee situation. As Robert Oakley observed "at a minimwn, an
earlier response would have had many more relief workers and supplies on the ground to start
work at once rather
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than after death and debilitation from disease and hunger had taken such a

heavy toll." 190 With media coverage of the escalating outrage, the international community began
to take action in what might be characterized as a typical case of"too little, too late."
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Given the absence of multilateral action, France unilaterally undertook a UN-authorized
intervention in Rwanda. "Operation Turquoise" began on June 22, 1994, and by July 2, the
French concluded that the most that could be accomplished was the setting up of a security zone
in southwestern Rwanda.
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Having fulfilled its duty after 2 months, and rejecting appeals to

prolong its mission, French forces withdrew, handing over control of the security zone to a UN
peacekeeping force composed primarily of African units. Giving reasons for the intervention
France stressed the strictly hwnanitarian nature of the operation. At the Security Council, France
maintained the aim of its:
"initiative is exclusively hwnanitarian: the initiative is motivated by the plight of the
people, in the face of which, we believe, the international community cannot and must not
190
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15.
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Some 3,000 French troops were involved in the operation and close to 1.5 to 2 million people ended up in the
security zone.
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remam passive. It will not be the nuss1on of our soldiers in Rwanda to interpose
themselves between the warring parties, still less to influence in any way the military and
political situation. Our objective is simple: to rescue endangered civilians and put an end
to massacres, and to do so in an impartial manner."
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Also, the French Prime Minister argued that France was under an obligation to end "one of the
most unbearable tragedies in recent history."
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Similarly, the French Defense Minister

emphasized that France was not in Rwanda for a national French action. It intervened to enforce a
UN resolution to stop atrocities.

195

In spite of these statements, France's motives for the intervention had been questioned.

Posen, for example, questions how much good the intervention did for the Tutsi inside the safe
zone. To what extent was the intervention a way of protecting remnants of the extremistdominated Hutu government of Rwanda from destruction by the RPF?
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Skepticism was

expressed about the French intervention since France had a long-standing relationship with and
supported the Habyarimana government that had engaged in massive human rights violations
against the Rwandans. It also supported that government militarily with troops and arms in its
counter-offensives against the RPF in 1992 and 1993. Moreover, some observers argued that
France was apprehensive of its credibility in Africa, particularly since an RPF victory meant a
Rwanda under the control of Anglophones. The regional impact of an RPF victory would also
mean curtailing the power of Mobutu Sese Sekou, a loyal ally of France, thereby weakening
193
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France's hold in the Central African region- an area traditionally under its sphere of influence.
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For these reasons there was ambiguity surrounding French action given it had significant political
and economic interests in Rwanda and in the region, and might not have been wholly guided by
humanitarian motivations.
Operation Turquoise nevertheless, served a significant humanitarian purpose. It provided
security and logistical support to humanitarian assistance operations both inside Rwanda and in
refugee camps in Zaire. It was prompt action that saved the lives of several thousands of Tutsis in
the period of frenzy and before the full deployment of UNAMIR11. 198
The moral considerations involving the genocide in Rwanda with regard to taking action
either to prevent or suppress it are overwhelming. Once the genocide began in the wake of the
assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, the international community took little or
no action. Yet there was evidence to suggest that an impending disaster was in the making, not
forgetting Rwanda's track record of previous massacres even dating back to its independence.
Even in the period between October 1990 and April 1994 "it was possible to trace the evolution of
the tragedy of mass killing. Many military and civilian institutions were largely or entirely
dedicated to mass murder, including the Presidential Guard, the Rwandese Armed Forces, and the
militias." 199 The UN had knowledge about and was warned that genocide was being planned but
the information either got lost in the bureaucracy or the Rwandan situation was considered to be
one oflow priority. 200
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Once the reign of terror began, the inability of UNAMIR to cope with the crisis prompted
a withdrawal. This withdrawal could be interpreted as a renunciation of the moral responsibility
of the UN with a result that diminished its credibility in Rwanda even though many humanitarian
NGOs caught in the throes of violence continued to work at risk to their lives.
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The UN

Secretary General, however, cast the net widely in admitting the mistake of the UN and its
responsibility. He stated that "we are all responsible for this disaster, not only the Super-powers,
but also the African countries, the non-governmental organizations and the entire international
community. There has been genocide and the world is talking about what it should do. It is a
scandal." 202
One of the reasons, if not the main reason, for the slow response to Rwanda lies in the lack
of political will on the part of the US in showing its leadership, in terms of making any substantial
commitment. As Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo show, American involvement was crucial.
Hesitation in Rwanda was due to the absence of US geopolitical interests in the area. As well, the
Somalia syndrome had a role to play regarding inaction on the part of the US. The situation in
Rwanda was, however, different from Somalia. Unlike Somalia, Rwanda was not swamped with
weapons, and the militias carried out attacks mainly armed with machetes. But the Somalia
syndrome was still at work, so much so that America had to rethink its foreign policy.203 It is
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instructive, however, to note that after months of hesitation the US launched a massive emergency
relief operation for the Rwandan refugees and displaced persons that involved the airlift of food,
medicine and water.
Going back to the French intervention, even if the argument is made that it represents a
case of selfish motives, the appalling situation in Rwanda morally required some form of action.
Webster drives the point home by writing:
"when the aftermath of the Rwandan affair is analyzed and the number of days when
massacres were averted are totaled up, an answer might emerge to the question of whether
it was better to do something, even in self-interest, as the French have done, or whether it
was better to stand aside in hesitation and indifference like the rest of the world." 204
The legal basis for the French intervention can be found in Security Council Resolution 929. This
resolution authorized member states of the UN to establish "a temporary operation under national
command and control aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and protection of
displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda."
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Acting under Chapter VII, it

authorized "member states cooperating with the Secretary General to conduct the operation

participation in multilateral operations. These guidelines for US involvement include: impact on US national
interests; availability of troops and funds; the necessity of US participation; congressional approval; a clear date for
withdrawal; and, acceptable command and control agreements. It emphasizes American military non-involvement in
operations in places where national security is not directly threatened. But, as Natsios has forcefully argued,
"humanitarian intervention applied carefully and with restraint is as much in the self-interest of the United States as is
geopolitical intervention. Most of the world expects moral leadership by the United States in humanitarian crises and
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using .... all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives."
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This resolution

authorized the use of force on the grounds that the human rights situation in Rwanda constituted a
threat to international peace and security. While this threat was manifested in the large influx of
refugees into neighboring African countries due to the civil strife, it was also quite clear that the
French intervention was designed to end the committing of further atrocities.
The scene of carnage, desolation and deprivation in Rwanda was evidence of the
commission of genocide under the Genocide Convention. The ruthlessness of the Hutu massacres
against the Tutsi and the objectives of those attacks undoubtedly confirmed the gravity of the
crime. Yet, quite unfortunately, the UN failed to take timely, decisive action by way of putting a
stop to it. In the event of the UN or other multilateral failure to act, it is imperative that unilateral
action be undertaken to assert the right of intervention for humane purposes. In this context, the
legitimacy of the French action would have been enhanced if it had come earlier than later.
In sum, the issue of intervention in Rwanda seems to be one of timely reaction. It raises

questions whether UN intervention in preventing internal conflict has been successful. Could it be
successful if better managed? Would it have been successful in preventing genocide in Rwanda?
When should the UN force have intervened and with what force?
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Although success does not

impair the legitimacy of UN or French action in Rwanda, and is not a requirement of right
action, 208 it is important that such question be raised and addressed by the UN, if only in terms of
lessons to guide future action.
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The deployment of force early in a crisis situation can save not only lives but also money.
In many cases it offers the best hope to prevent the escalation of violence.
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Major-General

Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, remarked that "in Rwanda, the international community's
inaction .... contributed to the Hutu extremists' belief that they could carry out their genocide
... UNAMIR could have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people .... A force of 5,000
personnel rapidly deployed could have prevented the massacres that did not commence in earnest
until early May, nearly a month after the start of the war."
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Thus, early robust intervention

could have prevented or dissuaded genocide, or would at least have prevented the heavy
casualties sustained. Rwanda is a prime example for the international community to direct
increasing efforts towards early warning, preventive diplomacy, and proper conflict management.
Rwanda demonstrates the tenuous commitment of states to humanitarian intervention. The
French response insisted on a duty of intervention to alleviate human suffering. The rest of the
international community expressed shock and condemnation of the massacres that bordered on
genocide. However, there was less commitment of physical resources to undertake a humanitarian
intervention when it was most needed.
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6- Intervention in Liberia (1990)

The civil war in Liberia, which began in December 1989, witnessed a disturbing number
of atrocities and created a refugee crisis in the West African sub-region, prompting regional
military intervention.
Liberia was created in the early ninteenth century as a settlement of emancipated slaves
from the United States. These freed slaves, known as Americo-Liberians, are the elite that ruled
the country for the next 150 years. Even though the Americo-Liberians constituted 5% of the total
population, they dominated the country's political, economic and social life. 211 In 1980, Samuel
Doe seized power in a bloody military coup that was initially welcomed by the indigenous
majority of the population. The military government promptly tried and summarily executed some
of the country's top politicians, bringing to an end a chapter in Americo-Liberians rule.
Throughout the 1980s, the Doe regime was sustained mainly by US foreign aid. Faced
with increasing pressure for political reform after five years of military rule, the regime agreed to
a program of democratization. In elections that were widely believed to have been rigged, Doe
emerged as the President of the new Republic. Despite the affirmation of a commitment to
democratic governance, human rights abuses were rampant under the Doe civilian
administration? 12 These widespread human rights violations coupled with increasing economic
difficulties quickened the outbreak of civil conflict.213
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The civil war broke out in December 1989 when Charles Taylor, leader of the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), invaded the country from the Ivory Coast with the objectives of
overthrowing the Doe government.
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By August 1990, civil authority had ceased to exist as the

NPFL forces controlled the entire country except for the capital city of Monrovia. Around this
time a splinter group of the NPFL emerged to form the fNPFL led by Prince Johnson. This group,
which initially aimed to overthrow the Doe government from power, made a deal with Doe and
subsequently directed its attacks on the NPFL.
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As the war continued, all sides to the conflict

were accused of torturing and murdering innocent civilians.

216

Thousands of civilians faced

starvation, more than 700,000 people fled the country seeking refuge in neighboring West African
countries and a further 500,000 were internally displaced. 217 The general breakdown of law and
order and the increasing loss of lives led the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) to intervene.
The ECOWAS intervening force, known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
was deployed on August 23, 1990 to end the fighting.
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In its attempt to impose peace on

Liberia, ECOMOG came under attack by the NPFL, which opposed any foreign intervention in
the conflict. In September 1990, Doe was killed by INPFL forces, which then directed its attack at
the NPFL. Subsequently, the fighting began among the factions and skirmishes between
base and communications facilities no longer attracted that aid which had held together Doe's patronage network.
Thus, with the invasion of Taylor's forces from the Ivory Coast in 1989, few, associates of Doe saw any personal
advantage in defending hid government. See Reno, "The business of War in Liberia" (May 1996). Current History: a
Journal of Contemporary World affairs at 212.
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217
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ECOMOG and the NPFL. By November 1990, ECOMOG was in control of Monrovia and a
precarious truce was made. A transitional governrnent which controlled the Monrovia areas was
established with protection from ECOMOG. In response to this, Taylor, who was in de facto
control of most of the country, declared the establishment of his own governrnent. These two
governrnents each claimed legitimacy and struggled for control of the country. This situation led
ECOWAS to look for a viable means of unifying the country under a free elected governrnent? 19
Liberia proved to be a frustrating experience for ECOMOG. There were cycles of ceasefire, renewed violence and negotiations. A series of agreements had been signed dating back to
November 1990 between Liberian factions and ECOWAS states which over time were divided
over the objectives of their action in Liberia. In October 1991, the Yamoussoukro agreement was
signed, which provided for ECOMOG's deployment throughout the country, the confinement of
armed forces to camp and the holding of multiparty 220 elections at the end of one year. Renewed
fighting, however, shattered this cease-fire with the entry into Liberia from Sierra Leone of the
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), which was made up of the
remnants of Doe's army. This force attacked the NPFL stronghold in Western Liberia, which in
turn provoked an NPFL attack on Monrovia in October 1992.221
In the surruner of 1992, a peace agreement was reached under the auspices of ECOWAS,

OAU and the UN. This became known as the Cotonou agreement. It provided for the expansion
of the ECOWAS force, the establishment of a UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNIMIL, which
subsequently was created by the Security Council) to monitor the ceasefire and disarmament, the
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creation of a multinational transitional government, and a peaceful environment for elections.
With an increase in the number of ECOWAS troops and the involvement of the UN, it was hoped
that peace would be achieved. While the three main factions continued to disagree over the
agreements, two other factions emerged and started attacks on NPFL and ULIMO controlled
areas. This situation breached the agreement as the factions were unwilling to disarm under the
threat of force from the new factions. 222
The parties subsequently signed three other supplementary agreements. These were the
Akosombo Agreement of September 24, 1994; Accra agreement of December 21, 1994; and
Ahuja Agreement of August 19, 1995. The Akosombo Agreement provided a more detailed
scheme for the disengagement, disarmament and demobilization of forces. It also called for a
more active role for the Liberian National Transitional Government in collaboration with
ECOMOG and UNOMIL to ensure its provisions were carried out. The Accra Accord primarily
called for a reorganization of the Liberian Armed forces. The Ahuja Accord mainly addressed the
composition ofthe Liberian Council of state and called on ECOWAS and the OAU to monitor the
operations of the Ad Hoc Elections Commission. 223 Prospects for peace were weakened with
continuing disagreement among the parties, and within ECOMOG, on details of the peace accords
and power sharing? 24
The initial international response to ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia was cautious.
Before Resolution 788 was passed, the UN, OAU, EC and other nations adopted a "wait and see"
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attitude, but nonetheless encouraged ECOWAS to find a settlement to the Liberian conflict. Apart
from Burkina Faso, which had earlier condemned the action as an unlawful intervention in the
internal affairs of a sovereign country, most states said little or nothing about the means employed
by ECOWAS to bring about peace in that country. 225 In November 1992, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 788,
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which determined that the situation in Liberia constituted a threat to

international peace and security, particularly in the West African region. This resolution
commended efforts by ECOWAS to find a lasting peaceful solution to the conflict. It called on all
the parties to the conflict to respect the Yamoussoukro IV agreement, which established a
framework for the settlement of the civil strife. It also imposed an embargo on the delivery of
weapons and military equipment to Liberian. An interpretation of the resolution and the
subsequent collaborative efforts on the part of the UN indicated a broad approval of the
ECOWAS decision to use force in the Liberian civil war. At the Security Council, the US
maintained:
"we must not lose sight of what ECOWAS has accomplished through intervention and
negotiation. The dispatch of a six-nation West African peacekeeping force in August 1990
demonstrated unprecedented African determination to take the lead in regional conflict
resolution. ECOMOG ended the killing, separated factions, allowed relief assistance to
flow to avert starvation and established a cease-fire and framework for peaceful
negotiations. Although the dispatch of peacekeeping forces to Liberia was a decision taken
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by the ECOWAS governments on their own initiative, we supported this effort from its
inception." 227
Giving reasons for the intervention, various leaders from ECOWAS cited humanitarian
grounds for the action. The President of Gambia stated that ECOMOG was not an invasion force.
Its task was strictly humanitarian, helping civilians caught in the civil war get relief supplies.
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Nigerian President stated that they were "in Liberia because events in that country have led to
massive destruction of property, the massacre by all parties of thousands of innocent civilians,
foreign nationals, women and children ... contrary to all standards of civilized behavior and
international ethics and decorum. "229 The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, in its final
report, justified the decision to intervene as follows:
"The failure of the warring parties to cease hostilities has led to the massive destruction of
property and the massacre by all parties of the thousands of innocent civilians. The civil
war has also trapped thousands of foreign nationals, including ECOWAS citizens, without
any means of escape or protection. The result of all of this is a state of anarchy and the
total breakdown of law and order in Liberia. Presently, there is a government in Liberia
which cannot govern and contending factions which are holding the entire population as
hostage, depriving them of food, health facilities and other basic necessities of life. These
developments have traumatised the Liberian population and greatly shocked the people of
the sub-region and the rest of the international community. They have also led to hundreds
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of thousands of Liberians being displaced and made refugees in neighboring countries,
and the spilling of hostilities into neighboring countries."230
In effect, the basis for the ECOWAS intervention was grounded in the need to end the atrocities
and mass killing of civilians in Liberia; the need to protect foreign nationals; the need to protect
regional peace and security; and lastly, the need to restore some order given the anarchic state of
affairs in Liberia.
Besides its mandate relating to the restoration of order, and in the long run, promoting a
lasting peace, ECOWAS had also focused on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It took
practical measures to alleviate human suffering by starting and encouraging the creation of
refugee camps where much needed relief supplies were distributed to refugees. Its members had
also taken in a large influx of refugees as a result of the war. 231
The legal basis of the ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian civil conflict may be
justified as a case of collective humanitarian intervention. Some commentators argued that the
ECOWAS' s justifications for the intervention were contrary to principles of international law
since the intervention did not satisfy many of the requirements for a valid humanitarian
intervention.2 32 However, it is argued that if unilateral humanitarian intervention survived the
Charter as a rule of customary international law, then a state or states, in this case ECOMOG, was
legally justified in intervening to remedy the extreme human rights violations. It seemed at the
time there was no viable peaceful means for resolving the conflict. Wippman for instance, has
explained why intervention to put an end to the violence did not come from either the UN or the
23
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US, despite calls by Liberian politicians for intervention at the time. Apart from the fact that the
international community's attention was focused on developments subsequent to the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, the US did not see any post-Cold War strategic interest in Liberia. It also did not want
to assume responsibility for assisting any of the warring factions, all of which Washington
considered undesirable, into power. It thus characterized the situation as an internal matter to be
left for Africans to resolve. This view was also shared by members of the Security Council,
particularly, Ethiopia and Zaire, who were members of the Council and who sought to avoid the
creation of a precedent for future intervention in African affairs.
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Consequently, the Security

Council was reluctant to become seized of the matter. It was in this context that ECOWAS took
the initiative to put an end to the crisis, given the prevailing disinterests by the international
community in addressing the volatile situation in Liberia, a situation that threatened regional
stability. "To the extent that attention was focused on the legality of the intervention" as Murphy
notes, "it would appear that the intervention was not viewed as violative of international law. " 234
The legality of the ECOWAS action has also been subject to debate with regard to the
issue of enforcement action undertaken by a regional organization acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter. Article 52 states ''Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace
and security'' under the condition that "their activities are consistent with the purposes and
principles of the UN." It encourages states to use such arrangements before directing their
conflicts to the Security Council. It also recommends that the Council make use of regional
organizations. Articles 53 and 54 seek to define relations between the UN and regional
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arrangements by prohibiting the latter from taking international peace and security measures
without Council authorization, and by insisting that the Council be kept fully informed of such
activities. The question is whether such organizations have an independent authority to authorize
military action whenever they reach the conclusion that such a measure is necessary to avert or
bring to an end a threat to peace and security, or to other collective regional interests.
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Some

commentators have asserted that ECOWAS did not have the legal authority to determine the
existence of a threat to peace and security, and to subsequently embark on an enforcement action
without Security Council authorization. The Security Council, in this case, did not give its
authorization for the enforcement action since the operation commenced before the Council's
involvement in the situation. However, it is argued that the ECOWAS intervention was consistent
with the broad purposes and principles of the UN to restore peace and security, and to remedy
gross human rights violations. Even if the initial action was considered unlawful, its subsequent
approval by the Security Council conferred legitimacy on the intervention within the meaning of
Chapter VIII. 236 ECOWAS had reported its efforts to the Security Council consistent with
provisions of the Charter. 237 In fact, the Secretary General of the UN was of the view that
ECOWAS did not need the consent of the Security Council before the intervention.238 The
Secretary General noted that:
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"Liberia continues to represent an example of systematic and effective cooperation
between the United Nations and regional organizations, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of
the Charter. The role of the United Nations has been a supportive one. Closest contact and
consultation have been maintained with ECOWAS, which will continue to play the central
role in the implementation of the Contonu Peace Agreement. " 239
Given the enormity of loss of life coupled with the fact that mass starvation and
deprivation were imminent, there is no doubt that intervention was required to end the horrible
situation in Liberia. Moreover, continuation of the conflict posed a clear threat to regional
security. This was manifested first in the conflict spreading to other countries in the region, as it
did when it spread to Sierra Leon; and second, in the large exodus of refugees into neighboring
countries which worsened the situation in those countries not well equipped to handle the large
refugee populations.
Furthermore, the ECOWAS intervention respected the sovereignty of Liberia. It did not
impose a government on Liberia but encouraged the formation of a transitional government
through the involvement of all parties to the conflict. The various peace accords (discussed
earlier) offered clear evidence of attempts by the intervening force to bring the parties together to
fmding lasting political settlement to the conflict, in the face of the intransigence of the various
factions.
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The precedential value of the intervention as an example in regional or sub-regional
collective action for meeting the challenge of humanitarianism is particularly significant. This is
so for the following reason: it shows many African states are becoming amenable to the idea that
mass human rights violations, whether arising from the governments or the result of civil war,
have become a matter of the international concern rather than the domestic one. These human
rights violations and the cross -border refugee situations that they engender are significant
indicators in the determination of the use of force. As Wippman correctly observes, "several
prominent African leaders' endorsement of ECOMOG's role in Liberia would have been
unthinkable just a few years ago." 240 In his defense that ECOWAS's role in Liberia was
consistent with the OAU Charter, the OAU Secretary General stated that "non-interference should
not be taken to mean indifference."
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For him, the OAU Charter cannot be interpreted to mean

ignoring massive human rights violations in member states. He continues:
" ... for an African government to have the right to kill its citizens or let its citizens be
killed, I believe there is no clause in the Charter that allows this. To tell the truth, the
Charter was created to preserve human dignity and the rights of the African. You cannot
use a clause of the Charter to oppress the African and say that you are implementing the
OAU Charter. What has happened is that people have interpreted the Charter as if it means
that what happens in the next house is not one's concern, this does accord with the reality
of the world." 242
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Other African leaders, notably Museveni of Uganda and Mugabe of Zimbabwe, have voiced
similar sentiments. 243 Even though most African leaders would probably not endorse the
Secretary General's interpretation of the OAU Charter, the fact that such proposals receive serious
attention in Africa is indicative of an important shift in thinking.
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It is a realization that an

absolute norm of non-intervention does not protect, nor does little to protect the values of state
sovereignty in the situation of a civil war that results in continuing anarchy with its attendant
humanitarian crisis. In situations such as Liberia, intervention to restore order and to address the
humanitarian problems promotes rather than undermines state sovereignty. Thus, notwithstanding
the commitment of the OAU to the principles of non-intervention, the ECOWAS intervention in
Liberia was hailed throughout Africa and the international community as appropriate and offering
hope for the restoration of order in that country.
In the face of the continuing concern regarding the Liberian situation, a 1996 OAU

summit resolution produced some serious tough talk. It had warned the faction leaders that should
the ECOWAS assessment of the Liberian peace process turn out to be negative, the OAU would
ask the Security Council for the imposition of severe sanctions on them, including the possibility
of the setting up of a war crimes tribunal to try the leadership of the warring factions on the gross
violations of human rights of Liberians. In July 1997, peaceful elections were held under the
supervision of ECOWAS and other international observers. Charles Taylor won and formed a
constitutional government. Whether democratic rule in post-war Liberia will be sustained and its
socio-economic and political structures rebuilt remains to be seen. 245
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In sum, ECOMOG was a West African sub-regional initiative to end the Liberian civil war
and the consequent humanitarian crisis, but it enjoyed the full regional support of the OAU 246 and
the UN. Recent proposals for a permanent ECOWAS force in light of its successful intervention
in Liberia is an indication of the regional grouping's efforts to remain at the forefront of dealing
with internal conflict situations in the future. This will be a new development pointing to less
dependence on the West in developing indigenous mechanisms to ending conflicts in the region.

7- NATO Intervention in Kosovo (1999)

In the case of Kosovo ( 1998), the Security Council considered a pending humanitarian

catastrophe brought about by civil strife and repression against civilians as a threat to
international peace and security. When it became clear that both Russia and China would veto a
Security Council authorization for military intervention, the Northern Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NAT0) 247 carried out humanitarian intervention without authorization from the
Security Council. Subsequently, the Security Council endorsed the political outcome of the
NATO operation. 248
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The intervention in Kosovo is now cited as an example of a new transition within the
international community, an unwillingness to tolerate tyranny and a strong concern for
humanitarian principles. For many years, human rights lawyers have tried to focus public
attention on Kosovo . They issued report after report of gross and systematic human rights abuses
in the troubled region. 249 International policy makers had overwhelming evidence that the
pressure in Kosovo was mounting and that an even greater human rights disaster seemed near,
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yet they disregarded the warnings as the situation deteriorated without being present and failed to
take the situation in Kosovo seriously. In March 23, 1999, NATO commenced an air strike
against Yugoslavia. Suddenly, Kosovo became a lead story in the mass media,
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and then

Kosovo finally came into focus.
NATO's intervention in Kosovo during the spring of 1999 aroused controversy at the time
and still provokes questions about the legality of the action, its precedential effect and procedures
on the international level. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) committed grave
international crimes against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. However, both the ethnic Albanians
and the Serbs in Kosovo engaged in aggressive and brutal actions against each other and both
were blamed, legally and morally. 252 The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) also committed
terrorist and other brutal acts against the Yugoslav Serbs and FRY forces. The intervention in
249
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Kosovo has again brought to the surface the legal, political and moral debate surrounding the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention and in particular the right of states to intervene with armed
force in another state, without Security Council authorization, in order to prevent gross violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law.
On June 28, 1989, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic set the stage for the
contemporary clash of nationalism in the Balkans by inflaming Serbian fears of ethnic
domination. His extreme speech invoked memories of the Serbs' defeat at the hands of the Turks
precisely six centuries ago. That same year, President Milosevic removed Kosovo's autonomy
and replaced it with direct rule from Belgrade. Ethnic Albanian politicians in Kosovo responded
by declaring independence in July 1990. They established parallel institutions that Serbia, in
control of the government in the formerly autonomous province, refused to recognize. Unrest
continued through the decade, but international attention was focused elsewhere in the Balkans
and Kosovo was not included in the Dayton Peace Accords. 253 Nonetheless, United States
President Bush issued a warning to President Milosevic on December 24, 1992, that "in the event
of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ
military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper." 254
Kosovo was boiling in early 1998 when dozens of Albanian separatists were killed by
Serb police. On March 31, 1998, the Security Council passed Resolution 1160, condemned the
use of excessive force by Serbian police and terrorist action by the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA), imposed an arms embargo, and expressed support for a solution based on the territorial
integrity of the FRY, but with a greater degree of autonomy for the Kosovar Albanians. Fighting
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continued and US-sponsored peace talk between Milosevic and the unofficial President of
Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, broke down in May.
On September 23, 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1199 "affirming that the
deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region"
and, under Chapter VII, demanded a ceasefire and action to improve the humanitarian situation. It
further demanded that the FRY take concrete steps to implement the Contact Group demands of
June 12, 1998- including a cessation of action by security forces, the return of refugees and
displaced persons, and free and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies.
The Council also decided that if these measures were not implemented, it would "consider further
action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region." 255
In the following week, reports of two massacres by Serbian forces of 30 Kosovar

Albanians strengthened NATO involvement. In a press conference on October 8, 1998, US
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that the time had come to authorize military force if
Milosevic failed to comply with existing resolutions. When questioned as to the need for a further
Security Council resolution, she replied that "the United Nations has now spoken out on this
subject a number of times." 256
On October 13, 1998, the NATO Council ordered an air strike against Yugoslavia. NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana stated that execution of limited air operations would not begin for
at least four days, to permit negotiations, but at the same time continued:
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Madeline Albright, press conference on Kosovo, Brussels, October 8, 1998, http://
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221

"The Allies believe that in the particular circumstances with respect to the present crisis in
Kosovo as described in UN Security Council Resolution 1199, there are legitimate
grounds for the Alliance to threaten, and if necessary, to use force."

257

An agreement signed on October 15, 1998, by the FRY and NATO in Europe provided for the

establishment of an air verification mission over Kosovo? 58 The next day, an agreement signed
by the FRY Foreign Minister and the Chair-in- Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) provided for a verification mission in Kosovo, including
undertakings by the FRY to comply with Security Council Resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199
(1998).
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On October 25, NATO negotiated an agreement with Belgrade concerning the

withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and police. Yugoslavia complied with this call until there was
renewed provocation from the KLA.
There were differences of opinion as to what precisely was authorized by Resolution 1203
(1998), other than demanding that both the FRY and the Kosovar Albanians comply with
previous resolutions.
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In statements made after they abstained from voting on Resolution 1203

(1998), both Russia and China, which had threatened to veto any resolution authorizing the use of
force, made it clear that they did not see the resolution as authorizing military intervention.

261

The US representative, by contrast, said that "the NATO allies, in agreeing on October 13 to the
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use of force, made it clear that they had the authority, the will and the means to resolve this issue.
We retain that authority." 262
This resolution marked the Council's final substantive involvement in Kosovo until
NATO's air operations ceased on June 10, 1999.

263

The issue slowed for some months, until the

massacre of 45 civilians in Racak in January 1999 led to a NATO warning that it remained
willing to take military action. Negotiations in Rambouillet from February 6 to 23 and in Paris
from March 15 to 18 concluded with the FRY's refusal to sign the agreement that required
freedom of movement for NATO throughout the whole of the FRY and a referendum on
Kosovo's independence within three years. The draft agreement included a clause comparable to
the Dayton agreement, in which the parties invited NATO to constitute and lead a military force
authorized under a Chapter VII of the Security Council resolution." 264
On March 24, 1999, NATO began air strikes against the FRY. NATO Secretary General
Solana stafed that the military alliance acted because all diplomatic avenues had failed.

265

President Clinton stressed that US interests in preventing a potentially wider war if action were
not taken, as well as the humanitarian concerns, led the allies to act.

266

United Kingdom's Blair

stressed the need to protect Kosovar Albanian citizens and argued that the choice was to do
something or do nothing_267
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In an emergency session of the Security Council on March 24, Russia, China, Belarus and
India opposed the action as a violation of the Charter. 268 Of those states that supported the action,
few asserted a clear legal basis for it. The US, Canada and France stressed that the FRY was in
violation of legal obligations imposed by Resolutions 1199 and 1203.

269

Only the Netherlands

and the UK argued that the action was a legal response to a "humanitarian catastrophe", and the
"minimum judged necessary for that purpose."

Other states expressed concerns about the

humanitarian situation and the failure of diplomacy. The Slovenian representative hinted to the
ambiguity of earlier Council resolutions "Because of differences of views among permanent
members, it was not possible to provide in those resolutions a sufficiently complete framework to
allow for the entire range of measures that might be necessary to address the situation in Kosovo
with success." 270
On March 26, 1999, a draft resolution demanding an end to the air strikes was rejected by
12 votes to 3.

271

Russia, China and Namibia supported it but 12 others (including 5 NATO

members) did not. Few states opposing the draft advanced any legal basis for the action. The UK
stated that military intervention was justified as an exceptional measure to prevent a humanitarian
catastrophe. France and the Netherlands noted that previous resolutions had been adopted under
Chapter VII, thus implying that the coercive powers of the Council already had been involved.
For the most part, the resolution was simply seen as an inappropriate response to the situation,
and one that might actually benefit Milocevic more than anyone else.

268
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In any event, the
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bombing initially magnified humanitarian problems. Ethnic cleansing began with revenge in
Kosovo. Prior to the bombing, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
estimated that there were 410,000 ethnic Albanians internally displaced as a result of Serb
operations, and another 90,000 across the border. Within a matter of days, there were 750,000
refugees in Albania and Macedonia, as well as 250,000 at the border. UNHCR had prepared
contingency plans for 100.000 refugees and was soon overwhelmed.
The 78-day bombing campaign was an example of escalation theory and high-tech, lowrisk military warfare. Initial targets were military, but after a month the bombing extended to
dual-use targets, including mass media and power lines. The war was also extended to FRY
territory, including the bombing of Belgrade. Many observers are of the opinion that the
destruction of Serbia's infrastructure and the threat of ground forces ended the war. The European
Union (EU) estimated the cost of reconstruction at $30 billion; the FRY at $100 billion.
In May, 1999, the FRY brought a case against 10 NATO members in the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) arguing that NATO intervention was an unlawful use of force in violation
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, that the members of NATO had breached the 1949 Geneva
Conventions by targeting civilians and using depleted uranium weapons, and that the attack
against the Serbs constituted a form of genocide in violation of the Genocide Convention. In the
course of the hearing on the FRY's requests for provisional measure, in response, Belgium
presented the most elaborate legal justification for the action. In addition to relying on Security
Council resolutions, Belgium claimed that a doctrine of humanitarian intervention was compatible
with Article 2( 4) of the UN Charter, in addition to making an argument founded on humanitarian
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necessity.
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The US also emphasized the importance of Security Council resolutions, and

together with four other delegations (Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK) made
.
. . catastroph e.
re fierence to the existence
o f a humamtanan
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Yugoslavia had requested the ICJ to issue an injunction, based in part on provisions of the
Genocide Convention, calling for an immediate cessation of bombing. However, the ICJ found
that it did not have prima facie jurisdiction to issue what it termed "interim measures," based on
those provisions.

275

The ICJ refused to grant the relief sought for technical reasons to do with the

FRY's accession to the jurisdiction of the ICJ during the conflict. Decisions on the jurisdiction of
the ICJ, on the other dimensions and a possible ruling on the merits of the case were postponed at
the request of Yugoslavia until April 2002. On December 15, 2004, the court ruled that it could
not hear a case brought by the former Yugoslavia and said it had no jurisdiction because the
antecedent state of Yugoslavia was not an official UN member in 1999 and was not party to the
ICJ statute. 196 Immediately following the end of hostilities, NATO deployed a 200.000 strong
Kosovo force to provide security within the war-tom society, which operated within the UN
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. The UN was charged with interim civil administration
and capacity building. The UNHCR was given responsibility for humanitarian affairs. The
European Union took the lead in rehabilitation, reconstruction and post-war peace building, and
the OSCE pursued long-term institution building.
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As Kosovo is a region of the FRY, and it was treated as such by NATO, the massive postintervention effort constituted a military "protectorate". The desire to avoid setting a precedent
was evident in subsequent statements by NATO members. US Secretary of State Albright stressed
in a press conference after the air strikes that Kosovo was "a unique situation" in the region of the
Balkans."

276

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair appeared to suggest that such interventions might

become more routine, stating that "The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to
identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts."
277

He subsequently retreated somewhat from this position, however, and emphasized the

exceptional nature of the air campaign. 278 This was consistent with one of the more considered
UK statements, by Baroness Symons in the House of Lords, made on November 16, 1998, and
reaffirmed on Monday 6, 1999:
"There is no general doctrine of humanitarian necessity in international law. Cases have
nevertheless arisen (as in northern Iraq in 1999) when, in the light of all the circumstances,
a limited use of force was justifiable in support of purposes laid down by the Security
Council but without the council's express authorization when that was the only means to
avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Such cases would in the
nature of things be exceptional."
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The UK Foreign Affairs Committee, as part of its inquiry into the legal merits of the Kosovo
intervention, concluded that "NATO's military action, if of dubious legality in the current state of
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international law, was justified on moral grounds." 280 Similarly, the Independent International
Commission on Kosovo held that NATO's military intervention was illegal but legitimate." 281
The Kosovo case has important implications for the employment of international criminal
prosecution. In May 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicted
Slobodan Milosevic and some other senior FRY officials for crimes against humanity in Kosovo.
In June 2001, these indicted criminals were extradited to the Hague, despite the fact that the
constitution did not permit that. Under considerable pressure from the international donors, the
government contended that international covenants outweighed nationallaw. 282
One of the persistent criticisms, even among supporters of the intervention in Kosovo,

283

was the unwillingness of NATO to employ ground troops in Kosovo. According to this view, the
presence of and the threat to use ground troops would have avoided the mass exodus of refugees.
It would have also helped make a more credible moral stance, in that humanitarian intervention

would have been worth the lives of Westerners and as well as Yugoslavs.

284

Does international law support the decision to use force in Kosovo? The main difficulty is
that, if NATO uses force without authorization from the UN Security Council, it breaches
international law as codified in the UN Charter. NATO interventions in similar conflicts can place
the organization outside legality. This question was given extensive discussion on the occasion of
NATO's war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which denounced the attack
before the International Court of Justice. The threat or use of force is governed under international
28
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law by the UN Charter, Article 2 (4) of the Charter, which declares that "All member states shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations." 285 Also, Article 2 (7) states that "nothing in the Charter shall authorize the UN
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ... " The
general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2 (4) is supported by language in subsequent
General Assembly resolutions. 286
Only three explicit exceptions exist to the general prohibition on the use of force. None of
these appears to apply to Kosovo. First, states may act in self-defense under Article 51 of the
Charter. Even a broad reading of self-defense is not particularly applicable with respect to
Kosovo. The concept of self-defense applies only to states; it does not protect individuals against
their own states. 287 The self-proclaimed Albanian Kosova has never been recognized as a state
and the NATO countries undertaking the intervention were never attacked or threatened with

285
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attack. Thus, the self-defense exception would require an extremely expansive interpretation in
order to apply to Kosovo.
A second exception to the general ban on the use of force is Security Council enforcement
actions under chapter VII of the Charter. 288 Security Council enforcement actions are limited by
the requirements of the UN Charter. The sole competence of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security is laid down in Article 39:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Consequently, any threat or use of force that is neither justified as self-defense against an armed
attack nor authorized by the Security Council constitutes undeniably a breach of the UN
Charter. 289 The UN Security Council adopted three main resolutions concerning Kosovo prior to
the NATO bombing. First, in March 1998, the Council issued Resolution 1160, which imposed an
arms embargo on both parties and called upon the FRY and the leadership of Kosovo Albania to
enter into meaningful dialogue for a peaceful settlement of internal strife. 290 In September 1998,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1199,291 which found the existence of a "threat to the
peace and security in the region" and enjoined the FRY to certain actions, including "ceasing all
action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and ordering the withdrawal of
288
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security units used for civilian repression."292 The Security Council warned that "should the
concrete measures demanded in this resolution not be taken, it would consider further action and
additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region. " 293 In the third main
Security Council resolution, Resolution 1203, adopted on October 24, 1998, the Council endorsed
the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO agreements with the
FRY and demanded once more that the FRY comply with the conditions set forth in Resolution
1199. 294 It would be premature to contend that under any Security Council resolution the use of
force was authorized or approved. On the contrary, as it was clear that China and Russia would
veto the use of force, 295 the Security Council failed to include in these resolutions the use of force
language "authorization of the use of all necessary means. "296
While all these resolutions were premises for authorization of the use of force, the act
needed to actually resort to force never materialized within the Security Council. However, the
Security Council is the only body competent to authorize the enforcement of its resolutions, not of
the individual states or group of states; thus, legally speaking, enforcing a resolution without
enforcement provisions is unlawful. In the words of White, "where there is no authorization, there
is no legal basis."297 At best, the strict adherence to UN Security Council resolutions offers
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political advantages as opposed to other unilateral action. 298 US Secretary of State Albright also
argued that the behavior of Serb forces in Kosovo was a breach of the Geneva Conventions, the
Charter on Human Rights and, if ethnic cleansing continued, of the Genocide Convention of
1948. She contended that these treaties provided an alternative source of legitimization of NATO
action.

299

Most jurists agree that the Genocide Convention was not affected. 300 In any case, these
treaties do not provide for enforcement; therefore, they do not offer a legal basis for the use of
force.
After the NATO bombing began, the Security Council had at least two opportunities to approve
the NATO intervention retroactively. At the height of the NATO bombing, on May 14, 1999, it
issued Resolution 1239. 301 This resolution neither supported nor condemned the NATO bombing.
The resolution merely "noted with interest the intention of the Secretary General to send a
humanitarian needs assessment mission to Kosovo and other parts of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia" and "reaffirmed the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the region." 302
At the conclusion of the NATO campaign, the Council issued Resolution 1244. 303 While this
resolution "decided on the deployment in Kosovo, under UN auspices, of international civil and

298
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security presence, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required," 304 it was wholly
prospective in nature. The resolution declined to comment on previous international intervention
in Kosovo. These and other Council statements fall short of offering retroactive approval of the
NATO bombing and, thus, the Chapter VII exception to the use of force cannot be said to apply to
Kosovo.
The third explicit exception to the general prohibition on the use of force, found in
Chapter VII of the Charter, permits actions undertaken by "regional arrangements or agencies for
dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security."

305

Regional

arrangements may undertake any action in this regard that is "consistent with the purposes of the
UN."
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Although NATO has never applied for recognition as a "regional agency dealing with

security issues" in accordance with in Chapter VIII of the Charter,

307

these provisions would be

applicable by way of analogy.
While Article 52

308

allows for the existence of regional arrangements, Article 53

explicitly forbids military intervention by regional organization without a Security Council
mandate:
"The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be
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taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council."
Even if NATO is seen as a regional arrangement under Chapter VII, regional actions also require
Security Council authorization, none of which was granted with respect to Kosovo. 309
Thus, the explicit exceptions in the UN Charter do not apply to Kosovo. Is this the end of the
story? No. Other provisions of the UN Charter implicitly permit the use of force under certain
limited circumstances. This implicit grant of authority can be said to apply to Kosovo.
By its terms, the Charter does not prohibit all threats or uses of force. Article 2 (4)
prohibits force against the "territorial integrity or political independence of any states .... " We
need to look closely at these words. As interpreted in treaties and diplomatic history, "territorial
integrity" refers not to the "territory of a state" but to the "integrity of the territory. " 3 10
Humanitarian intervention in such a case falls below the threshold set in Article 2 (4) since the
interveners do not seek to deprive the state of its integrity but, rather, to enhance it. 311
Alternatively, intervention in such cases could be justified on a 'waiver' theory. Under this theory,
governments that commit violations of human rights lose any claims against intervention by
others for the protections normally offered by sovereignty. 312
These arguments are in line with modem conceptions of sovereignty. The doctrine of
human rights restricts the ability of states to do what they want with their own citizens. Also,
sovereignty refers not only to state borders, but also to political sovereignty, that is, the ability of
people within those borders to effect choices regarding how they should be governed and by
309
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whom. 313 Those who threaten that ability violate the sovereignty of the people. 314 Accordingly,
when another state intervenes to protect human rights in such circumstances, it is not violating a
principle of sovereignty, but instead enhancing it. 315
A more complete reading of the UN Charter further supports the use of humanitarian
intervention in Kosovo-like situations. Here I will suggest four points. First, the UN Charter
advances central principles that could not be protected in Kosovo without intervention. The most
central purpose of the organization is the maintenance of international peace and security. 316 In
situations such as Kosovo, peace and security cannot be said to exist as long as the state is free to
commit gross and systematic human rights abuses against its own people.
Second, Article 1 of the UN Charter includes, as a central purpose, development of
"respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... " 317 Also included as
a central purpose is "encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion ... " 318 Self-determination does not mean the ability
of all groups of people to make their own state, but rather, the ability to participate in one's
government and enjoy basic human rights. 319 The prohibition of the use of force in Article 2 (4)
does not rule out the use of force designed in the central goals of the UN. Where, as in Kosovo, a
313
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2200, UN GAOR, 25 1h Sess; Supp. NO. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1871) "All peoples have the right to determine, without
external interference, their political status and pursue their economic, Social and cultural development, and every state has the duty
to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter"./ For an exclusive collection of documents related to selfdetermination See Documents on Autonomy and military Rights (Hurst Hannum ed; 1993 ).
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government flouts respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination and violates the
most basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals, the use of force may be the
only way to see the goals of the UN upheld.
Third, humanitarian intervention may be required or permitted under the human rights
provisions of the UN Charter. 320 Specifically, Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter appeal to all
members "to pledge themselves to take joint action in cooperation with the Organization for the
achievement of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all."

321

The international community has an interest in the protection of human rights of

people, regardless of state borders. 322 Whereas in Kosovo a state is incapable of protecting human
rights or is itself the perpetrator of human rights violations, the use of force on human rights
grounds, that is, humanitarian intervention, may be the only solution. The grounds for
intervention are particularly strong where the case at hand concerns allegations of genocide, 323
crimes against humanity, 324 and certain war crimes
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subject to universal jurisdiction and

responsibility. 326
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The final argument supporting NATO action in Kosovo is the UN's own failure to act. If
the UN were functioning as it was intended, unauthorized intervention would not be needed. Yet,
because the UN system has failed to function properly as a collective body addressing human
rights and other security concerns, states retain the right to act unilaterally.
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Article 43 of the Charter envisioned the creation of a system whereby states would make
available to the Security Council "on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or,
agreement, armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security." 328 These agreements were to be "negotiated as soon as possible
by the Security Council." 329 In this case, no such agreements have been negotiated. Article 106 of
the Charter envisioned the creation of "transitional security arrangements" whereby signatories to
the Charter could undertake joint action to maintain peace and security as temporary measures
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acceptance of the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention at the time of the drafting of the UN Charter, and
the impact of the Charter that doctrine. CF.Richard Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGill L.J.
203, 214 (1969) with WilD. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, 32 (3) NETH. L. REV.
357 (1985), Lauterpacht conflicted himself as to whether the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has ever become
part of customary international law. Cf, L. Oppenheim, International Law 312 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed; 1955) "there is
a general argument that, by virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy, a state can treats its nationals according to
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humanity is legally permissible." With H. Lauterpacht, The Gortian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
Int'l L. 46 (1946) The Doctrine of humanitarian intervention has never become a fully acknowledged part of positive
international law."
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until the signing of Article 43 agreements. The NATO action could be seen as one such temporary
measure. 330
All of the above arguments, taken together, provide an international legal basis for the
decision to use force in Kosovo. The next problem is whether the means of intervention in
Kosovo was appropriate? Did the intervention in Kosovo itself violate international humanitarian
law? Where force is used for humanitarian reasons, the legal requirements of necessity and
proportionality with respect to that use of force are important. 331 As Ruth Gordon states "a
humanitarian operation must be executed at a level amount to the evil it seeks to curtail." 332 Thus,
use of force for humanitarian purposes whether it is authorized or unauthorized by the Security
Council must comply with the principles of international humanitarian law. Under international
humanitarian law, civilians and civilian objects may not be directly targeted and all feasible
precautions must be taken to prevent civilian deaths. 333 Incidental injuries caused to civilians or
civilian objects are required to be proportionate to the purpose of the attack. 334 Moreover, an
attack is deemed illegal which "may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
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The argument for intervention by states due to the failures of the UN is not without precedent. Enforcement. Enforcement
actions by the Security Council have almost always been impossible owing to permanent member veto power. To circumvent this
problem during the Korean war in 1950,the general assembly exercised its own powers reserved under Article I 0-11 and 14 to
address "general problems in the maintenance of peace and security" and to recommend measures for peaceful adjustment of any
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maintenance of international peace and security in any case where appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
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necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
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direct military advantage anticipated"

335

In addition to strict compliance with the requirements of

international humanitarian law, Christine Chinkin argues that human rights law imposes an
obligation on the interveners by stating "Human rights give rise to responsibilities in states and in
people. These must encompass a duty not to make conditions worse for a threatened population
and the obligation to respect the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of all
civilians."

336

Thus, the means of enforcement chosen must be effective to protect the civilian

population and must be not endanger them or their way of life.
In the case of Kosovo, NATO's actions were subject to strong criticism in bombings of
non-military targets, such as telecommunications towers, bridges, heating plants, electric power
stations, water supplies and civilian convoys. Reports published by Amnesty International (2000
a,b) and Human Rights Watch (2000), which investigated these bombings, note that some 400 to
600 civilians were killed. The reports suggest that these killings of civilians could constitute
violations of the laws of war or violations of humanitarian law. In addition, the Amnesty report
suggests that NATO's "means and methods of attack" including its high altitude bombing policy
caused unlawful civilian deaths and that its use of certain weapons such as cluster bombs and
uranium may also "have contributed to causing unlawful deaths."
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In summary, a close reading of the United Nations Charter supports the decision to
intervene in cases like Kosovo. While the explicit Charter provisions permitting force do not
appear to be applicable to the intervention in Kosovo, the Charter may be read as implicitly
permitting such actions. The strongest justifications for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo are
linked to affirmative human rights concerns, subject to substantive and procedural limitations.
335
336
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While the intervention in Kosovo was initially within the limits of international law, it also
appears that the bombing campaign was eventually conducted outside those limits.

8- Intervention in East Timor (1999)

The Island of East Timor, situated between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia,
remained a Portuguese colony for over 400 years. In 1974, the new Lisbon government evinced a
commitment to allowing former colonies to pursue self-determination; Portuguese governor
Lemos Pires was dispatched to East Timor with decolonization as his principal aim.

338

Two main political parties emerged in the new climate of political independence: the
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
(Fretilin). Fretilin desired immediate recognition of East Timor's independence and a transition to
self-rule within 10 years. The UDT favored a slower transition and continued association with
Portugal. 339
The Indonesian government, led by General Suharto, found East Timor's impending
independence threatening, and the potential leadership of the Marxist-leaning Fretilin
unacceptable, despite popular support. Mindful of the rich oil reserves off the cost of East Timor,
and fearful that an independent East Timor might impel other ethnic groups in Indonesia to seek
independence, the Indonesian military initiated a special intelligence command, (Opersai
Komodo) designed to destabalize East Timor. In April and July1975, the head of Indonesian
intelligence met with leaders of the UDT to convey the militaristic government's concerns. In a
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clandestine meeting between these UDT leaders and certain Indonesian generals, the Indonesian
government succeeded in persuading the UDT to launch an anti-Fretilin coup. Instability, the
government reasoned, would permit Indonesia's invasion towards the purpose of "restoring
order." 340
Shortly thereafter, in August 1975, a civil war began between Fretilin and UDT forces.
Between 1500 and 2000 Timorese were killed in this clash. Portugal withdrew its military and
civil personnel from the Island; UDT forces withdrew into the Indonesian territory and stated that
they desired integration with Indonesia. Fretilin, the victor in the civil war, assumed de facto
administration in East Timor. On November 28, 1975, Fretilin declared the independence of the
Democratic Republic of East Timor.

341

The Fretilin claim of independence for East Timor was not well-received by the
Indonesian government. In 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor in order to annex it as an integral
part of Indonesia. The eastern half of the island of Timor was to become the 2ih province. Both
the Security Council and the General Assembly called for Indonesia to withdraw and respect East
Timor's territorial integrity and the right of its people to self-determination. The Indonesian
government ignored such calls, and its occupation resulted in the death of 200,000 to 300,000
people and a longstanding insurgency. 342
The annexation of East Timor was not formally recognized by the majority of the UN
member states; Australia was the main exception. Despite this growth in world opinion, East
Timor's independence only became possible following the replacement of Indonesian President
Suharto by his vice president, B.J Habibie, who offered to hold a referendum on the territory's
340
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future. An agreement dated May 5, 1999, between Indonesia and Portugal (as the administering
power of a non-self-governing territory), provided for a "popular consultation" on East Timor's
future, to be held on August 8.
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The agreement left security arrangements in the hands of

Indonesia's military, which had actively suppressed the East Timorese population for a quarter
century.
On June 11, the Security Council passed Resolution 1246 (1999) which established the
UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organize and conduct the electoral consultation. 344 A
month later, with the consultation postponed until the end of August because of security concerns,
the Secretary General reported to the Council that "the situation in East Timor will be rather
delicate as the Territory prepares for the implementation of the result of the popular consultation,
whichever it may be."
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Despite threats of violence the majority of Timorese voted in the

referendum for independence.
In the wake of the vote for independence, however, widespread violence and looting took
place under the direction of the Indonesian military.
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While the UN Secretary General was

engaged in negotiations about a possible security force, the headquarters of the ICRC was
attacked, several local UNAMET personnel were killed, and the UN began to withdraw its
civilian staff in the face of a rampage by the military-backed militias. The humanitarian crisis was
severe. Two-thirds of the island population had left their homes and were totally dependent on
international aid.

There was some reluctance to intervene, despite the massive international

response in Kosovo only months earlier, largely because of the political and economic importance
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of Indonesia. Nonetheless, Australia instigated discussions, driven by domestic political pressure,
concerns about a refugee crisis and regional stability, and some measure of contrition for its
previous policies on East Timor. Also, the likely negative impact on UN credibility of remaining
inactive seemed high. With many of the same motivations, members of the Security Council
authorized, on September 15, an Australian-led multinational force under Chapter VII to restore
peace and security to East Timor.
The legal necessity for requiring Indonesia's consent was doubtful to say the least. 347 But
as a practical political matter, an outside military operation was inconceivable without Indonesian
consent. No one was prepared to assume the risk of serious resistance from Indonesian troops.
After substantial arm-twisting including pressure from international financial institutions and
bilateral programs of military and development assistance, consent came from Indonesia.
Resolution 1264 (1999) welcomed a September 12 statement by the Indonesian President that
expressed readiness to accept an international force in East Timor.
On September 20, roughly 2,500 soldiers arrived in the capital Dili. Countries contributing
troops included Australia, the UK, Canada, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and
the US. At the beginning, it was unclear how the Indonesian forces and militias whom they
controlled would respond. Yet, over the next few weeks, skirmishes with these forces were
infrequent, and the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) ultimately supervised the
largely peaceful withdrawal of Indonesian forces. Control over the territory, however, did not
mean that the victims were safe. As many as 200,000 people had been pushed out of the territory
by militias. They were subsequently forced into militia-controlled camps in West Timor. The
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resolution authorizing the Australian-led INTERFET noted that the multinational force should be
replaced "as soon as possible" by a UN peacekeeping force. On October 25, the Security Council
voted in Resolution 1272 (1999) to establish the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET). INTERFET transferred military control of the territory to UNTAET on February 23,
2000, and initiated an ambitious program of police and civilian assistance.
In conclusion, despite the unique international legal circumstances of East Timor, the
intervention also had an undeniable demonstration effect elsewhere within the Indonesian
territory. According to the defmition of "hwnanitarian intervention", this study has suggested, in
order for an action to be an intervention, sovereignty of the state being intervened in must be
breached. Thus, INTERFET action in East Timor, while motivated by hwnanitarian objectives,
was not an intervention since the action was undertaken with the consent of the Indonesian
government. Even though, the INTERFET intervention was not considered as an intervention, it
can be characterized as a success.
Unquestionably, the intervention alleviate death, suffering and massive violation of human rights.
It also significantly reduced the likelihood that internal conflict would recur in the future.

Similarly, the stability provided by both the INTERFET and the UNT AET military forces
provided the space necessary for post-conflict peace-building, while the international community
developed a strategy for the completion of the transition process. It is now up to the people of
East Timor, assisted by the United Nations and the international community, to create the
political, economic and social conditions that will best ensure long-term peace and stability.
After decades of terror, it appeared that the dark chapter in East Timor's history had finally come
to a close.
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CONCLUSION
An overall assessment of the case studies discussed above suggests a number of cross-

cutting issues but points to the growing support for the use of force in aid of humanitarian
objectives and the debate over the conditions required for its legitimate use. Post-Cold War
practice suggests that the international community is ready to implement a broader conception of
the notion of humanitarian intervention. The cumulative effect of the number of Security Council
resolutions relating to the cases we discussed in the chapter has reinforced the observance of
human rights as a significant underpinning for international peace and security. Internal conflicts
producing human rights suffering, as in most of the cases examined, and massive human rights
violations by governments, as in the case of Haiti, constitute a threat to international peace and
security. These situations have given the basis for international action including the imposition of
economic sanctions, the use of protection forces to watch over minority enclaves, and the use of
military force in securing the supply of humanitarian assistance.
These recent cases show the growing support for humanitarian intervention and a
significant shift in the manner in which states respond to humanitarian crises. The degree to
which this change has occurred is manifest especially in comparison to the cases of humanitarian
intervention discussed in the preceding chapter where support or condemnation varied in the
context of the Cold War, and state response was mainly apathetic. These cases have also shown
the international community re-evaluating and taking seriously assumptions concerning human
rights and state sovereignty. Emphasis on notions of absolute state sovereignty and nonintervention are beginning to give way to a more responsible view of state sovereignty. The
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responsibilities which accrue to states include the protection of human rights. Thus, gross human
rights violations open the state to intervention on humanitarian grounds.
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CHAPTER SIX

Assessment of the Contemporary Developments in the Principles and
Practice of Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era:
Sources of Consensus

1-lntroduction
Developments in the post-Cold War era regarding intervention to protect human rights
suggest a gradual change in attitudes and challenges to state sovereignty and its corollary
principle of non-intervention.

198

With the end of the Cold War, the UN has been less inclined to

permit concern for human rights to end at a state's territorial borders. In 1991, Pereze de Cuellar
stated " ... we are clearly witnessing what is an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the
belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and
legal documents." The idea that sovereignty is continually evolving and that absolute notions of
sovereignty are no longer defensible is becoming increasingly evident. 199 As the UN's
198

As stated earlier, this is, not to suggest that state sovereignty and nonintervention are no longer important norms in
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Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues has stated "sovereignty need not
conflict with humanitarian concerns if states can be brought to defme their interests beyond the
short term ..... The interests of common humanity which transcend national boundaries are not a
menace to the vital interests of states." 200 This position is also supported by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).

201

Sovereignty is and will remain an important organizing principle in

international relations, but as Nanda noted "to insist on adherence to its 'absolute' dimensions
flies in the face of international realities." 202 The conclusions of a 1992 international conference
on human rights protection for internally displaced persons, which consisted of human rights
experts, humanitarian organizations officials from the UN and regional organizations,
international lawyers and government representatives, are that sovereignty confers responsibility
21 at 47. Similarly, Parekh has remarked that "sovereignty does not inhere in the state, it is an achievement made possible by the
continuing support of both its own citizens and the outside world. Since it has both an internal and an external basis, the state is
accountable not only to its own citizens but also to outsiders for the conduct of its affairs. Its citizens are not cut off from the rest
of mankind but an integral part of it, and are objects of its legitimate moral concern" Parekh, "Rethinking Humanitarian
Intervention" (1997) 18: I International Political Science Review 49 at 63. See also Chopra and Weiss, "Sovereignty is no longer
sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention" (1992) 6 Ethics and International Affairs 95; Scheffer, "Toward a Modem
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention" 1992) 23: 2 University of Toledo Law Review 253 at 259-261; Lyons and Mastanduno ed;
Beyond Westphalia; state sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995);
Makinda, "Sovereignty and International Security: challenges for the UN" ( 1996) 2:2 Global Governance: A Review of
Multilateralism and International Organizations 149 (examining how the UN has approached notions of state sovereignty and
international security in the post-Cold war period, and explaining the changing nature of sovereignty); Hehir, "Expanding Military
Intervention: Promise or Peril" (1995) 61: 1 Social Research 41-51 (arguing the pattern of world politics has changed sufficiently
that traditional notions of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention serves neither states nor their citizens); Schacter,
"Sovereignty and Threats to Peace" in Weiss ed; Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1993) at 19,23 (observing contemporary events have tended to show the limits of sovereignty as a principle of international order,
and that juridical thought while differing, have tended to "agree that sovereignty in law, as in fact, cannot be absolute");
Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention" in Hoffmann et al; The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention" (Notre
Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1996).12-37; Griffiths, Levine and Weller, "Sovereignty and Suffering" in Harris ed; The
Politics of humanitarian Intervention (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995), 32-90 (arguing that despite the absence of any declared
international consensus on the limits of sovereignty, there is nevertheless a consistent trend emerging from recent practice); Ryan,
"Sovereignty,Intervention, and the Law: A Tenuous Relationship of Competing Principles" (1997) 26: I Millennium: Journal of
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on governments to protect the people within their territories. Failure to meet those obligations
means that governments risk undermining their legitimacy. 203 In essence, there is the tendency to
restore notions of responsibility to state sovereignty.

204

When humanitarian tragedies of grave

amounts occur, be they in situations of civil strife or when a government persistently and
systematically abuses the human rights of its citizens, which causes outrage in the international
community, outside intervention is often one of the most important instruments that can be
employed to stop these tragedies. Yet, it remains unclear whether the international community
will support such action in every case.
The trend towards collective intervention discussed in the last chapter, and as reflected in
statements and decisions of the UN Security Council, while a welcome development, has
sometimes, to use the words of Weiss, tended to be surrounded by more heat than light. In light of
the varying international responses to the various humanitarian tragedies, the debate surrounding
the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention continues unabated. In 1993, Roberts was prompted
to observe that "humanitarian war is an oxymoron which may yet become a reality. The recent
practice of states, and of the UN, has involved major uses of armed force in the name of
humanitarianism... These humanitarian activities in situations of conflict raise many awkward
questions." More important, he highlighted two questions:
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1- Is humanitarian involvement in conflicts -in the form of the provision of food, shelter and
protection under international auspices- a step on a ladder which can or should lead to much more
direct military involvement, even to participation in hostilities?
2- Can we conclude from recent and contemporary practice that a new consensus is emerging on
humanitarian intervention, that is, military intervention in a state, without the approval of its
authorities and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the
inhabitants? 205
It is in this context that differing views have been put forth. Some observers argue a

significant change seems to be underway in terms of the establishment of precedents in the postCold War era regarding intervention to protect human rights. Others maintain the possibilities for
collective action under Security Council authorization will not be forthcoming in every case. Yet
still, for some, this is an errant period that is unlikely to continue in the future. This chapter
assesses contemporary developments in the principle and practice of humanitarian interventions
in the post-Cold War era and argues that a notable shift seems to be underway.
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2- Assessment of the Post-Cold War Practice
Recent practice seems to suggest a shift that has implications for sovereignty and
humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian crises resulting either from governmental acts or internal
conflict have become amenable to outside intervention. What emerges from these cases in terms
of the various UN Security Council resolutions, as Damrosch puts it, "evidence a newly emerging
consensus that the Security Council's enforcement powers may be invoked ... in ... purely domestic
situations."206 On the basis of these developments, significant conclusions can be reached on the
principles of humanitarian intervention and their application in the post-Cold War era?07 First,
these emerging principles suggest that massive or widespread violations of human rights or
humanitarian law resulting from governmental acts or internal conflicts and the magnitude of
human suffering that they engender can constitute a threat to international peace and security that
governments can no longer afford to ignore. These are matters that do not fall within the domestic
domain of states. The Security Council, in those circumstances, can take appropriate measures,
including the use of force grounded in Chapter VII of the Charter for the protection of
humanitarian relief operations and the creation of a secure environment for such operations.
Second, abandonment of victims of man-made or natural disasters, especially the
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deliberate withholding or impeding of food and medical supplies necessary for survival of
civilians trapped in the throes of internal conflict, constitutes a threat to human life, and ultimately
peace security. In those situations, necessary measures including force can be employed to get
much needed humanitarian relief supplies to such victims.
Third, states have a duty to lend support to international organizations or humanitarian
organizations working to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of complex emergencies
like situations of starvation, widespread suffering and death.
Fourth, state sovereignty will not bar action to protect and sustain the lives of large
numbers of civilians trapped in situations of internal conflict. Added to this is the principle of
individual responsibility for war crimes and grave breaches of international humanitarian law,
including interference with humanitarian assistance. 208
Although these principles emerge from the cases, international responses to the various
humanitarian tragedies were less consistent. Multilateral response to one situation "serve as a
benchmark for evaluating the response or lack of response to others." The emerging picture has
thus been varied international responses and mixed results. For some, this casts doubts on the
legitimacy of humanitarian interventions. Nonetheless, the various responses have been grounded
in the principle that massive human rights deprivations constitute a threat to international peace
and security either through transboundary refugee flows or spillage of internal strife across
borders. On this basis, international action, including the use of force, can be justified to address
these problems.
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However, the euphoria generated in the aftermath of the Gulf War subsided with the
expression of frustrations and disillusionment by the mid-1990s regarding vigorous international
action to deal with these humanitarian crises. This problem was concluded by Boutrus Ghali when
he admitted that "we are still in a time of transition... unforeseen or only partly foreseen
difficulties have arisen ... the different world that emerged when the Cold War ceased is still a
world not fully understood." 209 Even though there is a clear indication that the post-Cold War era
is still unfolding, it is important that the emerging international principles and practice be sorted
out if only to serve as signposts into the future.
Various actors and writers have sought to place interpretations on these trends. First, an
increasing number of scholars view these developments as establishing the right to international
intervention for human rights purposes, and thus establishing significant precedents.210 In a
comprehensive survey of state practice, UN law and most commentators, Ajaj reaches the
conclusion that humanitarian intervention has never enjoyed as much legitimacy as it does
today. 211 Scheffer interestingly summarizes the new sense of urgency with regard to the need for
international response by stating that:
"In the post-Cold war world a new standard of intolerance for human misery and human
atrocities has taken hold. Something quite significant has occurred to raise the
consciousness of nations to the plight of peoples within sovereign borders. There is a new
commitment expressed in both moral and legal terms to alleviate the suffering of
oppressed or devastated people. To argue today that norms of sovereignty, non-use of
209
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force and the sanctity of internal affairs are paramount to the collective human rights of
people, whose lives and well-being are at risk, is to ignore the march of history." 212
In that light, Greenwood has asserted "the law on humanitarian intervention has changed
both for the United Nations and for individual states. It is no longer tenable to assert that
whenever a government massacres its own people or a state collapses into international anarchy
international law forbids military intervention altogether."213 Ethically, Hoffman has argued
military intervention is justified when domestic unrest threatens regional or international security
and massive abuses of human rights occur. He points out, however, "in most, but not necessarily
all cases the intervention should be organized or at least authorized by the Security Council,
which should be given autonomous means and reorganized to enhance both its legitimacy and the
capacity for action." 214 While Roberts notes, with respect to the questions posed earlier, that
"international thought and practice seem to be changing." Teson forcefully argues that "the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention has experienced a dramatic revival with the end of the Cold
War" and concludes "that the international community has a right to intervene to uphold human
rights is supported by recent practice." 215 Even though Falk suggests that humanitarian
intervention since 1989 has been a failure, and attributes reasons for the failure, he nevertheless
argues that "with the end of the Cold War there has been a notable shift in intervention diplomacy
away from purely geopolitical interventionism in the direction of support for humanitarian claims
to alleviate human suffering" and "from a purely normative perspective of law and morality, this
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shift in intervention practice is a welcome development."216
Opponents of humanitarian intervention, however, remain skeptical by insisting that
sovereign states and their prerogatives remain fundamental even when humanitarian issues arise.
For Donnelly, ''we should not expect-hopefully or fearfully- the imminent emergence of an
international practice of humanitarian intervention."217 Others have also expressed concerns about
the viability of humanitarian intervention as a mechanism for enforcement of the will of the
international community. 218 Ayoob distinguishes between two kinds of humanitarian
interventions: the politically motivated and politically innocent. The former takes place when the
political interests of a major power are evident, and this affects the legitimacy of the action. The
latter type fails to consider and address the political causes of conflict from the beginning. He
questions the selective nature of humanitarian interventions even among the many candidates for
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intervention in the Third World which reinforces doubts about the real motives of interveners, and
concludes:
"for many reasons humanitarian intervention, in any effective sense of the term, can be
considered a nonstarter. Both politically motivated and politically innocent varieties of
intervention may be counterproductive. Moreover, lack of resources and will could make
such intervention selective, detracting further from its credibility as a legitimate
instrument for the enforcement of the will of the international community as a whole." 219
However, as Whitman argues, ''the deployment of military force is always founded on a hardheaded calculation of risk, and there is nothing to preclude humanitarian objectives on an agenda
framed by a more determinedly self-interested motivation." 220 It is argued that if states conduct
their affairs based on national interest, then the trends in post-Cold War humanitarian
interventions can be explained on the basis that national interest is being redefined in such a way
that humanitarian crises cannot be ignored since they affect all nations. This is especially evident
when humanitarian tragedies result in wider regional conflicts, and when the flow of refugees
destabilizes states. Thus, states have begun to redefine national interests more broadly, and in
ways which acknowledge the relationship between humanitarian crises, and national, political and
economic security. Instances of less consistent responses to humanitarian crises or the selection
bias in these cases of intervention can be explained by the assignment of various priorities to
other interests at any particular time.
Having said that though, it seems to be the case that not all states are supportive or in
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favor of the proactive international interventionist stance. International support has been
forthcoming mainly from Western states. France has been in the forefront and took the lead in
supporting a new humanitarian intervention,221 and to this end has even created a ministry of
humanitarian affairs to deal exclusively with those issues. In July 1991, President Mitterand stated
"France had taken the initiative of this new right, rather extraordinary in the history of the world,
which is in a way the right of intervention within a country, when parts of its population are
victims ofpersecution."222 Humanitarian issues have become a major matter of French diplomacy
within the UN. French initiatives led to the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 43/131
(1988), which recognized the right of humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and
similar emergency situations, and Resolution 45/100 (1990) which reaffirmed these rights and the
endorsement of the "corridors of tranquility" concept in order to facilitate the work of
humanitarian agencies. 223 It is therefore not surprising that, given the context of collective efforts
aimed at alleviating human misery and suffering, France was actively involved in UN operations
in Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia and took the initiative, albeit too late, in responding to the
221
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humanitarian tragedy in Rwanda. Thus, with regard to the justification for the French intervention
in Rwanda, its Foreign Ministry claimed a legal duty to intervene for humanitarian reasons.
Appalled by the response to the Rwandan crisis, the Danish Foreign Ministry convened a
study group jointly to evaluate the emergency assistance to Rwanda, which resulted in a report
that Hindell characterizes as essentially an interventionist manifesto. 224 Germany and Belgium
expressed similar sentiments. Genscher, the former German Foreign Minister, in his speech at the
UN General Assembly expressed that "where human rights are trampled upon, the family of
nations cannot be confined to a role of spectator.'ms The Belgian Foreign Minister also declared
that: "the international community should help states to respect human rights, and to force them to
do so, if necessary." 226 This statement emphasizes the idea that governments must be held
accountable for the human rights violations of their citizens. Thus, forcible measures should, if
necessary, be employed in extreme situations that warrant its use. Following the intervention in
Iraq, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, proclaimed that "recent international law
recognizes the right to intervene in the affairs of another state in cases of extreme humanitarian
need." 227 Britain has consistently supported Security Council resolutions dealing with
humanitarian crises discussed earlier. The Canadian government took a significantly different
approach in dealing with sovereignty, internal conflicts and human rights violations abroad.
Former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney drew an analogy between internal violence and
international violence by saying ')ust as it is no longer acceptable for society, the police or the
courts to turn a blind eye to family violence, so it is equally unacceptable for the international
224
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community to ignore violence and repression within national borders."228 The new approach in
Canadian foreign policy has been supportive of humanitarian intervention, although this has not
been without controversy. In September 2000, the Canadian government also established an
independent International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 229 At the
outset of the Clinton administration, a policy of "assertive multilateralism" was put forth, This
policy was to see the US working closely with international institutions like the UN in addressing
intractable problems like ethnic conflicts, aggression, genocide and the survival of democracy in
the face of tyranny, among others. The then the US Permanent Representative to the UN,
Albright, outlined the relationship that the US will forge in the UN. She pointed out the fusion of
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations with the delivery of humanitarian assistance as
examples of what the US will support. 230
At the UN Security Council summit meeting in 1992, Russian President Yeltsin intimated
support for the primacy of human rights and the need for a rapid response mechanism to
consolidate the rule of law throughout the world. 231 At the very least, Russia and other former
Soviet Republics have explicitly expressed their intention to participate actively in international
institutions, 232 or at least acquiesce in the international community's efforts towards such ends.
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This development has permitted the UN to take actions that it would previously not have taken.
In Northern Iraq, resolution 688 was passed to protect the Kurdish population through the

creation of no-fly zones and Kurdish enclaves. In this case, the Security Council emphasized the
link between respect for human rights and maintenance of international peace and security. In
Somalia, UNOSOM was created by Resolution 751 to monitor a ceasefire and escort delivery of
humanitarian supplies. Resolution 794 authorized the use of "all necessary means" to establish a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations which provided the basis for the US-led
deployment of UNITAF. Under Resolution 814, the UN assumed transitional authority in
Somalia, where the use of force was authorized to restore law and order, and to deal with bandits.
Moreover, in the case of former Yugoslavia, Resolution 743 established UNPROFOR with a
mandate "to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall
settlement of the Yugoslav crisis." In a series of resolutions, the Security Council demanded an
unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies for the populations of Sarajevo and other parts of
the country. Resolution 770 called on states and regional organizations to take "all measures
necessary", including use of force, to protect humanitarian convoys in Bosnia. Furthermore, in
Rwanda the UN mandate before the genocide broadly related to monitoring implementation of the
Arusha Accords. Resolution 912 reduced the number of troops with a mandate to mediate
between the government and rebel forces, and to assist in humanitarian relief operations. By
Resolution 918, the mandate was expanded to include protection of refugees through the
establishment of safe humanitarian zones and the provision of security for relief operations.
Resolution 929 eventually authorized member states to use "all necessary means" to carry out
humanitarian operations. In Liberia, ECOWAS troops intervened in that country to end the civil
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strife, restore law and order, and prevent further loss of life. The Security Council in resolution
788 commended the ECOWAS effort to fmd a solution to the conflict. Finally, in Haiti, Security
Council Resolution 841 imposed wide-ranging sanctions in 1993 on the Haitian military regime.
Resolution 940 called on member states to form a multinational force and to use "all necessary
means" to return Aristide to power. The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was finally
deployed to replace US forces. In Kosovo, Resolution 1160 (1998) imposed an arms embargo on
Yugoslavia. In East Timor, Resolution 1246 stated that the situation in East Timor was a threat to
international peace and security and there was a need to restore peace and security, and to
facilitate humanitarian assistance to East Timor. These resolutions reflect the UN's willingness, at
least in principle, to find massive human rights violations as constituting threats to or breaches of
international security, and thus taking action not excluding military measures to redress those
violations.
Opposition to humanitarian intervention has mainly come from Third World countries.
Many non-Western states view with skepticism the motives of Western countries in advocating
humanitarian intervention. States such as China, India
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and Zimbabwe
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have been at the

forefront in arguing that it is not within the domain of the Security Council to handle human
rights issues. China is very important in this regard since it has a veto in the Security Council.
However, it has proceeded cautiously. It has so far gone along with other Security Council
members, albeit reluctantly, in authorizing UN humanitarian interventions, or it has abstained
233
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from voting in that regard? 35
Furthermore, concerns have been expressed about the expanding definition of
"international peace and security" by the Security Council. 236 Scepticism is expressed regarding
the interpretation of what amounts to "a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression" to include issues which were previously considered to be within the domestic affairs
of states. The Security Council can become involved in issues ranging from peace building and
peace enforcement, early warning systems and the protection of human rights to nonmilitary
threats to peace and security in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields. 237 The
ever-increasing powers of the Security Council have created an apprehension among certain Third
World states of being subject to, in the words of Dallmeyer, a "hegemony directorate", or what
Nafziger describes as "the spectre of a modem Holy Alliance of the Great Powers" that could
dispense with the principle that the basis for the UN action in a state's domestic affairs must be
subject to that state's consent.

238

Some of these states perceive a greater threat from the

235

Wheeler and Morris comment that the reason for Chinese caution remains unclear, though it seems her experience with
colonial powers, and a radically different notion of human rights grounds a policy that places sovereignty over Article 2 (7) of the
UN Charter acts as a strong brake on Security Council mandated humanitarian intervention, her options are limited by wider
political constraints. This dictates not stepping too far out of line with a Security Council dominated by its three Western
permanent members, especially the US. Wheeler and Morris, supra, note 19 at 162-163.
236
See Weiss, "On the brink of a New Era? Humanitarian interventions, 1991-93" (1994) The Brown Journal of World Affairs
235 at 240.
237
See generally, Boutrus Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary General
pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations,
1992).
238

Dallmeyer provides an example of reaction by certain third world states towards a proposal to provide emergency
humanitarian assistance following major disasters. The Moroccan representative stated: "we believe also that any
international assistance in this area must be subject to consent, following a request by a state, and must be compatible
with needs and priorities. This consent and the appeal of the state concerned must be respected. Our country cannot
go along with any undertaking designed to create autonomous machinery that, if not properly defined and strictly
controlled, could result in interference in the internal affairs of states. The Indian representative stated: "The Charter
of the United Nations stresses the domestic jurisdiction of states; nobody can or should dilute this aspect of national
sovereignty, even if the stakes are high". The Pakistani delegate observed: "First, no attempt should be made to
compromise national sovereignty when providing emergency assistance. We agree with those who have categorically
rejected the use of humanitarian relief as a disguise for political intervention". Finally, the representative of Tunisia
stated: "First, there must be consensus on this important and complex question. Emergency humanitarian assistance

262

permanent members of the Security Council than which existed during the Cold War contest
between the superpowers.

239

Some Third World states have thus argued that the General

Assembly should maintain a greater involvement in decision-making processes regarding
humanitarian intervention lest the UN becomes dominated by the major powers using it for their
own interests.
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In cautioning against an expansion of the definition of humanitarian

intervention, the Chairman of the Group 77 noted:
"the G77 is slightly worried that some may ... not be sensitive to certain pleas for
anabiding respect for the sovereignty of nations. Our concern stems from our historical
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past, when many of us, as colonial subjects, had no rights. The respect for sovereignty
which the UN system enjoins is not an idle stipulation that can be rejected outright in the
name of even the noblest gestures .... An essential attribute of that sovereignty is the
principle of consent, one of the cornerstones in the democratic ideal itself." 241
In essence, international intervention is viewed with suspicion and fear since it brings back

memories of imperialism, colonialism, racism and humiliation which militates against any
broadly based formulation of principles regarding intervention.242 Nevertheless, this attitude of
outright hostility to humanitarian intervention seems to be changing. As noted in the last chapter,
comments by several prominent African leaders endorsing ECOMOG' s role in Liberia
demonstrate shifting attitudes and thinking about sovereignty and under what circumstances
intervention may be appropriate. This seems to be consistent with Childers and Urqhart's findings
of a growing readiness among Third World countries to fmd ways for "genuinely disinterested
and UN-directed humanitarian intervention." 243
Moreover, international organization appears to open the door to a more vigorous
approach to humanitarian interventions. Within institutional secretariats, the former UN Secretary
General, Boutrus Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace, and the Supplement to the Agenda offers a
useful starting point. Boutrus Ghali observed that respect for sovereignty and integrity is "crucial
to any common international progress," but "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... has
passed" and it was necessary for governments "to find a balance between the needs of good
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internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world. " 244 During his
time in office, Boutrus Ghali regularly urged the Security Council to devote equal attention to less
prominent trouble spots of the world when it seemed the Council would not discuss or even act in
certain situations.
The theme of a more assertive humanitarianism was commented on by other prominent
secretariat officials. The former UN representative in Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun, observed that
"governments cannot invoke sovereignty to prevent humanitarian access to the population . . .if
there is a humanitarian catastrophe, the international community is morally bound to
intervene."245 In a similar context, Jan Eliasson, Under-Secretary General of the UN Department
of Humanitarian Affairs, in response to a question as to whether there is a moral obligation for the
international community to respond to humanitarian crises, asserted that "certainly there is a
moral obligation, and now also an obligation that is accepted by . ... member states of the UN." He
went on to admit that "the concept that solidarity does not end automatically at a border but rather
with a human being in need has broken through in the humanitarian area. " 246 Commenting on the
role of the Security Council in the post-Cold War era, the present UN Secretary General, Kofi
Annan, Undersecretary General for peacekeeping operations stated that ''the Council is moving
towards greater interventionism because in many tragedies public opinion perceives a human
imperative that transcends anything else. We are using more force because we are encountering
more resistance." 247 Writing about concerns leading to an effort to better defme conditions under
which humanitarian intervention could be undertaken, the Undersecretary General for Political
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Affairs sums it up as follow:
"In interviews with representatives of member states at the United Nations and in

discussions at various seminars, there is no objection to humanitarian intervention where
there is overwhelming evidence that many people are starving and those involved in the
conflict are deliberately preventing the international community from delivering
humanitarian assistance to those who need it.

There is a consensus that under such

conditions efforts must be made to overcome obstacles and to override the objections of
the warring parties. There is also a consensus that these efforts should not be carried out
unilaterally-either by one country or a coalition of countries-but that such a situation
should be brought to the attention of the international community to obtain a clear
mandate for humanitarian intervention. "248
Another development occurred in Africa during the African Summit in Burkina-Faso in 1998.
President Mandella of South Africa, speaking at the Summit, pointed out that ''we should lmow
that we are not encroaching upon the sovereignty and we cannot deprive the continent of the right
release it from the duty of intervention and at the same time people have been slaughtered in the
cause of protecting a totalitarian regime."
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Mandella's speech was a good sign for the OAU to

intervene whenever gross human suffering takes place. Thus, it appears the consensus supports
multilateral intervention in situations of extreme human rights deprivations and suffering.
With regard to regional organizations, international enforcement action involved their use,
for example, in the former Yugoslavia. Security Council authorization to states "acting nationally
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or through regional organizations" to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia, to enforce economic
sanctions and to protect the Bosnian Muslims through the concept of safe havens were undertaken
through NATO and the Western European Union. As Solana, NATO Secretary General, points
out ''NATO helped bring the war to an end through its support over several years to the United
Nations through its limited, but effective use of airpower." He continues by saying "not to meet
the challenge of Bosnia would have been a profound failure of collective will and an abdication of
moral responsibility by the entire international community. " 250 These statements suggest NATO
had in the past complemented UN efforts and that, where necessary, the organization will support
future UN efforts when called upon.
The Haitian problem served as a trigger for the OAS to overcome its reservations
regarding interference in the domestic affairs of states. The Santiago commitment of June 1991,
in which the OAS resolved that any "sudden or irregular interruption of democratic political
institutional process" in any one of the member states would result in the convening of an
emergency meeting to decide what to do, was vital in establishing "a normative trigger" to deal
with Haiti, even though "articulation of the response was too weak to constitute a deterrent. " 251
Nevertheless, more significantly, the declaration "internationalizes the issue of domestic
governance, stating that democracy and human rights are essential to regional identity. " 252 If the
lessons of Haiti are anything to go by, then it seems the OAS will be prepared to take similar
kinds of action in future, even if they fall short of the use of force where democratic rule- and
consequent violations human rights- is truncated.
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The Somali tragedy has influenced the OAU in rethinking its approach to issues of
sovereignty, human rights and intervention. Prior to the Somali crisis, African states were
reluctant to allow foreign intervention in internal strife on the continent. However, a change of
viewpoint seems to be underway. At the OAU foreign ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in 1992,
and its summit meeting in July 1992, African states were prepared to approve intervention in
circumstances such as Somalia? 53 OAU commendation of the ECOWAS action in Liberia has
already been noted. Since the tragedy of Somalia, the Organization's Secretary General, Salim
Salim, has made bold proposals for an OAU mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution.
He has observed that "if the OAU is to play the lead role in any African conflict" then "it should
be enabled to intervene swiftly." He goes on to suggest that the OAU should be a leader in
transcending the traditional notion of sovereignty, building on African values of kinship,
solidarity, and the view that "every African is his brother's keeper."254 It is also interesting to
note that African leaders gave their support for a military intervention to dislodge leaders of the
recent coup in Sierra Leon. A Nigerian-led alliance took military action in that country which
eventually led to the return of the ousted president. Reacting to the events, the UN Secretary
General noted there was general African acceptance of the military intervention. The Nigerian-led
move had also enjoyed the apparent, if not explicit, support of the OAU and the Commonwealth,
whose General Secretary called a military intervention "totally justified. "255 As noted earlier, these
developments suggest an increasing recognition by many African states and the OAU that a total
prohibition on intervention in states' internal affairs as a result of suffering caused by war, or
widespread human rights violations is no longer feasible or necessarily in their intere~t.
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Nongovernmental organizations (NG0s) 256 are also becoming central to international
responses to internal conflicts, and have performed important humanitarian tasks alongside other
actors in the post-Cold War period. This increasing importance of NGOs is becoming evident in
the fact that "some control programmatic resources that rival or dwarfthose of many governments
and UN agencies." 257 During the Cold War, when UN agencies operations were limited due to
political considerations, NGOs mostly became the conduit through which relief reached suffering
populations. NGOs have been more flexible, less partial, and operate to some extent on rules of
neutrality in their delivery of relief supplies in situations of conflict.
The rise of NGOs in emergency relief throughout the 1980s was spectacular. In 1991,
European-based NGOs delivered about 450,000 tones of food aid to Africa, in comparison with
about 180,000 tones in 1989.2 58 In 1994 NGOs accounted for over 10% of total public
development aid which amounted to some $8 billion. They earmarked about half of the ever-
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growing percentage of their resources to emergency relief.2 59According to Weiss, "about onequarter of US development aid is being channeled through NGOs as of the mid-1990s", and this is
expected to increase to one-halfby the beginning of the 2000." 260 The reasons for NGOs' success
in emergency relief work, according to Griffith, Levine and Weller lie in their "flexibility, speed
of reaction, comparative lack of bureaucracy, operational and implementation capacity, and the
commitment and dedication of the usually young staff'. In addition, "the political independence
of the NGOs .... gives them a strong comparative advantage in increasingly complex internal
conflicts." 261

Their

"low

overhead operations

help

victims

that

governmental

and

intergovernmental aid programs often fail to reach." 262 Thus, bilateral and multilateral
organizations are increasingly relying on NGOs as sub-contractors. While this trend will allow for
expansion of the scope of their activities, some NGOs have expressed concern about the
possibility of being exploited by governments or international institutions with a consequent loss
of autonomy in their operations.263
The provision of humanitarian relief by NGOs has become a vital supplement to the
efforts of governments and international institutions to rebuild societies tom apart by war. NGOs'
response to humanitarian crises caused by internal conflicts in the post-Cold War era has meant
that they are often trapped in the midst of this violence. Thus, it becomes important to assess their
views on the use of force in addressing these crises.
NGOs' support for the use of military forces in the complex humanitarian emergency
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situations of the 1990s appears to be mixed. UN military actions have been the "objects a loud
chorus of criticism or mixed messages from parts of the NGO community- some calling for
military intervention one day and then castigating it the next." 264 Given the pacific nature of
humanitarian NGOs, it is not surprising that many of them have been critical of the use of force in
the various UN missions. However, as Keen, Curtis and Slim suggest, there is a tendency among
the NGO community where "it has certainly been of most de rigueur to concentrate on the failings
of UN military humanitarianism rather than to identify what military forces can do well in such
situations. "265 While African Rights, for instance, has described UN and NGOs missions in this
period as one of liberating humanitarian organizations from "the Cold War straight-jacket," it has
nevertheless been critical of these missions. It has characterized these missions as "a reckless
period of humanitarianism unbound in which assertive humanitarian policies have often done
more harm than good". 266 Some NGOs, such as Save the Children Fund (SCF), believe that the
injection of UN military forces in humanitarian emergencies actually worsens the situation. SCF
has stated that:
"military intervention is no panacea ... greater military intervention by the international
community should not be automatically equated with rapid and durable solutions ... once
the UN intervenes militarily in a humanitarian emergency, as in Somalia, its actions can
all too easily become another complicating ingredient of the problem. " 267
Slim and Visman have argued UN military operation in Somalia in early 1993 made NGOs less
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secure with the disarming of armed guards hired by the NGOs while leaving the rest of the
country still armed. 268 Once the UN had decided that it was embarking upon disarming these
armed guards, a more persistent and appropriate level of force should have been used to disarm
other armed bandits who were left to roam the countryside, and who carried out attacks on relief
consignments targeted for the civilian population.
There seems to be a dilemma among the NGO community on the use of force regarding
situations of intense levels of violence and acute human suffering. As Wheeler asks, in cases
where NGO operations are overwhelmed given the level of violence and human suffering, should
they appeal to states to use force knowing that such use of force, while unlikely to offer a lasting
solution, might save a lot of lives in the short term?
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In answering this question, Cuny has noted

how NGOs operating in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia "resented their sponsoring
governments' willingness to place them in harm's way without providing adequate security, either
by peacekeeping forces or direct intervention. " 270 Luck, head of the UN Association of the US,
has stated that when "a national government collapses, leaving chaos and widespread domestic
violence in its place" the UN is justified in authorizing a multilateral military intervention. 271

In the former Yugoslavia, NGOs were initially hostile to the idea of armed protection for
humanitarian convoys but, as the situation deteriorated, they finally succumbed to the idea. 272
Having resisted since its inception to advocate the use of force for humanitarian pwposes,
Medicine without Borders eventually called for it in response to the genocide in Rwanda in
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1994. 273 Other NGOs, such as the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), argue that
the use of force has a role to play in preventing massive violations of human rights. It notes
military forces were effective when ordered to protect civilians in Rwanda, and that far more lives
could have been saved had the UN employed military force to stop the genocide. 274 Capability of
even a small UN force to save more lives in Rwanda in May 1994, and the French action to
secure the chaotic situation in southwest Rwanda subsequently, according to Weiss, led Oxfam to
conclude that "the policy of caution about UN peacekeeping, induced by experiences in Somalia,
should now be reviewed. "275 Thus, it appears to be the case with NGOs, as Hermet suggests, that
the level of human suffering has come to mean "there could be no qualms about the methods
used." 276
In sum, there is a shift underway in terms of principle and practice of humanitarian
intervention in the post-Cold War era. 277 There is the belief that state sovereignty connotes
responsibility and cannot be used as a shield to commit massive and systematic violations of
human rights. Human rights have been a recurring normative theme in international relations.
From the inception of the state system, the Peace of Westphalia, which marked the ideas of
sovereign authority of the state, and subsequent peace treaties noted earlier, contained significant
clauses limiting sovereign prerogatives vis-a-vis the rights of populations inhabiting their
territories. Contemporary post-1945 developments have also seen an elaborate international
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human rights regime starting from the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, to the 1966 UN Covenants on Human Rights and beyond. These documents spell out
responsibilities of governments toward their citizens in terms of promoting and protecting their
human rights. Recent innovations, such as the OAS's Santiago Declaration, the OSCE's
Copenhagen Document and the Harare Commonwealth Declaration,
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contain notable human

rights provisions. Even states applying to join NATO's "partnership for peace" are required to
commit to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Similarly, international financial
institutions like the World Bank have, since the 1980s, imposed various political conditionalities,
including respect for human rights, as a prerequisite for receiving fmancial loans and aid. Most
Western countries in their dealings with Third World countries have as well incorporated the
linking of aid and trade to human rights in their foreign policies. The Commission on Global
Governance has recently acknowledged that:
"Global security extends beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites and exclusive state
interests to include the protection of people .... To confine the concept of security
exclusively to the protection of states is to ignore the interests of people who form the
citizens of a state and in whose name sovereignty is exercised. It can produce situations in
which regimes in power feel they have the unfettered freedom to abuse the right to
security of their people .... All people, no less than states, have a right to secure existence,
and all states have an obligation to protect those rights." 279
As Jackson argues, ''human security presupposes the sovereignty of the people and where those
278
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conditions are not met a human right of security can be invoked to protect people endangered by
that development. " 280
These policies and practices suggest adherence by governments to certain principles in
their domestic practices. Interventions to protect human rights should thus not be seen as
incompatible with state sovereignty but rather affirming it. Support for humanitarian intervention
is on the rise among scholars, states (to a lesser degree among Third World states), in institutional
secretariats, and it seems in the NGO community, at least in cases of intense violence and human
suffering. The trend, however, is still unfolding and if the international community should move
towards an entrenched notion of humanitarian intervention, the UN can use recent cases to
provide a framework for laying down some general principles or guidelines on when an internal
situation warrants international action, either through authorization by the Security Council or a
regional organization.
It is apparent that, although support for humanitarian intervention is gaining currency,

there are still various actors opposed to its use. In order to get closer to an international consensus,
a clear articulation of principles is necessary to further enhance the legitimacy of humanitarian
interventions. To this end, some analysts have proposed the Security Council and the General
Assembly jointly adopt a standard operating procedure for humanitarian intervention. 281 At the
280
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very least, some kind of general declaration or statement analogous to the Copenhagen Document
or Santiago Declaration would be appropriate. 282 While international consensus, understood not
necessarily to mean unanimity but eliciting the widest possible support to bring this about, will be
a difficult undertaking, it is nevertheless worth exploring. It is in this regard that the notion of
epistemic communities becomes important.
3- The Role of Epistemic Communities in Forging Consensus
Epistemic communities have been employed in altering perceptions and framing the
context for collective responses to various international problems. Examples of specific issueareas in which epistemic community roles have had significant influence include arms control,
where a US based epistemic community framed the issue and cultivated an interest in superpower
cooperation around the theme of nuclear arms control. In pollution control, ecologic epistemic
community activities have engendered joint decisions emphasizing environmental protection. In
proportionality, and necessity. Thu, humanitarian intervention by one state would be permissible only under tow circumstances:
( l) if a target state had declined to submit a dispute to impartial review within a reasonable period or time; (2) if after agreeing to
do so, the target state failed to comply in good faith with resulting recommendations or decisions. Humanitarian intervention
would be subsumed within a process of community decision, and would be authorized only as a last resort when Article 33
procedures have failed. Effective community deliberations and collective initiatives, rather than unilateral argument and doctrinal
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telecommunications, epistemic community activity has been relevant in framing the context of a
telecommunications regime and influencing state choices in the direction of multilateral
agreements. In structuring the Law of the Sea regime, epistemic consensus on the economics of
seabed mining produced a broader set of possible bargaining aimed at promoting a broader
arrangement of interest-based negotiation. It also aimed in the identification of specific
compromises on which international policy coordination could be based. 283 In post-World War II
economic management, policymakers were alerted to the possibilities of mutual gain and the need
for strategic, coordinated action.
Ikenberry shows how the underlying structures of power and interest alone do not fully
explain the postwar economic order. He looks, instead, at how the many conflicting political
interests were reconciled in reaching agreement by placing emphasis on the community of
experts, and how consensus was arrived at within the larger political environment, and within and
across both the United States and British governments. For Ikenberry, what mattered in
structuring this economic regime was that it was not based on policy ideas put forth by an expert
community, but that "the policy ideas resonated with the larger political environment." The ideas
of the experts, however, "ultimately carried the day because they created the conditions for larger
political coalitions within and between governments ... " He argues that the group of economists
and policy specialists did not entirely constitute a epistemic community by a strict definition of
the term, "nor did the manner in which these experts influenced the terms of settlement conform
to the strict logic of epistemic community influence ... "The community of experts in this instance
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was not "an independently existing scientific community" 284 Rather, the expert community was
created by the process of Anglo-American negotiations. Thus he points out, to that extent:
" ... The Anglo-American experts were, at best, a primitive epistemic community, a
collection of professional economists who shared a set of general and technical views
which concerned the proper functioning of the world economy and distilled contemporary
economic thought and lessons of recent economic history." 285
The application of Ikenberry's notion of primitive epistemic communities to efforts aimed at
codifying humanitarian intervention can potentially produce fruitful results. In the realm of
humanitarian intervention, one has to identify, heuristically, analogous actors at the international
level that could be considered epistemic communities given the role of these communities in other
issue areas. It is a recognized fact of international political life today that human rights have been
internationally recognized and made the object of varied international action. This development
has been possible in recent times due partly to the activities of certain groups. It would seem that
groups such as the ICRC, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, Doctors without
Borders, to name a few, and the International Commission of Jurists, the International Law
Commission, and the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) have all been
active and significant catalysts in the process of international governance and have played varying
roles in the institutionalization of human rights norms. These groups potentially fall within the
category of constituting at least primitive epistemic communities, for the purposes of
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consolidating the present support for humanitarian intervention. These various groups have
performed useful roles in the past and will be expected to do so in the future.
NGOs have demonstrated the ability to influence policymakers and have tried to effect
change at the national and international levels by working with and beyond the governmental
framework 286 As Weiss notes, "both through formal statements in UN fora and through informal
negotiations with international civil servants and members of national delegations, many NGOs
seek to ensure that their views, and those of their constituencies, are reflected in international
texts and decisions. "287 Their influence on state responses to humanitarian crises vary from one
organization to another and from case to case. Their efforts can affect the timing and
configuration of international responses to humanitarian crises. 288 In the US, for instance, NGO
efforts aided the favorable domestic climate that existed for the Bush administration's decision to
intervene in Iraq in support of the Kurds. A similar climate existed for the US-led decision to
intervene in Somalia. Key personnel within the humanitarian NGO community such as the
President of CARE US, who had been seconded to the UN, pressed for the use of force in
Somalia. With regard to Rwanda, NGO advocacy was less effective in persuading the Clinton
government to act in stopping the genocide in April and May 1994. Eventually, however they
were successful in urging the government to act in support of relief operations in the refugee
camps of Zaire and Tanzania. 289
Additionally, NGOs have drawn the attention of the media to crisis situations, particularly,
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as in the case of Ethiopia, where the government was part of the humanitarian crisis that engulfed
this country. Thus, its influence on public opinion, reports and activities, as Helman notes, "puts
pressure on Western democracies to act, regardless of the nonintervention principle."290 In France,
NGOs championed an assertive humanitarian policy that was adopted by the French government
which subsequently influenced debates in the UN, leading to the passage of the General Assembly
resolutions on humanitarian assistance referred to earlier. Thus, NGOs can have an impact on
how the international community will respond to various humanitarian crises, as well as the
ability to influence the creation of new norms for international action.
Humanitarian NGOs operate on a political logic shaped almost entirely by moral
considerations and, as Falk points out, on "an ethos of responsibility and solidarity- that is very
different from the statist outlook that guides most governments when they are engaged in
humanitarian missions. "291 Where governments are stymied by political considerations and are
unwilling to act, humanitarian NGOs can become significant catalysts, at least, in efforts directed
towards non-use of force in humanitarian tragedies, and promote states to use force when all else
fails. Humanitarian NGO operations historically have been dependent upon interstate
organizations for the provision of channels of action. However, in recent times, international
NGOs not only transcend national boundaries but have also created a direct and independent form
of nongovernmental diplomacy through networks of their own. 292
In the words of one writer, "the economic, informational and intellectual resources of NGOs have
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garnered them enough expertise and influence to assume authority in matters that, traditionally,
have been solely within the purview of state administration and responsibility .... Furthermore, the
relative influence of NGOs is not a static phenomenon. Their impact on state policies has changed
and is changing with time. "293
In sum, apart from the important roles humanitarian NGOs play in humanitarian crises,

they are also engaged in education and advocacy. Given these functions and first-hand knowledge
and experience in different humanitarian crises situations, it is possible that NGOs can be
instrumental in any endeavor to convince governments of the benefits of formulating agreeable
principles of humanitarian intervention through a combination of conferences, publicity, making
recommendations, and governmental diplomacy.
Since the 1940s, the International Law Commission has played a significant role in
generating ideas and making proposals to the General Assembly for the development of consistent
and coherent rules on various aspects of international law. It was, for example, instrumental in
formulating the Law of the Sea regime, and has been prominent in putting forward proposals for
the establishment of an international criminal court. Based on the experience of the Commission
in those areas, it is feasible that it could have a vital role in establishing the nature of a collective
debate on humanitarian intervention.
The Academic Council on the United Nations System is an international association of
scholars, teachers, practitioners and others active in the work and study of international
organizations. This group shares a professional interest in encouraging and supporting education
and research which deepen and broaden understandings of international cooperation. In
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implementing its goals, the Council focuses special attention on the programs and agencies of the
United Nations System. It also forges close working relationships with the UN Secretariat and
other institutions within the UN system, as well as with other inter-governmental and
nongovernmental organizations. The Council's program consists of promoting research and
organizing conferences and workshops to deliberate salient issues affecting the international
community. Individual members of this group have been at the forefront in advocating
humanitarian intervention and pertinent issues or considerations for its exercise. Based on the
experience of these members in humanitarian crises situations and their writings, it is possible to
spread these views among the wider membership that come from different parts of the world.
Members from various countries may then articulate the advantages of codifying hwnanitarian
intervention, with the ultimate goal of influencing governments towards that end.
The various groups, humanitarian NGOs and publicists discussed here bear evidence of a
primitive epistemic community or an epistemic-like community. Based on the experience of these
actors in other issue areas, it is suggested that identification of these groups and a simultaneous
coordination of their activities at the national and international levels is sufficient to demonstrate
the utility of epistemic communities in furthering the principle of humanitarian intervention as
well as helping in its international institutionalization. 294
In addition to the issues examined above, other important considerations that can be taken
into account by effective communities in an effort towards providing a consolidated framework
for collective hwnanitarian intervention should include, among others: the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court; defming the respective roles of the UN and regional
294
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organizations in humanitarian intervention; and the conditions under which humanitarian
intervention may be legitimately exercised.
First, issues relating to the possibility for the creation of a permanent international
criminal court to try, among other international crimes, grave human rights violations must be
seriously considered. 295 Advances have been made under the auspices of the UN in declaring
human rights deserve special protection. The many governmental actions adversely affecting
human rights which are now prohibited through the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and several other international instruments (discussed earlier) are indicative of this
progress. Many states are increasingly demonstrating a willingness to accept international norms
in an effort to create and maintain a more peaceful and stable international order. In this context,
there is growing international recognition of the pressing need for such an institution as an
essential means for reducing many of the sources of tension and conflict among states, and to
make individuals responsible for their crimes. 296 Although the Security Council has demonstrated
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some activism in creating ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, with the object of punishing those suspected of committing war crimes and other grave
breaches of international humanitarian law, these ad hoc measures are problematic. Inherent in ad
hoc measures dealing with international criminality, apart from political and procedural flaws, is
the question of selective adjudication. 297

The reported atrocities that were committed, for

example, in Liberia and Burundi have gone unpunished. In other areas where internal conflicts are
still continuing, with alleged crimes against international humanitarian law being committed,
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there seems to be demonstrable inaction. Thus, the case for a standing court supported by the
entire international community is strong.
UN activism surrounding humanitarian intervention also suggests an important role for
regional and sub-regional organizations. Regional arrangements such as the EU, OSCE,
ECOWAS and OAS played important roles in humanitarian operations in the Former Yugoslavia,
Liberia and Haiti respectively. Their role in the maintenance of international peace and security
suggests that they can perform important functions in fostering or undertaking humanitarian
interventions. Thus, their use in this context has certain advantages that may not be realized
through UN action alone. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides the legal and institutional
arrangements between these organizations and the UN?98 Article 52 encourages states to use
regional organizations before referring conflicts to the Security Council. It also recommends that
the Security Council make use of such regional arrangements to facilitate the pacific settlement of
disputes or to carry out enforcement measures. Regional organizations acting independently but
"consistently with the purposes and principles of the United Nations" may deal "with such matters
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action." Articles 53 and 54 prohibit regional organizations from taking measures involving
international peace and security without Security Council authorization and by insisting that
regional organizations inform the Council. It is evident that the security structure of the
international system is characterized by an overlapping jurisdiction between the UN, and regional
and sub-regional organizations. This lack of specificity on the division of responsibility, however,
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allows states the flexibility to create mechanisms fostering international peace and security, 299 or
to shift responsibility when they do not to deal with an issue.
As the United Nations is overburdened in its ability to engage in enforcement action
relating to international peace and security, then what role is there for regional organizations? Are
regional organizations appropriate mechanisms for conflict management? Should they be viewed
as a viable alternative to the UN? Should there be a possible division of labour? How could
regional organizations work in tandem with the UN? These are all questions that must be
considered in structuring a role for regional and sub-regional organizations vis-a-vis the UN.
Some observers have a preference for collective action at the regional level, believing that
humanitarian intervention should be the result of an expression of community standards and that
regional organizations usually reflect the community better than a universal organization such as
the UN. The advantages of regional collective action are familiarity with the region, its people, its
culture and the general environment. A regional organization should, therefore, be better adapted
to taking preventive measures and monitoring potentially volatile situations. Proximity to a
conflict situation is also likely to prompt regional entities to act in a timely manner since they are
more directly affected than are distant states. Moreover, the local population caught in the throes
of internal conflict is likely to view intervention by troops from a regional organization more
favorably; they are seen as less foreign and thus are more welcome. Lastly, the parties to a dispute
might prefer a regional forum for settlement.
There are, however, many problems associated with regional action. Weiss, Forsythe and
Coate, after examining the role of regional entities in conflict management, contend that "the
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apparent advantages of regional institutions exist more in theory than in practice." "In reality,

°

these organizations are far less capable," they point out, "than the United Nations". 30 First, most
regional entities, especially non-Western regional organizations, lack the organizational, financial
and military capacities either to carry out mandates in peace and security or to take effective
action. NATO, which is an exception, was reluctant, at least initially, to act in cases where it
should have acted, especially in the former Yugoslavia. Regional organizations may also have a
particular stake in a conflict. One or more of the strong states in regional organizations may also
be parties to a conflict or another humanitarian emergency, thus crippling the capacity of the
organization to act as a neutral mediator, and rendering conflict resolution problematic.
Furthermore, members of a regional entity may be so deeply divided as to make agreement on a
particular course of action difficult to arrive at. Lastly, the leadership of a regional organization
may be unwilling to approve a course of action lest it provides a precedent to be used against
them in the future. 301 Regional collective action can thus have either positive or negative effects
in a conflict situation. Although they may have the advantage or privilege to seek peaceful
solutions within their regions, they do not necessarily have the institutional capabilities to do so.
In light of the difficulties associated with effective regional action, it is argued that
"although it makes sense to strengthen regional organizations where possible, ... they should not
be viewed as a viable alternative to the UN in a conflict management role. "302 Rather, these
regional arrangements should be viewed as a complement and not a replacement when it comes to
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dealing with issues relating to maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. In
this era of multilateral diplomacy, the UN must clearly define its relationship with the various
regional organizations. Issues relating to when the UN should address a particular problem, when
a regional body should take up an issue, and under what circumstances both the UN and regional
organizations should act in a particular situation need to be carefully re-examined. The modalities
within which regional arrangements and the UN can best complement each other, especially
regarding the taking of enforcement action, should be an important consideration.
The post-Cold War practice suggests new forms of inter-organizational cooperation in
approaches to human security. It is encouraging that in his supplement to the Agenda for Peace,
former UN Secretary General Boutrus Ghali identified at least five ways in which this
cooperation can take place. First, there should be consultations with the object of exchanging
views on conflicts and finding solutions to those conflicts. Second, mutual support must be gained
through diplomatic initiatives. The UN can offer support to regional organization endeavours in
peacemaking and other issues and vice versa. Third, operational support can be offered by
regional organizations such as NATO air support for UNPROFOR troops during the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia. The UN, on the other hand, provides advice on technical or other aspects
of peacekeeping operations carried out by regional organizations Fourth, there should be codeployment of UN and regional troops in enforcement actions such as in Liberia, or the former
Soviet Republic of Georgia. Lastly, joint operations may be undertaken, as with the UN mission
in Haiti. 303 The task ahead will be to build upon these principles, structuring a flexible UNregional organizations relations. As Henrikson argues, " .... at least some UN action is always
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necessary, if not to elicit regional-organizational efforts then to make them more fully accepted
and effective; yet, without direct and deep regional involvement, international peacemaking is
likely to lack continuity and consistency." 304
If the present inconsistent stance on intervention is to improve, it is necessary to develop

criteria for such interventions along with the development of the means and the will to intervene.
The conditions that would justify intervention to protect human rights have been enumerated in
various scholarly works. 305 These deal with substantive and procedural issues and are considered
either absolute or preferential prerequisites.

4- Possible Criteria for the Use of Armed Force for Humanitarian
Intervention
After discussing the history and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, it is possible to
conclude that the doctrine has a substantial basis in international law and may be used in extreme
circumstances; the basic issue, however, is which circumstances should necessitate humanitarian
intervention. Obviously, international relations are too complicated to determine specific criteria
for the application of humanitarian intervention in all circumstances. Nevertheless, some working
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standards may be formulated if humanitarian intervention is to exist in intemationallaw. 306
Some states support the establishment of formal criteria that have to be met before
intervention can take place, although questions remain over who would set out the criteria and
who would oversee their implementation. Presumably the UN would have a major role in this
process but not all its members share the same views. These criteria seek to establish a set of rules
that advance the goal of building formal processes to overcome the sovereignty and human rights
disconnect. Such guidelines would be helpful for at least two reasons; First, specific criteria
would help in drawing the proper lines between genuine humanitarian intervention and its abuses.
Second, clearly articulated criteria should prevent governments from violating their citizens'
rights 307 and from abusing the right to humanitarian intervention.
Different arguments have been advanced to justify using force to rescue or protect
nationals abroad: (1) an emergency need to save lives; (2) legitimate self-defense, and (3) nonderogation of territorial integrity and political independence of the state in whose territory the
action occurred.
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A classical study of the use of force gave three conditions under which a state

may use force abroad in self-defense to protect its nationals. "There must be (1) an imminent
threat of injury to nationals, (2) a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to
protect them and (3) measures of protection in place strictly confined to the object of protecting
them against injury."
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Similarly, other criteria have been suggested to determine the legality of

humanitarian intervention. 310

306
307
308

See Bazyler, supra note 6 at 598.
Id.

Schachter, supra, note 47, at 145.
Waldock, supra note 36 at 467.
310
Summarizing the worksofRichard B. Lillich and John Bassett Moore, John R. D'Angelo outlined the following

309

290

The intervening states have invoked different arguments to support their actions. For
example, in 1976, the Israeli delegate to the UN, justifying the Entebbe raid, stated that the Israeli
action was self-defense for which they had "no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."
311

He also emphasized that the Israeli government only employed the amount of force strictly

necessary to rescue its citizens.

312

In suggested criteria for using force for humanitarian purposes, one may conclude that

many such criteria should be similar to the criteria for using force in international relations.
Obviously, this conclusion is not surprising because the same criteria should govern any use of
force in international relations. Additional criteria may be added as particular uses of force may
warrant.
All this having been said, a number of authors are against formulating such criteria, as
doing so might provide potential interveners not only with an extra incentive to intervene abroad
but also with the knowledge where to find and exploit loopholes in the law. 93 Others take the view
that it would, nevertheless, be preferable to formulate or even codify these criteria, as the
traditional requirements stipulated by customary international law are necessarily vague and their

factors:
( 1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

the immediacy of the human rights violation;
the extent of the violation human rights
an invitation from an appropriate authority to use forcible self-help
the degree of coercive measures employed
the relative disinterestednessofthe intervening state
minimal effect on authority structure
prompt disengagement consistent with the purposes fthe action
immediate full reporting to the Security Council and appropriate regional organizations. John R. D'Angelo,
Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The US Rescue Mission to Iran and its Legality under
International Law, Va.J. Int'l L. 485,497. (1981).
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clarification could contribute to reinforcing the legal restraints on abuse.

94

Since it would be

utterly unrealistic, moreover, to expect states to refrain from humanitarian intervention in extreme
cases of gross and massive human rights violations which the UN cannot prevent or stop, it would
serve a proper law-promoting purpose to formulate these criteria.
It is worth noting that the fate of the concept of humanitarian intervention in the future

will depend entirely on what intervening states plan to do with it; more precisely, whether they
will use it properly or abuse it. If the community of states is interested in keeping the concept
alive as a morally, politically and legally acceptable instrument, any state venturing to resort to
armed force in protection of human rights abroad should respect the necessity of utmost restraint.
In view of the large-scale abuse made of the concept in the past, any state claiming to plan, or to

be involved in, an act of humanitarian intervention should submit convincing evidence to the
United Nations prior to the intervention, if possible, or immediately during the intervention if
necessary, that the following criteria will be or have been fulfilled.

(A) Threat to Lives and Large-Scale Atrocities
What constitutes "an emergency need to save lives" justifying the use of force?
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It is

easier to justify the use of force when a situation has become violent and there is an imminent
threat to national lives. In 1956, the United Kingdom sought to justify the Anglo-French invasion
of the Suez in this manner.
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The Lord Chancellor informed the House of Lords that "self-

defense undoubtedly includes a situation in which the lives of a state's nationals abroad are
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threatened and it is necessary to intervene on that territory for their protection .... "
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In such a

situation, the state may choose between repatriating its nationals or using force to save them. The
decision depends on many circumstances. Generally, a peaceful solution is preferable.
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In some

cases, however, using force is the state's only alternative. The Israeli rescue action in Entebbe,
Uganda, was the most evident example of state action when citizens' lives were in danger.
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It

was clear that Israeli lives were in danger and the Ugandan government had done nothing to
protect or rescue them. In these circumstances, using force to rescue these citizens was both
legitimate and justifiable.
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The US position was stated in the following manner:

"Israeli action in rescuing the hostages necessarily involved a temporary breach of the
territorial integrity of Uganda. Normally such a breach would be impermissible under the
Charter of the United Nations. However, there is a well-established right to use limited
force to protect one's own nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death where the
state in whose territory they are located is either unwilling or unable to protect them."
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When the threat to lives is imminent, a state may use force but there are many situations when the
threat is not so obvious. For example, should a state be permitted to use force when there is
substantial evidence of imminent danger to nationals? In other words, should a
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state be

allowed to use force in anticipation of an attack against its citizens? The answer has substantial
practical effects because armed force is frequently used in the absence of an attack on nationals.
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This practice has giVen nse to much controversy among international lawyers.

103

In 1842,

Secretary of State Webster utilized a formula relating to the Caroline incident. This formula has
been cited as an example of anticipatory self-defense, although it is quite controversial and not
endorsed unanimously.

104

The British claimed they had a legal right to attack a vessel, the

Caroline, on the US side of the Niagara River in 1837 because the ship carried armed personnel to
support an uprising in Canada. 105 Webster required the British government to show that the
"necessity of that self-defense is instantly overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation." 106 It also had to show that the Canadian authorities did nothing
unreasonable or excessive because the necessity of the self-defense limits the acts that are
justifiable.
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This formulation of self-defense is often cited as authoritative customary international
law. 108 During the Secretary Council debates on the legality of the Israeli bombing of a nuclear
reactor in Iraq, some delegates referred to the Webster formulation of the right of anticipatory
self-defense prior to an actual attack only where such attack is imminent with no time for
negotiation. 109 Regardless of different interpretations and controversial state practice, it is hard to
deny the right to anticipatory self-defense in a nuclear age, due to the potential destruction of a
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nuclear attack. 110 In 1946, the US government offered a new intetpretation of armed attack,
entirely different from that which existed prior to the invention of nuclear weapons. It
encompassed the dropping of an atomic bomb as well as "certain steps in themselves preliminary
to such action." 111 These steps are also required for conventional warfare.

112

It can be argued that

an armed attack on nationals abroad does not necessarily imperil a state's existence.
Ultimately, the fate of a state is linked directly to its citizens' welfare.

113
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It is possible that anticipatory self-defense could become a pretext for interventions and
gross international law violations.

115

The potential for abuse, however, arises with respect to any

rights available to a state. Similarly, a right to self-defense in national law is subject to individual
abuse, but this hardly justifies complete denial of this right.
Large-scale atrocities are the first prerequisite for humanitarian intervention. 116 The target
state's government should be involved in killing, torturing or creating conditions of unbearable
suffering for large numbers of its own citizens. Because the right to life is a fundamental human
right, the international community should not forgive its violation.
This prerequisite raises the issue of what should be considered as massive killing or largescale atrocity. The most obvious answer is that it should be a question of fact to be determined
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according to particular circumstances. The murder of one person is not a reason for humanitarian
intervention, though human losses should not have to amount to millions to justify intervention.
Without a doubt, any government practicing genocide may be a target of humanitarian
intervention. 117 Interestingly enough, the Genocide Convention does not specify the number or
percentage of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group that must be killed to constitute
genocide.

118

But once a situation reached the point where many thousands or millions of lives are

being lost or are at risk of being lost, this possible criteria would probably be met. If any
additional information is needed, it is on the intervening state to acquire such information before
deciding to intervene.
Some scholars propose a balanced approach that would involve weighing "the amount of
destruction which may be caused by armed intervention and the importance of the human rights
sought to be protected." 119 Others have argued for humanitarian intervention not only in cases of
"genocide, enslavement or mass murder, but also to put an end to situations of serious ordinary
oppression." 120 This approach, however, gives too much scope to states, providing them with
unlimited power to employ force in every case violating human rights.
Although every human rights abuse is a violation of international law, it does not
necessarily require the use of force. International law provides numerous alternative methods,
such as diplomatic protests, public condemnations, and various sanctions. The response should
match the abuse, and interventions should not be allowed for small-scale abuses. 121
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Is anticipatory humanitarian intervention permissible? It is possible to draw a line with
rescue operations to save nationals abroad? As discussed, an argument has been made in favor of
anticipatory use of force to protect nationals, but humanitarian intervention is definitely more
unusual and should be considered with more care. The intervening state should have very clear
evidence of atrocities. By only alleging the possibility or imminence of massacres, the intervening
state does not have a substantial basis for intervention. Allowing states to intervene in the event of
merely potential atrocities would create enormous risk of abuse. The intervening state would
become not only a judge, but a supervisor that could dictate how to proceed. Even if the
intervening state crosses the line, its action may be partially warranted in the event of ongoing
abuses but is unlikely to be justified where atrocities are merely pending.

Humanitarian

intervention is a remedy of last resort to be used only in situations of apparent and current
massacre or other serious abuses, after exhausting all other remedies. The intervening state should
attempt all possible peaceful procedures before restoring to force.
In some circumstances, resort to other options may be useless. The intervening state may

use force to stop atrocities when it is apparent that no other remedy is available or efficient. For
example, where the atrocities will proceed with such speed that any delay, even informing the
UN, may bring tremendous casualties, it is conceivable that the intervening state may
immediately intervene and use force for humanitarian ends. 122

(B) Necessity
No state should resort to armed force unless absolutely necessary. Necessity is comprised
of two elements: ( 1) the existence of a danger (2) the nonexistence of reasonable peaceful
122
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altematives. 123 Using Webster's formula, in the context of the Caroline case:
"It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on board the Caroline

was impractical, or would been unavailing; it must be shown that daylight could not be waited
for; that there could be no attempt at discrimination between the innocent and the guilty; that it
would not have been enough to seize and detain the vessel; but that there was a necessity, present
and inevitable, for attacking her in the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and while
unarmed men were asleep on board, killing some and wounding others, and then drawing her into
the current above the cataract, setting her on fire and, careless to know whether there might not be
in her the innocent with the guilty, or the living with the dead, committing her to a fate which fills
the imagination with horror." 124
At first glance, the danger requirement seems self-explanatory. As soon as danger is present, a
state is free to exercise its right to self-defense. In other words, when an armed attack occurs,
armed force may be used to rebut that attack. No future justification is necessary to warrant any
action taken in self-defense; however, particular cases can be more complicated. The international
community is generally skeptical of any use of force. The necessity of using force is questioned
especially when such action is an anticipatory use of force or the threat to nationals' lives is
longstanding.
The presence of danger is closely related to the justification of armed attack. As soon as an
attack is imminent, the necessity for force is justified. Particular circumstances may raise
additional questions but, as a matter of principle, an imminent attack warrants the use of force in
self-defense.
123
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The continuity of threat raises another issue. When a threat is imminent, a state may use
force to defend its nationals. Does the state still posses this right if it is not exercised without
delay? The rescue mission in Iran illustrates this problem. On November 4, 1979, 52 people were
seized and held hostage at the US Embassy in Tehran. Soon after the Security Council adopted
Resolution 457, condemning the capture as illegal and calling for the immediate release of the
hostages.

125

Several days later, the Security Council repeated its ca11. 126 On December 15, 1979,

the ICJ issued an order demanding the release of the hostages. 127 The court pointed out that "a
dispute which concerns diplomatic and consular premises and the detention of internationally
protected persons, and involves the interpretation or application of multilateral conventions
codifying the international law governing diplomatic and consular relations is one which by its
very nature falls within international jurisdiction." 128 The case was before the World Court
despite Iran's refusal to cooperate with the ICJ and the United Nations. 129 Because the case was
presented to different bodies of the UN, it was argued that the US did not have a right to use
military force to rescue the hostages. 130
Judge Lachs, in a separate opinion, stated that the United States, "having instituted
proceedings, is precluded from taking unilateral action, military or otherwise, as if no case is
pending." 131 The International Court of Justice did not agree. It assessed the rescue mission as
moderate and did not attempt to outlaw it. The Court's only criticism was that the US may have
inflamed the situation, and defied the court's earlier order:
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"an operation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind
calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations; and to
recall that in paragraph 47, 1 B of its order of 15 December 1979, the court had indicated
that no action was to be taken by either party which might aggravate the tension between
the two countries." 132
The critical question was whether the hostages were in imminent danger of being executed. 133 The
environment in Tehran and the Iranian government's threatening posture were decisive factors in
the US determination that rescue measures were appropriate.
The state whose nationals are in danger must be given the option to determine whether a
rescue action is necessary; there is no international body or third party in a position to make that
judgment. The rescue action, therefore, cannot be characterized as illegal under international law.
Whether it was wise in a political and military sense is a different matter. 134
In sum, a state has the right to rescue its nationals immediately after their lives are

endangered. An obscure threat, however, does not constitute danger. An actual attack (or at least
an apparent threat where attack is imminent with to no time to negotiate) must have occurred. A
state may use force while its nationals are in danger when its use of force is the last resort.
Because the world community is always very sensitive about the use of force, a state should do its
best to show that all reasonable peaceful measures have been exhausted, using force as the final
alternative. 135 In some circumstances, resorting to other options may be fruitless or inefficient.
For example, the atrocities may be proceeding so rapidly that any delay (no matter how brief)
132
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may result in tremendous casualties.

(C) Exhaustion of Peaceful Measures
An intervening state must exhaust all reasonably available means and avenues ofpeaceful
conflict resolution before resorting to force to stop the criminal behavior. These would include
UN resolutions, diplomatic missions, negotiations, political initiatives and non-forcible
countermeasures such as economic sanctions. A related problem is that of making a balance
between the use of force and peaceful means of settlement. Obviously, peaceful means are
preferable, and every state is obligated to seek redress through such measures. Article 2 of the UN
Charter provides that "all members shall settle their international disputes," 136 and Article 33
requires that member states actively utilize peaceful means to settle any dispute likely to endanger
international peace. 137 On the other hand, the prevailing view among international lawyers is that,
in the absence of a special agreement, states have no international legal obligation to settle or
even attempt to settle, their disputes. In particular, in the absence of a special agreement, a state
has no international legal obligation to submit a dispute with another state to impartial arbitral or
judicial settlement. 138
Any categorical answer to the choice between using force and seeking redress through
peaceful means is unwarranted. 139 Despite a general trend in international law toward peaceful
settlement of disputes, states are not obligated to exhaust peaceful means before resorting to the
forceful rescue of nationals. In a particular situation, a state should carefully balance all pros and
136
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cons of different means and choose the most efficient way to save its nationals' lives abroad.
Different circumstances may dictate a variety of solutions. Ultimately, the state must decide
whether to resort to force, negotiate, or use other peaceful means of settlement. Yet, there may
also be cases where, because the threat is so massive and the situation is evolving so rapidly, that
there might not be time to implement other measures of force before resorting to more forceful
action.

(D) Preference for Collective Measures
Among the peaceful alternatives to the use of force, one of the most critical is collective
measures. Collective measures are generally preferable to unilateral action. They are more likely
to succeed and their legality is unlikely to be questioned, especially by the United Nations.
140

"Collective intervention therefore, in general, possesses a legitimacy which is normally denied

to unilateral intervention." International institutions, however, historically reflect numerous
inefficiencies and failures. Therefore, the intervening state must use its best efforts to gain support
from the world community by exercising all possible peaceful means.
The UN Charter embodies the expectation that, where possible, member states will use
collective measures to avoid unilateral use of force. 141 In principle, the UN resolution is always
preferable to unilateral actions. Unfortunately, international institutions often do not perform
according to their original intent, and member states need them to be more effective.
Even in the aftermath of the Cold War, the UN still is not an effective mechanism to end
140
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human rights violations. Moreover, the UN has been an extremely ineffective enforcement
mechanism. Therefore, it is unlikely that states would rely heavily on the UN. They will continue
to use force unilaterally. This unfortunate reality should not veil the fact that UN members must
use their best efforts to engage the UN's collective intervention. The Persian Gulf War is a perfect
example of the UN's potential to intervene collectively. Regional organizations have also been
effective in stopping large-scale atrocities. Liberia and Kosovo cases are good examples of
regional intervention by ECOWAS and NATO as we have already seen earlier in this study.
Given the unfortunate fact that nations cannot rely on multinational efforts, there will be any
unilateral interventions. Nevertheless, their best efforts should be used to engineer multinational
actions.

(E) Humanitarian Objectives
Military intervention must be truly humanitarian to be justified. Therefore, the intervening
states' motives are particularly important. The problem is to formulate standards to measure the
humanitarian purpose of the intervention, with the following standards as of disinterestedness.
First, intervening states must aim military action at stopping human rights deprivations by
governments. Second, collateral non-humanitarian motives should be such as not to impair or
reduce the first paramount human rights objective of the intervention, so that intervening states
should not use humanitarian motives as cover for overthrowing target state governments or for
other non-humanitarian ends. For example, with respect to the Congo operation, the State
Department of the United States declared "This operation is humanitarian not military. It is
designed to avoid bloodshed not to engage the rebel forces in combat. Its purpose is to accomplish
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its task quickly and withdraw, not to seize or hold territory." 142 Such declarations support the
argument that the intervention was genuinely humanitarian. Third, the means used must always be
rights-inspired. This requirement is violated where the intervener acts to impair human rights
along the way (for example in third nations), even if the true overall aim is to protect human
rights in the target state.
Disinterestedness should not be measured by reference to some mythical "state will" as
evidenced in statements by government officials. Rather, the genuineness of the humanitarian
purpose must be ascertained by examining the concrete actions taken by the intervener in the light
of the human rights objective.
How can the humanitarian purpose mission be reconciled with the violation of a state's
territorial integrity? A rescue mission's main purpose is not to violate territorial integrity or
political independence, but to protect nationals endangered abroad and secure a minimum
international standard ofhuman rights. 143 For example, in the Entebbe situation, it was not Israel's
main purpose to violate Uganda's territorial integrity. The mission was in response to inhuman
behavior and was intended to liberate Israeli nationals held hostage. The temporary and limited
breach of Uganda's territorial integrity was therefore justified. 144 The UN Charter usually
prohibits such a violation of territorial integrity or political independence regardless of the
grievance under which it arose. 145 Nevertheless, the Israeli action was permitted due to the
extraordinary circumstances of this specific case and because of the well-established albeit narrow
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right to use force to protect nationals endangered abroad. 146
Interestingly enough, some highly regarded lawyers argue that there was no violation of
Uganda's territorial integrity or political independence. 147 One commentator stated that "Israel
could argue that in the circumstances its raid at Entebbe was not a use of force against the
political independence or territorial integrity of Uganda, or in any other way contrary to any
purpose of the UN." 148 In addition, two other commentators wrote that "the action of the Israelis
could not possibly have had the effect of threatening the territorial integrity or political
independence ofUganda."

•
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Iflsrael's intention was other than purely humanitarian, the world's

reaction to the mission would have been quite different.
Some of the questions we must ask in order to assess the genuineness of an intervention
are the following: Did troops occupy the territory longer than necessary? Has the intervener
demanded advantages or favors from the target governments? Did the intervener seek to dominate
the target state in some way unrelated to humanitarian concerns? The test I suggest here avoids
the difficulties of trying to determine what state officials really had in mind when they decided to
intervene, whether they said that they were acting out of humanitarian concerns or they cited
some other reason. Their actions, not their words, must count. And the final test will be whether
human rights have been effectively restored as a result of the intervention.

(F) Proportionality
Proportionality means that great care must be taken to ensure that the force used is
146
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proportional to the situation. In other words, military actions must do more good than harm. The
intervener should employ only the amount of troops reasonably necessary to accomplish the
objectives so as to reduce to a minimum the infringement upon the territorial integrity and
political independence of state intervened in. 150 Since humanitarian intervention is being
sanctioned only in response to mass violence and killing, the question of using violence for
situations which are not violent, or relatively not violent, will not come up. However, the force
used should be as surgical as possible so that only the absolute minimum amount of force is used,
and that which is used is proportional to the situation which is being remedied. Also, the force
should only stay as long as it takes to stop the mass violation and loss of life. Sometimes, this
might mean deposing a ruling despot and perhaps putting a country under UN trusteeship for a
time. 150
Proportionality is a fundamental element for determining the legality of the use of force

151

and is closely linked to the necessity of the use of force. In a letter to the British authorities, US
Secretary of State Webster included a requirement of proportionality:

" It will be for (Her Majesty's Government) to show that the local authorities of Canada,
even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the
US at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the necessity of
self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it." 152
Proportionality limited the right to self-defense under classical international law. Although not
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specifically mentioned in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the Charter strictly maintains
proportionality. 153 The proportion of force used in relation to the danger deserves significant
consideration when drawing the line between lawful self-defense and illegal reprisals. Illegal
reprisals consist of action in response to a prior unlawful military attack, aimed not at defending
oneself against an attack as it happens, but rather in delivering a message of deterrence against the
initial attack being repeated. 154 In 1974, acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush wrote that:
"the United States has supported and supports the foregoing principle a duty to refrain
from acts of reprisal involving the use of force. Of course we recognize that the practice of
states is not always consistent with this principle and that it may sometimes be difficult to
distinguish the exercise of proportionate self-defense from an act ofreprisal." 155
Proportionality, as well as necessity, has another practical importance. According to the
International Court of Justice, a state's use of force can still be unlawful, even though it complies
with the rules of necessity and proportionality. 156 Yet, if this activity is not necessary and
proportionate, this may constitute an additional ground of wrongfulness. 157 Even though it is
difficult to define, proportionality is an important question of fact. 158
Proportionality "requires functional reference to all the various factors relating to the
opponent's allegedly aggressive coercion ... which together comprise a detailed context."
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the immediate attack that led to the state's response. In this context, the UN's negative response
to the Grenada invasion demonstrated the world community's intention to limit self-defense and
forbid it to be an instrument of intervention. The main cause of such a negative response was that,
despite unanimous consensus that only a short-term use of armed force is justified, the US
military forces remained in Grenada for nearly two months, long after those Americans who
wished to be evacuated had left. 160 The lesson to be learned from the Grenada invasion is that the
measures taken should be strictly confined to the purposes of protection and, in particular,
military forces should not remain after exercising their protective function.
The numerous fatalities and actual threat to US citizens rendered the invasion in Panama
problematic. Despite the seriousness of the Panama situation, it did not warrant launching a fullscale invasion, eventually consisting of 12,000 American soldiers. This military attack was not
proportional and it resulted in the death of 26 Americans and over 700 Panamanians, mostly
civilians. 161 In addition, severe and widespread physical devastation, property damage and
dislocation resulted. 162 Nevertheless, it is plausible to argue that if more soldiers are deployed,
fewer casualties may occur. In today's war, the preparation of the military force may be the
decisive factor. Therefore, it is conceivable that if fewer soldiers were used in the Panama
invasion, there may have been more casualties.
In comparison to the Panama invasion, Israel's response in the Entebbe case was precisely
proportional. The US specified that the right to protect nationals abroad, "stemming from the right
of self-defense, is limited to such use of force as is necessary and appropriate to protect threatened
160
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nationals from injury." 163 In this statement, the United States emphasized that its right to protect
nationals abroad was limited and must adhere to certain standards. In 1976, this approach was
also highlighted in the Legal Advisor of the Department of State's internal memorandum to the
Secretary of State regarding this incident:
"The Israeli military action was limited to the sole objective of releasing the passengers
and crew, and terminated when that objective was accomplished. The force employed
seems reasonably justifiable as necessary for the rescue of the passengers and crew; the
killing of Palestinians themselves for obvious reasons; the firing on Ugandan troops
because they involved themselves in the conflict; and the destruction of Ugandan aircraft
to eliminate the possibility of pursuit of the Israeli force." 164
Because this operation was carefully proportionate, only three hostages, one Israeli commando,
seven Palestinians, and some Ugandan soldiers were killed. 165
With respect to the Congo operation, commentators have made this same point. Personnel
engaged were under orders to use force only in their own self-defense or in the defense of the
foreigners or Congolese. They will depart from the scene as soon as their evacuation mission was
accomplished. 166
The foregoing examples reemphasize the importance of proportionality. To be
proportionate, a state's response should be limited in intensity and magnitude to what is
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reasonably necessary to secure the permissible objectives of self-defense. 167 Because a rescue
mission aims to protect nationals' lives abroad, the military operation should limit its scope to
protecting lives and preventing future attacks. On the other hand, it should not be too restrictive.
In principle, the rescue operation may allow a state to retaliate beyond the immediate area of

attack, when that state has sufficient reason to expect a continuation of attack (with substantial
military weapons) from the same source. Such action would not be "anticipatory" because prior
attacks occurred; nor would it be a "reprisal" since its prime motive would be protective, not
punitive. Thus, defensive retaliation may be justified when a state has good reason to expect a
series of attacks from the same source and such retaliation serves as a deterrent or protective
action.

168

A state undertaking a rescue mission should be careful to avoid civilian casualties. A

commitment to save human lives should not be transformed into a brutal massacre of civilians. A
state has an obligation to balance possible civilian casualties against the threat to nationals' lives.
Proportionality plays an important role in distinguishing genuine humanitarian
intervention from abuses. As we noted, actions of a state in self-defense should be proportionate
to the attack. The same is true to humanitarian interventions. If an intervening state delays the
evacuation of its soldiers after an invasion, this delay may indicate that the action has transcended
the confines of appropriate humanitarian intervention. The world community generally views
such activity with suspicion. Similarly, if an intervening state uses more soldiers than necessary to
stop a massacre, the world community may doubt the credibility of the state's humanitarian
motives.
An important debate is whether a group of states could undertake an intervention without
167
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UN authorization. If UN authority were not required for humanitarian intervention then this
would be an alteration to the present restrictions on the use of force and a major dilution of UN
power. However, if these criteria were simply adopted by the UN then this might be seen as a
refinement of Chapter VII and reinforce the notion that a humanitarian disaster is a threat to
international peace and security.
Some states are wary over relinquishing the protection that the UN affords them. They
envisage the retention of a UN structure that preserves the primacy of the state in providing
security for the population of a state. Others suggest that if a state is not providing security for all
its population, then protection of human rights should be the prime consideration. 169
Finally, critics suggest that establishing formal criteria for humanitarian intervention
would generate expectations that if those criteria can be met, intervention will take place. 170
Positive intervention from anyone, despite the possibility that the above criteria could be met, has
only involved a small number of states at one point in time, but might culminate into something
quite disastrous. Defining when abuses are grave or when there is a disaster is highly subjective
and the nature of the decision, whether it is made by the UN Security Council or a coalition of
concerned states, would inevitably be highly politicized. 171
In the debate over humanitarian intervention, a certain real fact remains. Decision making

in states is driven by a variety of factors, with humanitarian concern being only one. Decisions by
states, whether in the Security Council or with allies, cover a variety of considerations including
political, military and economic interests. Criteria for intervention might usefully be formulated to
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guide conduct in an intervention (proportional use of force, high probability of success, clear and
articulated goals, post-conflict plans, following laws of war, (etc.) but are unlikely to form the
only basis of a decision to intervene. This does not mean that the exercise of formalizing criteria
is necessarily useless. Some see it as desirable to establish criteria as a guide and as an ideal.
Others suggest, however, that given the nature of international relations, it should not be expected
that rules for humanitarian intervention would regulate conduct absolutely.
Since it would appear to be impossible in the post-cold war era to raise sufficient support
for any effort to codify these criteria, or even formulate them in a non-binding UN General
Assembly resolution, the only alternative available to promote their adoption and implementation
in state practice, probably, is to suggest that as many international lawyers as possible should
express their support for them in their writings.

In sum, the object of deliberating the issues discussed in this chapter is to reduce the
dangers of abuse by proposing a standard against which to judge humanitarian intervention. As
Minear suggests, the process of negotiating the new ground rules or trigger mechanism would
help to de-politicize some of the post-Cold War conflicts and might gain the consent of a reluctant
government or rebel group, or failing that, could help to isolate an entity unwilling to cooperate.(
However, the establishment of such a standard is no guarantee that states would enforce it unless
they considered it to be in their self-interest to do so. Nevertheless, it is important that the issues
and criteria discussed here should be seriously reconsidered with a view to improving them for
acceptance by the international community.
The difficulty in making use of epistemic communities is the lack of consensus within the
various bodies, even on the question of the desirability of codifying the principles of humanitarian
312

intervention. At the very least, however, primitive epistemic communities or epistemic like
communities working within and outside the UN system could start to explore how a widespread
consensus could be reached on the feasibility of such an undertaking. Here the dissemination and
diffusion of ideas on, among other things, the changing character of state sovereignty is
important.
The nature of the increasing support for Post-Cold War humanitarian interventions
presents an opportunity to push forward the idea of codification. This undertaking is worth
pursuing if the international community builds upon the present practice of humanitarian
intervention for the future. Epistemic communities can assist in this endeavor by laying the
foundation through enlisting widespread support for the idea and its eventual reality.

5- The Possibility of Abuses
It is not clear what is meant by "abuse." One possible interpretation is that the intervening

state abuses when it does not aim its action at stopping human rights violations. This is enough to
turn the intervention into aggression. But there is an alternative interpretation. Some legal
scholars approach this problem as one of disinterestedness. In this view a necessary condition for
the justification of humanitarian intervention is that the interveners act purely out of humanitarian
concerns.
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A state acts abusively by this standard if it harbors a hidden agenda or if its main

motives are selfish. If we are concerned with human rights, we should look at whether the
intervention has rescued the victims of oppression, and whether human rights have been restored.
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The intervener must also employ means that are consistent with the humanitarian purposes.

173

But, unless other motivations have resulted in further oppression by the interveners (including
political subjugation), they do not necessarily count against the morality of the intervention. It is
not immoral for a government to act out of humanitarian and self-interested motives at the same
time. The true test is whether the intervention has put an end to human rights deprivations. That is
sufficient to meet the requirement of disinterestedness, even if there are other, non-humanitarian
reasons behind the intervention. There is nothing wrong in a government trying at the same time
to rescue foreign victims of oppression and to legitimately advance the interests of its own
citizens, provided that the self-interested action dies not impair the main humanitarian objective.
Humanitarian intervention is thus justified not because the motives of the intervening government
are pure, but because "its various motives converge on a single course of action that is also the
course of action called for by the victims of oppression." 174
The opponents of humanitarian intervention frequently use the possibility of abuse to
support their position against intervention. The opponents argue that interventions for allegedly
humanitarian purposes were a cover that "permitted outside powers to invade sovereign states for
all sorts of illegitimate reasons, but primarily to prevent the indigenous people from changing the
religion, or especially, the socio-economic systems imposed by their governments."
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Many

countries are concerned that they are more likely to be considered a humanitarian intervention
target than an intervening state exercising a right to humanitarian intervention.
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Another

For an application of this standard to the United States intervention in Nicaragua, see infra, Chapter 10.
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commentator presented humanitarian intervention as "simply a cloak of legality for the use of
brute force by a powerful state against a weaker one, and experience has shown how readily more
powerful states have used the pretext of a higher good to impose their will and values on weaker
177

states."

Such violations and abuses have existed in the history of international relations. The
doctrine of humanitarian intervention has often been used to achieve unlawful and criminal
ends. 178 Opponents of humanitarian intervention argue that even when humanitarian intervention
is undertaken for proper ends and is relatively successful, it may cost too much in terms of human
lives, injuries and disruptions to normal life. The Somalia case is a good example. 179
The fact that the use of force for humanitarian purposes is susceptible to abuse or may
lead to casualties is too important to ignore. In today' s world, it is too dangerous to provide some
governments with an instrument that allows them to circumvent conventional means of peaceful
dispute settlement and increase their capacity to violate international law. Nevertheless, the
potential for abuse is not sufficient to reject humanitarian intervention. Even lawful and welljustified rules can be abused.
rule.
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The potential for abuse is common to all legal policy, doctrine or
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potential wrongdoer can usually fmd many other suitable excuses and pretexts. Although Adolph
Hitler relied on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in his unconvincing attempt to
legitimize the annexing of Poland and Czechoslovakia, nothing would have prevented him from
using another pretext if the doctrine of humanitarian intervention had been unavailable. 182 Hitler
would simply have found another false justification for invasion. The harm still would have
occurred.

183

"Foreign policy is too intricate a topic to suffer any total taboos."

184

On the other

hand, humanitarian intervention "should not be allowed to become a regular and routine feature of
the governmental process, cast in the concrete of unquestioned habit and institutionalized
bureaucracy."

185

To prevent abuse, the foregoing criteria may be a useful guide to appraise an

act's lawfulness.

6- Recent Trends in Intervention
It is worth noting that all of the military interventions of the 1990s were more legitimate

than the earlier cases. Rather than remaining on the sidelines, the Security Council was seized by
each of them and made decisions authorizing coercion. Unlike the earlier cases, in which the
rescue of nationals and self-defense were the prominent justifications, the conscience-shocking
and truly "humanitarian" elements of the post-1990 cases were explicitly recognized as important
justifications for international action. Instead of single state military operations, the interventions
of the 1990s were also genuinely multilateral.
During this period, the forms of non-consensual intervention shifted. It was a decade of
182
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profound change for two forms of intervention, sanctions and international criminal prosecutions.
The 1990s have been labeled the "sanctions decade" because the Security Council imposed more
than twelve sanction regimes, several times more than in the previous 40 years combined. As well
as being used more frequently, sanctions were also applied more widely, including against nonstate actors in Angola and Cambodia and other places.186 The frequent resort to sanctions
occurred despite the fact that most observers criticized their political inefficiency and devastating
humanitarian consequences. 187 Ultimately, the Charter's call to use non-forcible before forcible
measures may have a less than optimal humanitarian result. Some advocate moving toward
"smart sanctions" designed to target regime leaders while minimizing the impact on the general
population,

188

while others call for the application of deadly force sooner rather than later.

International criminal prosecution was another type of intervention that, for the first time
since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, was employed to bring to justice those
who had committed crimes against humanity. A number of recent legal decisions suggest
considerable erosion of the rules relating to the immunity of states and their leaders. These have
long provided that leading officials (including retired ones) of a state cannot be tried in courts in
another country for acts committed in their own state and in the exercise of their official duties. 189
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Although the Genocide Convention specially calls for punishing perpetrators ''whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals," state practice over
decades had overwhelming supported the notion of sovereign immunity.

190

The fight to establish limits to impunity received a boost with the establishment of the
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994,
respectively. More recent violence in Burundi, the Congo and East Timor has led to calls for
additional ad hoc tribunals. Dissatisfaction with early institutional shortcomings for both the
Rwandan and the former Yugoslavian tribunals demonstrated to many observers the need for a
permanent court. In 1998 the International Criminal Court (ICC) was created. However,
international agreement on the independence of the prosecutor and the court 's jurisdiction over
internal conflicts and disturbances suggests that criminal prosecution could become a common,
rather than an ad hoc, response in the face of large scale atrocities.
Questions related to the legality of intervention for humanitarian purposes are also
relevant to non-military intervention. The Security Council has the legal capacity both to
authorize intervention and to delegate needed authority to regional bodies. Sanctions have been
crime was committed and the court in which the action was brought. More generally, moves to negotiate the draft
Convention into existence failed.
178
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imposed without Council authorization by regional bodies or unilaterally.
The most substantive departure in the post-Cold War era, however, remains the Security
Council's willingness to authorize military action in response to matters that were to be solely
within the domestic jurisdiction of states.
The most basic transformation in the use of Security Council powers in the post-Cold War
era is that civil war and internal strife have been described as threats to international peace and
security and may, therefore, be the basis for Chapter VII enforcement action. This development
was virtually inconceivable during the Cold War, when similar conflicts were not considered to
constitute such threats. Yet, by 1995, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia summarized that it is the "settled practice of the Security Council and
the common understanding of the United Nations membership in general" that a purely internal
armed conflict may constitute a "threat to the peace." 191
Substantial flows of refugees have been deemed by the Security Council to constitute a
threat to international peace and security. This has enabled them to justify Chapter VII actions to
create safe havens in the Balkans and Rwanda. The Council also determined that "serious" or
"systematic, widespread and flagrant" violations of international humanitarian law within a
country also threaten international peace and security. This undoubtedly represents a considerable
stretch for those who are familiar with the convictions of the framers of the UN Charter. But
resolutions establishing the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia did not indicate that violations of humanitarian law were a threat to international
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peace and security, a position strongly supported by the ICRC and other humanitarian agencies. 192
There has been, therefore, a gradual shift away from strict reliance on the transboundary
implications of a humanitarian situation as the determining factor.
Some have argued that the ever-widening definition of international peace and security is
artificial and unsustainable, and that more explicit grounds for intervention to protect civilians
should be developed. For example, the Independent Commission on Global Governance proposed
"an appropriate Charter amendment permitting such intervention but restricting it to cases that
constitute a violation of the security of people so gross and extreme that it requires an
international response on humanitarian grounds." 193
If humanitarian and human rights tragedies can be squeezed under the rubric of
international peace and security, the restoration of democracy within a country demands even
more leeway. In this light, operation Restore Democracy in Haiti can be seen as a high watermark
of Council activism in the 1990s. The unprecedented authorization called for the use of force to
remove one regime and stall another. It has been argued that this foreshadows the emergence of a
more general norm of intervention in support of democracy, a proposition that finds limited
support in the amended OAS Charter. 194 ##

192

International Committee ofthe Red Cross, "Report on the Protection of the War Victims," International Review of
the Red Cross 296 (September-October 1993), pp. 391-445.
193
The Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.
90.
194
Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? P. 98. Some scholars argue that the absence of democracy may itself
constitute a threat to international peace and security. This is an extreme form of the democratic peace thesis that
authentic democracies do not fight each other, or, depending on the definition of "democracy" or fighting, that such
conflicts are exceptional. Depending on the definitions, application of this thesis would mean that around one-third of
the world's states could be deprived of the protection of Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. See Tom J. Farer,
"Collective Defending Democracy in a world of Sovereign States: The western Hemisphere's Prospect," Human
Rights Quarterly 15, November 1993., pp.716-750.

320

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention in Islam and
Christianity

(1) Introduction
At a time when some informed Muslims believe Islam to be "set on a collision course with
the West" and some Christians warn of a possible "irrational but surely historical reaction of an
ancient rival against our Judea-Christian heritage, "313 it may be helpful to ask what both traditions
teach about the current issues of joint concern. One of the most urgent of these issues is the
question of humanitarian intervention. Setting aside broader questions of interpretation, such as
the extent to which Islam can be identified with political radicalism and Christianity with Western
political interests, this chapter compares Muslim and Christian teachings on this issue. Both
traditions have had to confront questions of political violence, suffering and war since at least the
time of the conversion of Constantine in one case ( 1600 years ago) and the founding of the first
Islamic state at Medina in the other (1300 years ago). The central argument in this chapter is that
there is a surprising measure of agreement between the two traditions on the question of
humanitarian intervention, enough to provide the basis for a shared doctrine.

A Search for Consensus
The question of humanitarian intervention has become an urgent and highly contentious
313

Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim rage," Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, p. 60.
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one in 1990s for Muslims and Christians alike as humanitarian crises associated with a series of
"complex emergencies" have faced the international community. Both Muslims and Christians
have been implicated as aggressors and have suffered as victims in these situations. In some
cases, Christians have persecuted Muslims (Bosnia); in others, Muslims have persecuted
Christians; and Muslims have persecuted Muslims (Iraq) and Christians have persecuted
Christians (Croatia).4 Impassioned, if inconsistent, calls for humanitarian intervention have come
from both faith communities. Where there has been collective military intervention on supposedly
humanitarian grounds, associated in some cases ambiguously with the UN Security Council
resolutions- as in Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Zaire- the governments of
both predominantly Muslim and predominantly Christians countries have voted for these
resolutions and provided troops for subsequent missions. 5 On the Muslim side, the two leading
troop suppliers for UN peace-keeping and observer missions worldwide in 1996 were Pakistan
and Bangladesh, while in Somalia the first UN Secretary General's special representative and the
first force commander of the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) were
Muslims. Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic also contributed military forces in Somalia.
The question of humanitarian intervention is not a new one but it has assumed new
dimensions with the end of the Cold War. 314In terms of international law, there has been a shift of
concern in humanitarian intervention debate from UN Charter Article 2(4) (the legitimacy of
4
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cross-border military action by states) to UN Charter Article 2(7) (the legitimacy of intervention
by the UN in the internal affairs of states, as we saw earlier). This has revived older conceptual
categories, apparently eclipsed by modem statist orthodoxy, from within Muslim and Christian
tradition, raising deep questions about conflicting values of order and justice enshrined in the
character, the desirability or possibility of reform of the United Nations, and the nature of
international collectivity itself. These are issues of great concern to both Muslims and Christians,
and there can be no prospect of collective international response - or even, I would argue, of
genuine humanitarian response- unless it embodies a cross-cultural international consensus that
includes both faith communities. This chapter compares Christian and Islamic teachings on the
question of humanitarian intervention in order to determine the scope for possible doctrinal
concurrence.

(2) Christianity and Humanitarian Intervention
Controversy on the issue of humanitarian intervention within the Christian tradition goes
back to the break up of the universal Roman church in the Reformation and the end of the Holy
Roman Empire's authority with the emergence of the modem state system. In the earlier period,
no fundamental inconsistencies had been thought possible between the jus naturale (natural law)and the corpus of canon and civil law that flowed from it and applied throughout Latin
Christendom- and thejus gentium (law of nations), which governed dealings with foreigners such
as Tartars, Greeks and Saracens. 315 However, with the slow emergence of the concept of the
secular sovereign state, heralded by Jean Bodin and Albercio Gentili in the 16th century and
315
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reappearing in the cuius regio eius religio clauses of the Peace of Westphalia, the earlier unity of
Latin Christendom was progressively replaced by an "international anarchy" in which states no
longer recognized superior universal jurisdiction. 316 In that situation, did states have the right to
wage war, not only in defense of their own interests but also in order to protect the citizens of
other states from abuse by their own governments? Early commentators such as Gentili thought
that they did. Grotius endorsed Gentili's position, albeit with some caution:
"The fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights equal to those
of kings, have the right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries
committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do
not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to
any persons whatsoever ... Truly it is more honorable to avenge the wrongs of others rather
than one's own." 317
Here was an adaptation of earlier traditions in which "defense of the innocent" was allowed as a
"just cause" for a war, a tradition that went back at least as far as Augustine, and is also found in
codes of chivalry. 318 Grotius did not have a modem conception of intervention because he did not
see an intermediate condition between peace and war, and he envisaged a "solidarist"
international community of humankind in which natural law applied to individuals as well as
states. 319
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(A)- Order Versus Justice
It was in the eighteenth century, in the writings of Christian Wolff and Emerich de

Vattel, that the principle of non-intervention received its first explicit manifestation, although not

°

its technical definition. 32 From then on, what alter came to be called international law was seen
by most jurists to apply solely to states, not individuals; as Vattel put it, "The natural society of
states cannot continue unless the rights which belong to each by nature are respected." 321 At this
point, the new statist non-intervention prohibition, championed as the foundation of international
order by some, came into direct conflict with the older solidarist tradition that recognized
governments' duties and rights to defend humanitarian values wherever they were threatened in
the name of international justice. The debate deepened when the idea ofprincely sovereignty gave
way to the idea of popular sovereignty at the time of the American and French revolutions. The
key question then became: If particular governments lose inner legitimacy because they violate or
fail to protect the natural rights of their citizens, do they by the same token forfeit international
legitimacy?
This discrepancy was never satisfactorily overcome. It reappeared in nineteenth-and
early -twentieth-century discussions about the rights and duties of Christian European powers to
intervene to protect threatened populations elsewhere, particularly in the Ottoman Empire. The
UN Charter itself contains an underlying tension between what Lori Fisher Darnrosch has called
the two "clusters of values" that lie at its core: "state system values" provided by the nonintervention norm enshrined in Articles 2(4) and 2(7), and "human rights values" enshrined in
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Articles 1(3), 55, and 56. 322

(B)- Just War Perspective
All of these irmer contradictions and disputes are reflected in contemporary Christian
thinking, with Christian realists in the tradition of Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian pacifists
unlikely bedfellows in opposing humanitarian intervention, albeit on very different grounds, and
many Christians in what might be called the broad "just war" tradition prepared to countenance it
under certain circumstances. 323
It is difficult to fmd a consensus or even a central tradition here. In the transformed post-

Cold War situation, however, where gross human suffering is associated with protracted internal
conflict and incipient state collapse, where the question of "consent" is ambiguous, and where the
possibility of concerted action through regional organizations and the United Nations is possible,
there appears to be more agreement.
Interviews with spokespersons from different churches suggest that a majority of them
accept Christian doctrine as teaching that governments are not only responsible for their own
citizens, but also have a duty of concern for people in other countries; the non-intervention rule in
international law should not be a shield behind which atrocities can be committed with impunity;
where basic subsistence and security needs or rights are threatened, international action to sustain
and protect below the level of the use of force should be pursued vigorously; and in extreme
circumstances, military force can and should be used by governments to protect the innocent in
322
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other countries. 324
Some doubt whether circumstances are ever likely to be right. A minority of them, while
endorsing vigorous cross-border humanitarian concern, rule out the use of force for Christians on
pacifist grounds. For these spokespersons, even an apparently benign use of military force
presupposes the whole machinery of militarism, itself considered an evil that Christians should
not condone. They see the resort to force as representing a tragic failure by the international
community to act better.
There is, therefore, no general approach common to these various Christian
perspectives. Within all of them, however, we may note the persistence of what Alan Donagan
calls the "common morality" of the original natural law tradition. 325 By implying "positive
concern for the welfare of people outside one's own community," this tradition is thought by
many Christians to provide the normative grounds for a justified humanitarian use of force across
international borders. 326 This is also reflected in the papal insistence:
"The conscience of humankind, sustained henceforth by its liability to international human
rights, asks that humanitarian interference be rendered mandatory in situations which
gravely compromise the survival of entire peoples and ethnic groups: this is an obligation
for both individual nations and the international community as a whole. "327
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(C)The Case of Bosnia
When war erupted with devastating force in Bosnia in April 1992, the international
community in theory had three broad military options: abstention or withdrawal (because there
already were United Nations Prospective Force (UNPROFOR) troops in Bosnia), enforcement,
and non-forcible "peacekeeping." The international community drifted into the non-forcible
peacekeeping option over the summer of 1992, and there it remained until UNPROFOR was
reconstituted by the pulling back of vulnerable contingents and the deployment of the more
heavily armed Rapid Reaction Force before "Operation Deliberate Force" began on August 30,
1995. The NATO-constituted Implementation Force (IFOR) subsequently took over as part of the
Dayton Agreement. 328 In the period between April 1992 and August 1995, despite extensive and
successful relief work, the international community clearly failed to prevent large-scale
humanitarian atrocities, including blatant massacres in specially designated UN-protected "safe
areas." As the catalog of violations grew, so did the calls for forcible action to end them. How
does this relate to the Christian thinking on humanitarian intervention outlined above?
It must be acknowledged that there is substance to the criticisms that some Christian

churches contributed to the tide of intolerance and that reactions were often decidedly partisan.
For example, there was significant Christian support both from within Croatia and from the
Serbian Orthodox Church for nationalist policies in Bosnia. While at times condemning "violence
and crimes from whatever side they come, "329 Serb church leaders in general failed to comment
upon or even acknowledge Serb atrocities in Bosnia. They seem to have shared many of the
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perceptions of their fellow Serbs, including denial that humanitarian abuses were perpetrated on
the scale claimed by outsiders, assertions that blame was shared by Croats and Muslims, and
insistence that the whole humanitarian agenda, including the activities of UNPROFOR, was in
any case a political program promoted for reasons of self-interest by their enemies. Serbs were
seen as the victims of European history. Other Orthodox churches, the Russian Orthodox for
example, reacted comparably. At a lower level, many clergy and bishops expressed solidarity
with their Slav Orthodox brothers, and few of them criticized the atrocities. 330
Christian churches elsewhere were also divided on the question of humanitarian
intervention, and many of them simply endorsed the policy lines followed by their respective
governments. The reaction of the British churches, for example, was criticized by Adrian
Hastings in this attack on a 1993 Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland report on the
Bosnian situation:
"The overall impression of these and other documents is of an amazing inability to face up
to the reality of evil and to grapple responsibly and clear-mindedly with a moral crisis comparable
to the Holocaust. On the one hand the ecumenical desire not to upset the Serb Orthodox Church
and, on the other, willingness to swallow whole the political line of the Foreign Office and the
European Community, have completely nullified any prophetic voice on the part of central church
leadership." 331
In answer to such criticism, three main points are usually made. First, that the churches

were not silent or inactive on the Bosnian conflict. From the beginning visits were made to
Bosnia, expressions of outrage were unanimous, and strong representations were made to the
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British government to do everything possible to stop atrocities. A 1992 message from Cardinal
Basil Hume to the British Prime Minister can be taken as representative:
"we are faced with atrocities in Bosnia, some committed in the name of "ethnic cleansing"
which is horrifying and totally unacceptable, and they cannot be allowed to continue. It is
not for me, as a churchman, to defme what would be politically and militarily acceptable,
but people are looking for an early response which needs to be effective and sustainable in
bringing humanitarian relief to those who are suffering, particularly the Muslim
community, and also a cessation ofhostilities." 332
The second point is that Christian churches did not speak with one voice, nor was there an
agreed "Church of England" position. Nevertheless, strenuous efforts were made to respond
ecumenically, including attempts at solidarity with Jewish and Muslim representatives and
communities.
The third point is that many Christian leaders found it difficult to pronounce on political
options, particularly those to do with the possible use of military force. In a joint letter to the
Times (London) on July 14, 1995, at the time of the Srebrenica atrocities, the Archbishop of
Canterbury, the Archbishop of Westminster, the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council,
and the Chief Rabbi condemned these outrages: "Events in recent days have highlighted once
again the barbarity of those who murder, terrorize and oppress people in Bosnia." But they went
on to say that "as religious leaders we are not competent to judge between the agonizingly
difficult military and political choices which are now facing the international community." It was
hard to find a consensus on these issues within the Christian churches in Britain. Nevertheless, by
the late summer of 1995, there seemed to be a large body of opinion supporting the enforcement
332
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option. The Church of Scotland stated: "so terrible is the plight of the victims of this conflict that
no immediate means of ending the violence apart from the commitment of the United Nations
troops seems available. "333
An open letter to all victims of "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia, titled the

Sarajevo Charter, which was endorsed by, among others, the bishops of Oxford, Hereford and
Barking, was an unequivocal call to undertake humanitarian intervention. 334
The horrors of the Bosnian war have provided what is probably the most strenuous test of
Christian thinking on the question of humanitarian intervention so far in the 1990s. This survey of
opinion from within the British churches suggests that, though a majority of them favor the
principle of humanitarian intervention, national church leaders held back from making specific
recommendations in a situation over which public opinion was divided, government policy was
opposed, political-military outcomes were seen to be uncertain, and there was a real prospect that
..

British lives might be lost. In other words, there is majority support for a general doctrine of
humanitarian intervention, derived from, among other things, a revival of traditional prestatist
Christian natural law thinking, but this is supported only "under certain circumstances"-and as yet
there is no clarity or consistency in determining what those circumstances might be.

3- Islam and Humanitarian Intervention

At the political level, since the 1950s there has been as much inconsistency within the
Islamic as within the Christian world on the concept of humanitarian intervention. On the one
333
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hand, many governments of predominantly Muslim countries have been firmly opposed to
anything that might revive colonial domination and thus reluctant to the idea of humanitarian
intervention. This deep, historically conditioned objection dates back at least as far as the period
in the nineteenth century when most supposed cases of humanitarian intervention involved
intervention by European powers in parts of the Ottoman Empire- the only Muslim power to be
accepted on anything like equal terms as a member of the international "society of states." 6 The
principle of non-intervention has been regularly cited as foundational for regional organizations
with strong Muslim memberships, such as the Organization of African Unity and the Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the case of ASEAN, since its formation in 1967
members have explicitly adhered to the "Asian way," in which governments support each otherfor example against communist insurgents-but on no account meddle in each other's domestic
affairs, observing the "rule of silence" when disagreement threatens. 335 Western attempts to link
aid to human rights or to orchestrate protest against Indonesia for the Dili massacre in East Timor
were branded by Malaysia as "cultural imperialism" and part of a global campaign "to make us
permanent developing countries," in the words of Prime Minister Mohamed Mahathir. 336
On the other hand, in different circumstances the governments of predominantly Muslim
countries have been prominent in not only allowing but demanding intervention to uphold
international human rights. For example, with reference to South Africa, it was the Tunisian
representative at the United Nations who in 1961 declared that protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms was the essential purpose of the UN, and that the organization would dig
6
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its own grave if it tolerated abuses and failed to intervene. As we have seen earlier, similar calls
for intervention have been voiced in the 1990s in response to the victimization of Muslims in
recent humanitarian crises, particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo, as can be seen in this impassioned
appeal from Mustafa Cericthe "leader of the Muslim Religious Council" in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
in July 1993:

"A fascist invasion has taken over 200,000 lives, raped tens of thousands of Muslim
women, destroyed over eight hundred Muslim holy places, and driven more than a million
Muslims from their homes. Therefore, we address ourselves to all Muslim Imams
throughout the world in the name of Islamic compassion; to all Christian dignitaries of the

..

Catholic Orthodox and Protestant churches in the name of Christian love; to all Jewish
rabbis in the name of Talmudic justice; to all Buddhist priests in the name of Buddha's
enlightenment; and all those who nurture in their hearts a spark of humanity: we call upon
them, through the force of their faith and love, to open up a path to Sarajevo, and thus save
hope and belief in the dignity of man and universal divine and human values."7

(1) The Community of Muslims (umma wah ida)
The Qur'anic concept of the umma wahida

8

or a single community of Muslims

(potentially a community of all humankind) long predates the modem secular state and is widely
seen to overrule it. All other divisions, including ethnic, racial or national difference are
7
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secondary: Allah (God) made humankind into "nations and tribes" for self-understanding and
...

interaction "so that you may get to know one another" 9 but for no deeper purpose. Exclusive
nationality and state sovereignty are not foundational concepts in Islamic law. The majority of
Muslim states that are members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) are recent

o-

creations, often within what are seen as artificial ex-colonial borders. As members of the United
Nations, their governments have signed up to the international instruments that define statehood

..

in contemporary international law. But, it seems fair to say, there is still a great deal of work to do
to relate traditional Islamic law to this relatively recent set of circumstances in a way that satisfies
Islamic legal principles. The OIC itself, for example, voted in 1980 to set up an International

v

Islamic Law Commission "to devise ways and means to secure representation in order to put
forward the Islamic point of view before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other such

~

institutions of the United Nations when a question requiring the projection of Islamic views arises
~

therein," but as yet it has failed to do so. 10
The importance of all this for the question of humanitarian intervention is that Islamic
jurisprudence overwhelmingly tends to recognize the Qur'anic umma, not the state, as the

(

foundational element in international law, so that the question of overriding a statist nonintervention norm to protect the vulnerable technically does not arise. The onus is all the other
,....

way: "The burden of proof lies with those who would challenge the right of intervention on
grounds of sovereignty rather than on those who assert it." 11

'
t
9

Qur'an 49: 13.
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(2)The Ethical Basis of Intervention
How can the political espousal of statist non-intervention principles by a number of
governments of Muslim countries and the absence of clear teaching on the status of the modem
state in Islamic law be reconciled? Perhaps the best way to respond is to tum, finally, to the
ethical dimension and, recognizing that the political, the legal and the ethical are inexorably
intertwined in Islamic doctrine, to ask with Sohail Hashmi: "Is there an Islamic ethic of
humanitarian intervention?" A moral obligation is laid upon Muslims "to order that which is right
and to forbid that which is wrong" (Qur'an 3:104), which includes the defense of the vulnerable
against injustice and oppression. This is the authentic voice of humanitarianism, in which
principles of humanity, impartiality and universality are firmly grounded in the duty of obedience
all Muslims owe to divine command. What happens if these orders are violated and vulnerable
populations are threatened by or actually suffer injustice and oppression on a massive scale, either
in Muslim or non-Muslim countries?
Hashmi identifies three schools of modem Islamic thought on the relationship between
Islamic tradition and the nation state. The first is a diffuse secular school in which the traditional
concept ofthe Muslim community is "stripped of substantive political content" and in some cases
rejected in favor of rapid modernization and state building. Despite its historical significance in
relation to modernizers like Kamal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran, this group is
considered marginal today.
The second group tries to reconcile Islamic tradition and the modem state system, for
example, by arguing in the vein of Mohamed Iqbal (influential ideologue of the new Pakistani
state) that nation states represent a temporary phase of human development, useful in this era, but
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to be condemned strongly when "regarded as the ultimate expression of the life of mankind." As
Hashmi puts it "modernist Muslim intellectuals cannot be embraced as the summum bonum of
Islamic political life. "337
Finally, there are those such as Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, Abu'-A'la Mawdudi in the Indian subcontinent, and Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini in Iran, who reject the nation state as an un-Islamic relic of European colonialism.
From this perspective the significant distinction is not between states, but between the Dar a/-

Harb (home of war) and the Dar al-Islam (home of Islam).
These debates are as yet unresolved. But, within what is broadly the second approach,
which is indicative of mainstream academic Muslim opinion, there is still a clear trend in favor of
humanitarian intervention. As Zaki Badawi puts it:
"The notion of the state is not very clear in the Muslim perspective; but we have now
recognized and accepted it, so a Muslim country may not intervene in the internal affairs
of another state, provided- and this is a very important proviso- that the internal war is not
a war against a Muslim community or a weak community. If it is a power struggle
between two generals, say, you would not intervene. But if a minority is singled out for
oppression, then it is incumbent on Muslims, or for that matter the international
community, to intervene. "338
Up to this point, therefore, Islamic teaching can be seen to coincide with the Christian
natural law tradition in recognizing a theoretical basis for humanitarian intervention. And, just as
within the Christian tradition, this is seen as a revival of earlier just war categories going back at
337
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least to the time of St. Augustine. So, within the Islamic tradition it is seen to take its place within
the broad Qur'anic tradition of jihad. The command to act justly and enforce justice clearly
includes a duty to wage war for the protection of the weak, the vulnerable and the helpless as laid
down in the Qur'an:
"How should you not fight for the cause of Allah and for the feeble among men and of the
women and children who are crying: Our Lord! Bring us forth from out this town of which
the people are oppressors! Oh, give us from Thy presence some protecting friend. Oh, give
us from Thy presence some defender!" (4:75).

When to Intervene
As in the case of Christian approaches, there are as yet wrresolved problems in relating
Islamic teaching to contemporary politics. Following Hashmi, we can distinguish three broad
situations that elicit different doctrinal responses and pose different ethical challenges for
Muslims.

A -When Muslims are Oppressed by Non-Muslims
There is the question of whether Muslims should intervene in other countries on behalf of
Muslims who are oppressed by non-Muslims, as in Palestine or Afghanistan during the Soviet
occupation and in the ongoing war in the name of terrorism or in Bosnia. In this case, the Qur'an
gives two solutions. First, oppressed Muslims should remove themselves physically from the
territory of the oppressors.(4:97) Second, the Muslim community should respond collectively in
defense of the oppressed.(4:75) The Qur'anic verse reads:
"And why should you not fight in the cause of God and of those who being weak are ill337

treated and oppressed: men, women and children whose cry: "Our Lord! rescue us from
this land whose people are oppressors. And raise for us by your grace one who will help."
(4:75)

In describing the oppressed community in both above cases the Qur' an uses the words

"mustad'afun." If the oppressed Muslims are able to relocate, it is better for them to do so, of
course by the assistance of the Muslim community. This first case of intervention on behalf of
Muslims being oppressed by non-Muslims is the most clear example of jihad cited by both the
early and modem scholars. In today's world this case has been used to legitimate anti-colonial
struggles and the Palestinian struggle against Israel. According to the Iranian scholar, Ayatollah
Mutahari, who defines jihad as "defensive war on behalf of oppressed Muslims:
"we may be in a situation whereby a party has not transgressed against us but has
committed injustice against a group from another people, who may not be Muslims. If
they are Muslims (as in today's plight of the Palestinians, who have been exiled from their
homes, whose wealth has been seized, who have been subjected to all kinds of
transgression) whereas for the moment the transgressor has no intentions against us, it is
permissible for us to give assistance to the oppressed Muslims and deliver them. This is
not only permissible, but obligatory because they are Muslims. Such action would not be a
case of commencing hostilities, but rather of rushing to the defense of the oppressed in
order to deliver them from the clutches of oppression." 20
A similar argument was addressed by leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as reasons for
denouncing the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement as Islarnically illegitimate. They accused
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President Anwar Sadat in crippling the ethics of jihad by withdrawing from a conflict in which
Muslims remained oppressed by non-Muslims. This argument has been supported by many
Muslim countries.
Other conflicts which have been supported as cases of jihad against foreign aggression are
the two wars in Afghanistan and the war in Bosnia. These wars have demonstrated large-scale
support by several Muslims in different ways. Muzaffar stated that "the degree and extent of
oppression suffered by the oppressed would have justified intervention in the eyes of Islam," and
the fact that most of the oppressed were Muslims was "an added reason, as it were, for
intervention."

21

In the case of Bosnia, Badawi claims that "a policy of firm military action

against the aggressor at the outset would have been accepted by almost all Muslims, " 22
On the other hand, although Muslim leaders were publicly in favor of forcible
humanitarian intervention, for political reasons their actions proved otherwise. King Hussein
threatened to pull Jordanian troops out of UNPROFOR if no military action was taken to stop
Serb attacks on Muslim enclaves in Bosnia? 3

8 - When Muslims are Oppressed by other Muslims
There is the question of whether Muslims should intervene forcibly when Muslims are
oppressed by other Muslims, as in the case with the Kurdish minority in Iraq. In the Sunni
Muslim tradition, this was treated as a special case of civil discord (jitna) between Muslims. In
the Shi'a tradition it was treated as part of jihad. Here the Qur'an provides:
"If two parties of the believers fall into a quarrel, make peace between them; but if one of
21
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them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight all of you together against
the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of God. But if it complies,
then make peace between them with justice, and be fair: For God loves those who are
fair." (49:9) 24
The interpretations of this verse appeared clearly in most of the Muslim discourse during the Gulf
war. According to this verse two steps have to be followed:
First, Muslims collectively seek reconciliation between the warring parties. This gives
Muslims a right to collectively engage in preventive intervention to resolve a dispute before
hostilities breakout.
Second, seek permission to launch a collective intervention on behalf of the aggrieved
party. The party to be collectively fought is the party that has resorted to unacceptable means to
achieve its ends. This was the justification cited by the Muslim countries of the US coalition in
the Gulf War for this verse. Iraq was the baghi (rebel) not because it had breached the sovereignty
of Kuwait, but because it had employed unacceptable means in resorting its dispute with
Kuwait. 25
The same reasoning could have been applied to justify collective Muslim intervention on
behalf of Iraqi minorities in the south and in the north. In the case of the Iraqi Kurdish and Shi 'i
situations against the Iraqi government, as required by the Qur'anic verse, the Muslim community
has the obligation to intervene against the party employing unacceptable means, which is the Iraqi
government. The atrocities visited upon these minorities, fall within the unacceptable means. It
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seems that Islam is again in favor of armed humanitarian intervention in these circumstances,
even though the aggressors are Muslims. However, no matter what the actions or inactions of
individuals, groups or governments, Islamic teaching recognizes a right and duty of forcible
intervention when Muslims are the oppressors as well as the victims of humanitarian abuse.

C -When Muslims Oppress Non-Muslims
Where Muslims oppress non-Muslims, as in Nigeria, Muslim states should be in the first
line in undertaking humanitarian intervention and conflict resolution within the Muslim world.
This is clearly demanded by Qur'anic ethical principles. 26 Badawi in his view agrees: the
international community supported by Muslim governments, should "without question" intervene,
even if the victim is non-Muslim and the oppressing government is Muslim "the prophet (PBUH)
he explains that "your brother right or wrong," which means that if your brother is in the right you
support him, but if he is in the wrong you prevent him from doing the wrong because to prevent
what is morally wrong is to support the right." 27 This receives wide agreement in the Qur'an:
"Oh, you who believe! Stand out firmly as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your
parents, or your kin, and whether it be against rich or poor."(4: 135)

0- When Muslims Ally with Non-Muslims against Muslims

The question facing us now is about the legitimacy of an alliance between Muslims and
non-Muslims in undertaking humanitarian intervention. In other words, can Muslim states ally
themselves with non-Muslim powers to fight another Muslim state that may be committing
26
27
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massive human rights violations against its own people? Of course Muslim states should
undertake humanitarian intervention and conflict resolution within the Muslim world. This is
demanded by the Qur'anic principles. Also, nothing in international law would prevent Muslim
states organized in an international body from enforcing principles of collective security and
humanitarian intervention. This is compatible with Article 33 and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter
that urges regional organizations to maintain international peace and security.
The Gulf War demonstrated the strong need for an effective collective Islamic body to
resolve intra-Muslim disputes. The inability of the Islamic Organization made Western
intervention in the dispute easy and necessary.
According to Ayatollah Mutahari in Iran, "no one should have any doubts that the most
sacred form of jihad and war is that which is fought in defense of humanity and of human rights,"
ifnon-Muslims join this jihad, then their action is also sacred. Indeed, citing the example of some
Europeans who fought on the side of the Muslim Algerians against French colonial oppression,
Mutahari says "the jihad of such people was even more sacred than that of the Algerians because
the Algerians were defending the cause of their own rights, whereas the cause of the other was
more ethical and sacred." 28

4-Problems and
Muslim World

Prospects

for

Humanitarian

Intervention

in

the

If we move from the theory to the practice of humanitarian intervention in the
contemporary Muslim world, the situation is frustrating at best. The issue faces all the problems
28
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of implementation that it encounters elsewhere in our current international system: first, the lack
of any clear commonly supported conception of humanitarian crises requiring quick collective
intervention; second, the lack of any dependable institutional mechanism for implementing
international resolutions on collective intervention.
In the Muslim world, the existence of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was

established in 1972 on the rhetoric of universal Islamic ethics yet has been mired ever since in the
reality of the politics of its charter, involving forty seven disparate and often mutually hostile
states. The objective for the establishment of the OIC was the Israeli occupation of Palestine
territory in 1967. Its charter especially acknowledges the centrality of the Palestinian-Israeli
dispute in its objectives "to coordinate efforts for the safeguard of the Holy Places and support of
the people of Palestine, and help them to regain their rights and liberate their land." The charter
went further to include support "of all Muslim peoples with a view to safeguarding their dignity,
independence and national rights. "29 However, the charter remains passive on mechanisms
whereby how these goals can be achieved. So there is no attempt to establish any collective
mechanisms for the protecting and safeguarding of the human rights of Muslim peoples.
Not surprisingly, the record of the OIC in responding to international crises has been
disdained to date. In 1971-72 it failed to respond to the Pakistani atrocities in Bangladesh;
throughout the eight year Iran-Iraq war its peace initiatives were repeatedly rejected by Khomeini,
who criticized the organization's failure to condemn Iraq's aggression; during the Afghan-Soviet
war it was effectively paralyzed; and in the second Gulf War, it took no concerted action to
intervene in Iraq to combat the baghi (aggressor according to the Qur'an) 30 ; and finally, during
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the war against Taliban Muslim regime, the OIC was completely paralyzed.
Indeed, the August 1991 Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Turkey essentially
disclaimed the OIC members of any responsibility for the misery inflicted on the Iraqi people and
put it on the Iraqi regime. Despite OIC's persistent, the Organization was clearly silent regarding
Israeli violations of Palestinian rights and also was clearly silent on the gross abuses of human
rights that Palestinians and others have faced in the aftermath of the Gulf War.
Similarly, in the unfolding tragedy of Bosnia, the OIC's role has primarily been one of
verbal declarations from the sidelines. The meeting of foreign ministers on June 1992 in Turkey
offered nothing more that calls for the strengthening of UN economic sanctions against Serbia.
There was, indeed, much hinting prior to and during the conference of collective Muslim
intervention, either unilaterally or through the UN, in order to check the Yugoslav army's military
assistance to local Serbian militants.

In the cause of mounting domestic outrage of Serbian atrocities in Bosnia, the OIC states
initiated measures in early November to exempt Bosnia from the UN arms embargo against
Yugoslavia in effect since September 1991. 31 This request was formally incorporated into a
resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers Conference in Saudi Arabia on December 1-2, 1992.
The resolution demanded UN enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnian territory and for
immediate measures "against Serbia and Montenegro including the use of force prescribed under
Article 42 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter."
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measures against Serbian aggression. 33 However, other than limited arms assistance by individual
ore states and support for limited UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, the Ole member states
have not undertaken any collective intervention.
At the opening meeting of the senior officials of the 57th Organization of Islamic
Conference in Malaysia on October 13, 2003, and in responding to the ongoing US occupation of
Iraq, the ore called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq, allowing the United Nations
to administer Iraqi affairs, which was prelude to the restoration of Iraq's independence, and to the
rebuilding of what has been destroyed over the past 20 years. 34
In short, as it is presently constituted, the ore cannot be expected to play any decisive role

in applying the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in Muslim countries even if a consensus
could be developed and existed among the ruling elites that such a right exists. However, the OIC
like the UN itself cannot long remain immune from the current forces of change that are sweeping
the international arena. The humanitarian crises in different parts of the world, including the
Muslim world, have created have a popular voice permitting and demanding a doctrine of
humanitarian intervention. In fact, in all crises up to today, the Ole states have been moved to
take action by strong internal pressures.
So what should the Ole do to be an effective international body? First, The ore as a
regional organization could potentially play an important supportive role in humanitarian efforts
of the UN. With strong motives and leadership being provided by the Security Council, the OIC
in collaboration with other regional organizations could be encouraged to develop within the UN
system a series of guidelines establishing the conditions that would trigger collective intervention.
33
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Such regional organizations are better suited to maintaining standing peacekeeping forces that are
able to rapidly intervene, not only after the fact, as at present, but prior to the outbreak of
hostilities. Such a proposal would also better meet the needs of most humanitarian crises for
regional organizations, and not ad hoc UN peacekeeping forces, are much better suited to
providing the long term presence in a crisis situation necessary for any meaningful conflict
resolution.
In the long term, the OIC needs to defme with much greater clarity its own place and the
place of Islamic thoughts in the international system. One essential first step toward this goal
would be the convening of the International Islamic Law Commission and for a truly open and
systematic discussion of the place of Islamic theory in the contemporary international system.
This could play an appreciable role in undertaking humanitarian intervention and preserving
international peace and security as well. As the world community evolves toward a more
universalist ethics based on the rejection of traditional concepts of state sovereignty, the OIC and
Muslim peoples generally are uniquely positioned by virtue of the Qur' an's universalist ethics to
contribute to a new international society.
In sum, traditional Islamic legal and ethical teaching on the question of humanitarian
intervention has been rendered more relevant by a transformation in the terms of the humanitarian
intervention debate since the end of the Cold War. This transformation is reflected in much of the
contemporary thinking on the issue within the Muslim community. After the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, Islam entered a long period of political decline from which it has begun to
recover.
On the issue of humanitarian intervention in response to the denial and gross violations of human

rights, Islam recognizes universal ethical and legal norms that condemn such abuse. Islam also
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acknowledges human solidarity across interstate borders where the government refused to
safeguard the rights and needs of its citizens and where the government has collapsed. Islam
recognizes a common duty and right of action on the part of other governments in such cases, this
includes the right to intervene forcibly if there is no other remedy available.
This doctrine of humanitarian intervention is part of an Islamic jihad tradition. As we have
already seen in this study that defensive jihad in its original Qur'anic wording did not only apply
to the protection of Muslims, but to the protection of the oppressed in general.
Finally, violation of humanitarian doctrine in the name of Islam by some radical Islamists
or extremists is strongly condemnable. As to the objection that Muslims are in favor of the
defense of threatened coreligionists while ignoring if not condemning their own oppression of
others, this was deemed to be a common response to humanitarian abuse. There are accusations of
double standards. Nevertheless, the Islamic teaching should condemn humanitarian abuse
wherever it occurs and whoever perpetrates it. And if the government of a Muslim country fails to
respond, then it should be castigated immediately.

5-Conclusion
This conjunction of prestatist Christian natural law doctrine and traditional Islamic legal and
ethical teaching on the question of humanitarian intervention has been rendered more relevant by
a transformation in the terms of the humanitarian intervention debate since the end of the Cold
War. This study suggests that this transformation is reflected in much of the contemporary
thinking on the issue within both faith communities. Despite different starting points and quite
different traditions of exegesis from founding texts, both religions came to engage with similar
problems and grapple with similar difficulties from quite an early period, including the
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formulation of what John Kelsay calls the shared notion of "war as a rule-governed activity. "339
More recently, historical experience diverged again. With the eclipse and eventual collapse ofthe
Ottoman Empire, Islam entered a long period of political decline from which it has only recently
begun to recover. The Christian West, on the other hand, entered a period of unprecedented global
expansion, which is only now beginning to be challenged. At the same time, unlike Islam,
Christianity lost its dominant position within an increasingly secularized Western culture,
introducing what perhaps remains the greatest single discontinuity between Islam and Christianity
today. Nevertheless, despite these differences, a common ancestry, which includes a rich Hebrew
and Greco-Roman inheritance, still provides substance for a shared response to common
problems.
On the issue of intervention in response to actual or threatened mass denial of human
rights, this study suggests that both religions recognize universal ethical or legal norms that
absolutely condemn such abuse or dereliction of the primary duty of governments to safeguard
the rights and needs of their citizens; both religions acknowledge human solidarity across
interstate borders where such abuse or dereliction takes place, including situations in which the
government has collapsed; both recognize a common duty and the right of action on the part of
other governments in such cases; and both consider this to include a duty as well as a right to
intervene forcibly if there is no other remedy and if other conditions are satisfied.
This shared doctrine of humanitarian intervention is part of a wider conjunction of the
Christian just war and Islamic jihad traditions. 340 One of the most important conclusions in the
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wider study of which the research for this study was a part was that "defensive" jihad in its
original Qur'anic formulation did not just apply to the protection of Muslims, but to the protection
of the vulnerable in general. This, as has been seen, is consonant with interpretations of Christian
just war doctrine that includes defense of the innocent as one of the legitimate justifications for
the use of force by properly constituted authorities. 341
To sum up, there seems to be general agreement from both Muslim and Christian
traditions in condemning humanitarian abuse wherever it occurs and whoever is the perpetrator.
And if the governments of Muslim or Christian countries fall short in response, then they should
be criticized accordingly.

Tradition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990); Kelsay and Johnson, eds; Just War and Jihad; David Smock,
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(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992); Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative
Ethics (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993); Harifiyah Haleem, Oliver Ramsbotham, Saba Risaluddin,
and Brian Wicker, eds; The Crescent and the Cross: Muslim and Christian Approaches to war Peace (London:
Macmillan, forthcoming).
341
See Haleem et al; The Crescent and the cross, cbs. 3-4.

349

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

In this study I have tried to establish a legal basis for armed humanitarian intervention

through an examination of the evolution of the doctrine and its practice. The introduction briefly
mapped out the purviews of the study. Chapter one offered a "working definition" of
humanitarian intervention in the sense that the definition itself establishes the criteria of legality
or illegality. I preferred to adopt an approach which addressed humanitarian intervention as a
specific problem, whether and under which conditions it is permitted under international law to
intervene or threaten to intervene.
Chapter two outlined the traditional development of the doctrine and state practice of
humanitarian intervention before World War II. Various interventions during this era indicate
some level of acceptance, as a matter of international law, of the right to intervene for the
protection of human rights. These interventions reveal the difficulties in assessing the motivations
of the intervening state or states and the tendency of states to seek other justifications for their
conduct. The best that may be said of this practice is that a concept of humanitarian intervention
was present before World War II state practice, but its application was sporadic and uneven.
Chapter three examined the evolution and strength of humanitarian intervention under the
UN Charter during the Cold War era. It also examined the norms of state sovereignty, nonintervention in internal affairs, the international protection of human rights, and the UN Charter's
effect on humanitarian intervention. It argued that the customary international law right of
humanitarian intervention has survived the UN Charter. It also showed that humanitarian
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intervention coexisted with state sovereignty and that the meaning and interpretation of state
sovereignty is consistent with intervention to protect human rights. This chapter demonstrated that
a norm of justified intervention to protect human rights can be found in international law,
scholars' writings and state practice. Furthermore, state practice relating to humanitarian
intervention was discussed. It concluded that the extent of support or condemnation varied in each
case depending on its impact on the wider geopolitical relationship between the superpowers, thus
resulting in the doctrine not enjoying wide support in some cases. Nevertheless, the silent
acquiesce~ce

on the part of the majority of states and the UN, arguably, indicated

acknowledgement of humanitarian intervention in this period under consideration. In this chapter
I have argued that the use of force on humanitarian grounds is legitimate because it is directed
neither against the territorial integrity nor the political independence of a target state and,
however, is in harmony with the most fundamental provisions of the UN Charter.
Chapter four investigated incidents of intervention during the Cold War era. During this
era (1945-1989), the UN was unable to act collectively most of the time to end human rights
violations because the Soviet Union and the United States vetoed or threatened to veto resolutions
in the Security Council. In most cases discussed in this chapter I showed that intervention was
conducted unilaterally and based on one or more reasons, such as self-defense, invitation, consent,
rescue of nationals abroad, and on humanitarian reasons. Then, we can say that in this era,
humanitarian intervention was limited and incidental.
Chapter five covered the practice of humanitarian intervention after the Cold War period,
and the challenges and debates surrounding such intervention in their legal, practical and moral
dimensions in the cases of Liberia, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo
and East Timor. It suggested that the cases show the emergence of a wider support in the
351

international community for humanitarian intervention. The practice of the Security Council after
the Cold War era shows that the authority of the Security Council to authorize the use of force
under Chapter VII is not limited to cases of military aggression or military threats to international
peace and security. To intervene by armed force in a human emergency within a member state,
whether or not there are external effects, can be brought within the scope of Chapter VII, if the
circumstances are such as in Somalia and if the government structure in the member state has
collapsed. If there are transboundary effects of a human emergency, such as a large exodus of
refugees, or other external aspects which threaten international peace and security and are
determined as such under Article 39 by the Security Council, the case for applying forceful
collective measures would seem even stronger.
In this chapter I also examined the two fresh cases of intervention, which are Kosovo and

East Timor. The situation in Kosovo was regarded as being a very grave situation, so serious in
fact that the Security Council adopted a resolution saying that it constituted a threat to
international peace and security. The tragedy of East Timor, coming soon after that of Kosovo,
has focused once again attention on the need for timely intervention by the international
community when death and suffering are being inflicted on large numbers of people, and when
the state nominally in charge is unable or unwilling to stop it. Through the examination of the
Kosovo case, I recognized that the NATO action violated the UN Charter by using force without a
mandate from the Security Council. The action of NATO also risked destabilizing the
fundamental international rule of law that prohibits a state or group of states intervening by the
use of armed force in another state (Art. 2(4)), absent authorization by the Security Council
(Art.42) or a situation of self-defense (Art.Sl). Even though, to many observers NATO's war in
Kosovo marks a dramatic shift in the contours of international relations that is likely to have far352

reaching ramifications for years to come. 1 In Kosovo NATO intervened without seeking authority
from the UN Secretary Council. In Timor the Council determined that the situation was a threat to
peace and security, and accordingly, has authorized intervention, but only after obtaining an
invitation from Indonesia. What we have learned from these two fresh cases of intervention is that
the world can not stand aside when gross and systematic violations of human rights are taking
place. We have also learned that, if it is to enjoy the sustained support of the world's peoples,
intervention must be based on the authorization of the Security Council.
Chapter six made an assessment of the humanitarian intervention during the post-Cold
War. The developments in this era regarding intervention to protect human rights suggest a
gradual shift in attitudes and challenges to state sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention.
This is, however, not to suggest that state sovereignty and non-intervention are no longer
important norms in international relations. They still are. After a comprehensive assessment of the
humanitarian intervention during the post-Cold War era, this study concludes that instead of the
view that interventions in internal conflicts must be presumptively illegitimate, the prevailing
trend today is to take seriously the claim that the international community ought to intercede to
prevent bloodshed with whatever means are available. Arguments now focus not on condemning
or justifying intervention in principle, but rather on how best to solve practical problems of
mobilizing collective efforts to ease internal violence.
Even though humanitarian intervention should be left to practice on a case by case basis,
in this chapter the study suggested six criteria for the use of force for humanitarian intervention.
These criteria are: (1) threat to lives and large-scale atrocities; (2) necessity; (3) exhaustion of
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peaceful measures; (4) preference for collective measure; (5) humanitarian objectives; (6)
proportionality. The purpose of these criteria is to limit the use of humanitarian intervention to the
cases in which no alternative is available and to limit the effects on the target state and the risks of
abuse. History shows that the lack of clear criteria will allow abuse.
This chapter also dealt with the problem of abuse which means that the intervening state
abuses when it does not aim its action at stopping human rights violations. Most legal scholars
who are opposed to humanitarian intervention argue that governments always or almost always,
abuse when they intervene abroad, even if they say they are intervening on humanitarian grounds,
and even if the actual result of the intervention is to redress human rights violations. This
argument is not sufficient to reject humanitarian intervention because even lawful and welljustified rules can be abused and the potential for abuse is common to all legal policy, doctrine or
rule.
Chapter seven briefly discussed Islamic and Christian concepts of humanitarian
intervention, and concluded that what has been established so far is support in principle for a
doctrine of humanitarian intervention as part of the jihad and just war traditions, but only under
certain circumstances. The further requirement, therefore, is to specify what those circumstances
are- a task that involves reconciling just war and jihad criteria. 342 One of the most important
conclusions is that the defensive jihad in its original Qur' anic formulation did not just apply to the
protection of Muslims, but to the protection of the oppressed in general.
In conclusion, a notable shift seems to be underway. The principle has been invoked by
the UN and regional organizations, by national governments, non-governmental organizations and
342
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international scholars. Looking at the reality, humanitarian intervention has gained wide support
in the international community. Also what we are witnessing is that the world today is moving
towards consensus and enhancement of humanitarian intervention legitimacy.
Finally, what we concluded from this study is that intervention in support of human rights
is grounded in the premise that it is the interests of humanity at large that are at stake, and not the
interests of any particular state or states. From a legal angle, the international recognition of
human rights tends to hold governments responsible for gross and systematic violations. Most
governments that engage in violations of human rights tend to use national sovereignty and nonintervention as a barricade to protect them from international scrutiny. Traditional notions of
sovereignty, however, are beginning to give way to a growing international awareness grounded
in international law, and under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that states cannot ignore the
consequences of internal conflicts and the attendant human rights violations that displace entire
societies. State sovereignty means adherence to certain domestic practices including protection of
the human rights of citizens; thus obstacles that the concept has raised cannot, and should not, be
used as a bar to international intervention in issues that are deemed international. Sovereignty
cannot mean that whatever happens within your borders and whatever you do to your citizens, the
world will not get involved. I see sovereignty as a principle of responsibility to put your house in
order, to take care of your people, to assist them and protect them and, if you need international
cooperation, to call on the international community, or at least to welcome their initiative to help
your people. I believe that the cause of human rights and humanitarian intervention is progressive,
is incremental and that those who are trying to halt the march of humanitarian progress will be
seen historically in a negative light. Sovereignty has always been limited by human rights issue.
This is not something new. What we are witnessing in the post-Cold War era is an enhancement
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and improvement of what has already been unfolding.
Recent experience suggests the growth of authoritative claims to act in defense of human
rights. While the character of the UN's role has sometimes been ambiguous, and has been subject
to castigation, the cases demonstrate an emerging international support for humanitarian
intervention legitimacy. The enormous number Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq,
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Liberia established the linkage between human rights
violations and threats to, or breaches of international peace and security. It is equally plausible to
argue that, even if such a link is not invoked, humanitarian intervention is still permissible or
justifiable. In spite of problems that have confronted the UN, it has established protection forces
to watch over the security of minority enclaves. It has also considered different means of securing
the supply of humanitarian assistance to populations in crises as a result of internal conflicts.
These developments constitute notable precedents for future international practice.
Even though post-Cold War practice reveals the UN is prepared to implement a broader
conception of humanitarian intervention, there is a realization at the same time that some of the
problems confronted do not lend themselves to simple solutions. As Weiss points out, "Security
Council resolutions have not always matched the means to well-considered ends and objectives.
Thus, a lack of commitment and resources has plagued some of the interventionary projects of
this era. The result has been that UN humanitarian operations have suffered from operational and
institutional shortcomings, and have not been translated into effective performance with any
consistency, thus evoking mixed reactions. " 2
The post-Cold War international order is still unfolding with its uncertainties. With the
relaxation of East-West tensions and the demise of repressive regimes in many parts of the world,
2
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expressions of domestic tensions and grievances have come to the fore. Given this state of affairs,
it is likely that internal conflicts will increasingly challenge what one analyst characterizes as "the
ingenuity and resourcefulness of the international community. " 3 If this is the case, then as Sadako
Ogata points, "the time has come for a major dialogue on the hard choices that will have to be
made in the face of finite humanitarian resources and almost infinite humanitarian demands. "4
Pressure on the UN to engage in more humanitarian operations if this scenario unfolds will mean
the assignment of priorities in light of limited capabilities to intervene effectively. As Weiss
suggests, it would seem to be the case for now that "confronted with increasing chaos and a
seemingly endless number of humanitarian emergencies, the choices are better prevention, better
intervention or triage. " 5
If the UN is to become more effective in the future regarding humanitarian intervention,
then it must learn from its mistakes. I am in line with those who suggest that there exists a
necessity of establishing a comprehensive framework of general principles to guide the UN in
deciding when a domestic human rights situation or internal conflict deserves actions by the
Security Council, regional organization or a collectivity of states. 6 If future humanitarian
interventions are to be successfully developed, then they must be collectively undertaken by the
international community as a whole. Epistemic communities may play a key role in this regard.
3
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The opportunity for developing a general framework towards successful humanitarian
intervention has presented itself. How to improve collective responses still constitutes unfinished
work of the international community. The UN, however, remains the only meaningful
organization in the world that can legitimately act for the betterment of mankind as a whole. In
the world as it is today, with still-defective UN machinery when it comes to preventing or
stopping acts of genocide or comparable atrocities against human beings, sincere humanitarian
intervention, for the time being, seems to be the only way to prevent or eliminate situations in
which too many people are left at the mercy of subjugation, despotism and cruelty.
An independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)

set up by the Canadian government would be a very good contribution to this subject matter. This
Commission is made up of foreign ministers, academics and representatives from NGOs to study
ways and means for humanitarian intervention and to promote a comprehensive debate on the
issues surrounding the problem of intervention and state sovereignty, and to contribute to building
a broader understanding of those issues. The mission of this Commission is also to study the
history of intervention, why and how it is conducted, questions about national laws, trade-offs
between the UN and its members, and how countries respond to intervention and the concept of
national sovereignty. 7 I hope this Commission will come up with criteria under which
humanitarian intervention can be conducted to prevent gross human rights violations. That is the
task of the future.
In the end, let me just be optimistic and dream that by the end of the 21st century the abuse of
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people within a state's borders wilJ be a historical phenomenon. ##
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